State v. Van Treese

• Decision Date: 11 November 1924
• Docket Number: 36292
• Citation: 200 N.W. 570,198 Iowa 984
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. COLUMBUS VAN TREESE, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

200 N.W. 570

198 Iowa 984

STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. COLUMBUS VAN TREESE, Appellant

No. 36292

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

November 11, 1924

Appeal from Poweshiek District Court.--D. W. HAMILTON, Judge.

THE defendant was indicted for the crime of receiving stolen property, knowing the same to have been stolen, and with intent to conceal same. There was a verdict of guilty and a judgment thereon. The defendant has appealed.

Affirmed.

J. H Patton, for appellant.

Ben J Gibson, Attorney-general, Maxwell A. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney-general, and R. W. Boyd, County Attorney, for appellee.

EVANS J. ARTHUR, C. J., and PRESTON and FAVILLE, JJ., concur.

OPINION

EVANS, J.

The property involved in the larceny charged in the indictment consisted of four $ 100 bills and twelve $ 50 bills, amounting to a total of $ 1,000. The larceny had been committed by one Bryan Dale, post-office clerk. The money in question was contained in an envelope, and was addressed to one of the banks of Grinnell. The larceny was committed at the Grinnell post office, when Dale was an employee therein. Sometime thereafter, Dale delivered the currency to the defendant herein, under an arrangement whereby the defendant was to receive the sum of $ 200 for putting the money into circulation and obtaining smaller bills therefor. Sometime later, the defendant delivered the same currency to one Gooch, jointly indicted with him, under an arrangement that, if Gooch should reduce the currency to smaller bills, he should receive from this defendant $ 100. Neither party ever put the money into circulation. After a lapse of some months, official suspicion was directed to Gooch, and he was arrested. Shortly thereafter, the defendant herein was also arrested, and likewise Dale. Dale was indicted for larceny, and pleaded guilty thereto.

I. One of the principal grounds of reversal urged is that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction. Particular stress is laid upon the alleged lack of evidence that the defendant knew that the money was stolen. As witness, he denied his knowledge thereof. Dale was witness for the State, and testified that he had not at any time disclosed to this defendant the fact that he had stolen the money. It is urged, therefore, that the evidence in behalf of the State fails to prove knowledge. That knowledge was not proved by direct evidence may be conceded. It was not requisite upon the State to produce direct evidence of such fact. It was permissible to it to prove the same by circumstantial evidence. Indeed, such is the usual method of such proof. It appears from the testimony of the defendant himself that, during the entire time he held the money, he did so in constant fear, and that he was afraid to present the larger bills to anyone for the purpose of getting smaller bills in exchange. His explanation of this is that he suspected that the bills were counterfeit, but had not suspected that they had been stolen. The circumstance thus admitted, however, was a very significant one, and permitted damaging inference by the jury. The jury was not bound to accept the defendant's explanation of the circumstance. Other circumstances quite as damaging appear in the record, and we deem the evidence abundant to sustain the conviction, with little room therein for reasonable doubt.

II. Complaint is made of Instruction No. 10, given by the court. This instruction was as follows:

"If you are satisfied, after you have considered all of the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, at the time the defendant received the currency or bills in question from Bryan Dale, that he believed that the said currency or bills had been stolen, and that he received them with intent to aid the said Bryan Dale in the concealment thereof and of depriving the owner thereof, then he would be guilty of the crime charged in the indictment. And this is true, even though he was not told that it was stolen property. Provided you have also found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bryan Dale had stolen said currency or bills, as explained to you in these instructions."

The specific complaint is that the court erred in permitting the jury to find the defendant guilty if he believed, when he received the currency, that it had been stolen. The contention is that it was incumbent upon the State to prove that the defendant knew that it had been stolen, and that it was not sufficient to show that he believed it had been stolen. The point is not well taken. It was not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant ...