State v. Donnell

• Decision Date: 16 January 1928
• Citation: 140 A. 186
• Parties: STATE v. DONNELL et al. SAME v. DONNELL.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

140 A. 186

STATE

v. DONNELL et al.

SAME

v. DONNELL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 16, 1928.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Androscoggin County, at Law.

Charles K. Donnell was indicted for manslaughter, and Charles K. Donnell and another were indicted for conspiracy. A change of venue was granted in each case, and defendants bring exceptions. Exceptions sustained.

Argued before WILSON, C. J., and PHILBROOK, DUNN, BARNES, BASSETT, PATTANGALL, JJ.

Fred H. Lancaster, Co. Atty., and H. E. Belleau, both of Lewiston, for the State.

Louis J. Brann, Frank T. Powers, and Clifford & Clifford, all of Lewiston, for respondents.

PATTANGALL, J. On exceptions. These cases may be considered together. The same questions arise in both. The same considerations govern both decisions.

At the June term (1927) of the superior court of Androscoggin county, indictments were returned against these respondents; one against Donnell, charging him with manslaughter, another charging him, together with the respondent Osgood, with conspiracy. Both respondents were arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and the cases were continued. At the October term, the state presented motions for a change of venue in both cases. The presiding justice ordered the cases transferred to the docket of the superior court of the county of Cumberland. Respondents excepted to the decrees of the court in this respect, challenging its authority to so order, and the plain issue thus joined is before us.

The superior court of Androscoggin county was created by chapter 260, P. L. 1917.

Section 1 of the act provides that:

"A superior court is hereby established at Auburn, within and for the county of Androscoggin, consisting of one justice, who shall be an inhabitant of said county."

Section 2 provides that:

"Said justice shall establish a seal for said court."

Section 4 provides that:

"The original and appellate jurisdiction in all criminal matters now vested in, and exercised by the Supreme Judicial Court within and for the County of Androscoggin, and all powers incident thereto, shall be transferred to and conferred upon the superior court within and for said county, which court shall exercise the same in the same manner as heretofore authorized by law to be exercised by the Supreme Judicial Court in said county."

Nowhere in the act is any express authority siren to transfer either civil or criminal cases from its docket to that of any other court. If such authority exists, it must be found in the inherent powers of the court, or be implied from the language of section 4.

By the great weight of authority, and notwithstanding the dictum of State v. Vannah, 112 Me. 252, 91 A. 985, the Supreme Judicial Court of this state had authority, at common law, to transfer cases from one county to another, when it was necessary to do so, in order to procure an impartial trial. Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N. E. 369, 21 Ann. Cas. 1061; Cocheco R. R. v. Farrington, 26 N. H. 428; State v. Albee, 61 N. H. 423, 60 Am. Rep. 325; Hewitt v. State, 43 Fla. 194, 30 So. 795; Cooke v. Cooke, 41 Md. 362; Bell v. Niewahner, 54 App. Div. 530, 66 N. Y. S. 1096; Shotwell v. Dixon, 66 App. Div. 123, 72 N. Y. S. 668.

But this is only true of courts of general jurisdiction whose authority equals in scope that of the courts of king's bench in England. It is not true of courts of limited jurisdiction. It was not true of our early courts of common pleas, established by chapter 11, Mass. St. 1782. Lincoln County v. Prince, 2 Mass. 544; Cleveland v. Welsh, 4 Mass. 591; Hawkes v. Kennebeck, 7 Mass. 461.

The superior courts in our state should not be confused with the superior courts of our neighboring New England states. Courts of Massachusetts, sd entitled, possess, by statutory enactment, all of the powers of courts of the king's bench as well as those formerly exercised by the courts of common pleas.

Our superior courts are county courts. Each was created independently of the others. They have no common seal. The presiding justice of each must be an inhabitant of the county in which he acts. Each has its own docket They are in no way connected with, and in no sense dependent upon, each other. The common law confers upon such courts no power to transfer cases one to the other.

Nor do the provisions of section 4, chapter 260, P. L. 1917, supply the needed authority. That section, in general terms, granted to the superior court of Androscoggin county full jurisdiction in criminal cases in that county, and, in order to carry on its work properly in that respect conferred upon it all of the powers incident to that jurisdiction then possessed by the Supreme Judicial Court, to be exercised as heretofore exercised by the latter cou...