State v. Vannah

• Decision Date: 10 October 1914
• Citation: 91 A. 985,112 Me. 248
• Parties: STATE v. VANNAH.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

91 A. 985

112 Me. 248

STATE

v. VANNAH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 10, 1914.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Kennebec County, at Law.

Frances A. Vannah, alias Frank Vannah, was convicted of murder, and he brings exceptions. Overruled.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, BIRD, HALEY, HANSON, and PHILBROOK, JJ.

Scott Wilson, Atty. Gen., and W. H. Fisher, Co. Atty., of Augusta, for the State. B. F. Maher, of Augusta, for defendant.

HANSON, J. This case is before the court on exceptions to the order of the justice of the superior court for the county of Kennebec, overruling four motions filed at the January term of that court, 1914. The respondent was indicted for the murder of one Edward E. Hardy, at the April term of that court, 1913, and at the September term, on his own motion, was committed to the State Hospital for observation. He was tried at the January term, 1914, and was found guilty of murder.

The motions in their order were: (1) To continue to the Supreme Judicial Court. (2) To continue to a later term of the superior court, when a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court may preside. (3) Refusing to plead. (4) In arrest of judgment. The reasons stated in the several motions are the same. The first motion is as follows:

"And now comes the respondent and moves: First. That the superior court is without jurisdiction of the offense alleged in the indictment.

"Second. And the respondent further moves that said superior court is without jurisdiction in offenses such as charged in the aforesaid indictment because the allegerl offense was committed on the 20th day of March, A. D. 1913, and said act, attempting to confer jurisdiction upon the aforesaid court, was passed on the 7th day of April, A. D. 1913, and took effect July 1, 1913, and was accordingly, in its attempt to reach the aforesaid case at bar, retroactive legislation and ex post facto in its nature.

"Third. And the respondent further moves that said superior court is without jurisdiction of the offense charged in this indictment, because chapter 220 of the Public Laws of 1913, wherein jurisdiction was sought to be conferred upon said court in section 4 of said act, by its terms would make reply to this particular case, and was in effect the creation of a court to try a particular case.

"Fourth. And the respondent further moves that he was deprived of one of his constitutional rights to seek and obtain change of venue for cause sought, which cause he says exists because of the silence of the act, wherein jurisdiction for offenses, such as is charged in this indictment, is sought to be conferred upon said superior court.

"Fifth. And the respondent further moves, because by virtue of the statute in such case made and provided, in offenses such as charged in this indictment, one of the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court to be designated by the Chief Justice thereof shall preside, which designation has not been made and no such justice presiding, this court is without jurisdiction to proceed in the absence of such designation, in conformity with the statute.

"Wherefore, and because of the aforesaid reasons now before the impaneling of a jury, the respondent moves that the said cause be continued to the next term of the Supreme Judicial Court to be held within and for said county having jurisdiction of the offense alleged."

Counsel for the respondent argues: (1) That it has never been the policy of the state to allow a court of limited and inferior jurisdiction to determine the rights of a man charged with murder. (2) That the respondent was denied the constitutional right to a change of venue; that, if such change were sought and ordered, he would then receive only what the law insures, the right to a trial before a justice of this court (3) That he is entitled thereto, because "the law of April 11, 1913, attempted to repeal section 2 of chapter 132, R. S., which gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction, * * * must relate back to the time of the shooting, namely, March 20, 1913"; that therefore the amendment in question was not in force on that day; and that, as to his client, such amendment was entirely inoperative in any event until after the expiration of 90 days from the date of its approval. (4) While supporting his exceptions as stated in the foregoing, counsel concludes his brief with this statement:

"We do not undertake to argue upon the unconstitutionality of the law on this question.

"Our contention is not whether the law is ex post facto, but we claim that the attempt of the state to control the situation as it was March 20, 1913, was futile, and, under the 90 days' provision, of no force or effect. In other words, we say it was not an ex post facto law of which we complain, but 'no law' which could take effect until long after the shooting took place on that fateful day of March 20th near the reservation at Togus, Me.

"And concerning the fifth section of page 12 of the printed case, wherein it is set forth that the respondent declined to plead in the superior court, while a ruling of the superior court may be open to exceptions, we think comment unnecessary and depend more fully upon the attempt of the prosecution to keep the case away from a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court in the manner hereinbefore stated."

As to the first objection raised by the respondent's counsel, it is sufficient to say that, when the superior court for Kennebec county was established in 1878 (Laws 1878-80, e. 10), it had full jurisdiction in criminal cases. At the same session, the act creating that court was amended as follows:

"Sec. 19. When any indictment is found for any of the offences described in sections one and two of chapter 117 of the Revised Statutes, sections two, three, four, five, six, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fifteen, twenty-five and twenty-seven of chapter 118 of the Revised Statutes, sections one, two and three of chapter 119 of the Revised Statutes, the clerk of said superior court shall certify and transmit the indictment to the Supreme Judicial Court for said county, at the next term, when it shall be entered. The Supreme Judicial Court shall have cognizance and jurisdiction thereof, and proceedings shall be had thereon in the same manner as if the indictment had been found in that court." (Laws 1878-80, c. 48.)

Full jurisdiction was restored in 1881, and so continued until 1891, when the provision relating to the trial of murder cases was again changed, providing that a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court be designated to preside at such trials. In 1899, the provision requiring indictments to be certified to this court was restored, and remained in force until 1913, when the section providing for certifying and transmitting indictments to this court was repealed, and section 90, c. 79, R. S., was amended by chapter 220, § 3, and as amended reads as follows:

"Laws of 1913, chap. 220, sec. 3. The original and appellate jurisdiction in all criminal matters in said counties of Cumberland and Kennebec, and all powers incident thereto, originally exercised by the Supreme Judicial Court, but heretofore conferred upon and exercised by said superior courts, are continued."

The following section was added, and the principal contention in this case arises thereunder:

"Sec. 4. Any indictment for murder returned by the grand jury in said superior court at the April term thereof, in the year nineteen hundred and thirteen, shall be in order for trial at the next September term of said court, which shall have jurisdiction of all matters pertaining thereto."

It is urged in the motion that this provision, "in its attempt to reach the case at bar, is retroactive legislation and ex post facto...