State v. Vargas
| Decision Date | 08 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | A-1471-19 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MIGUEL A. VARGAS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Argued March 1, 2023
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Atlantic County, Indictment No. 16-06-1543.
Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney Frank M. Gennaro, on the brief).
Linda A. Shashoua, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (William Reynolds, Atlantic County Prosecutor attorney; Alyssa M. Gilroy, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges Haas and Mitterhoff.
Following a multi-day trial, the jury convicted defendant Miguel A Vargas of three counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of three of the children in his care, I.D., G.V., and L.V.,[1] by abusing and neglecting them over a years-long period of time in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2). The jury also convicted defendant of fourth-degree obstructing a criminal investigation in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). The jury was unable to return a verdict on four counts associated with defendant's alleged abuse of another child, J.D., and the trial court dismissed those charges at the time of sentencing.[2] The court sentenced defendant to consecutive eight-year prison terms on each of the endangering charges, and to a concurrent one-year term on the obstruction charge. Therefore, the court imposed an aggregate twenty-four-year sentence.
On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:
We find insufficient merit in these contentions to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add the following comments.
Defendant came to the attention of the Atlantic City police when he reported that one of his children, L.V., had run away from home. Detective Keith Wendling learned that defendant kept L.V. and his other children isolated inside his home and did not permit them to go to school or to have friends.
The child was found in a shelter in Philadelphia. She told the staff that she was afraid to return to defendant and that defendant had assaulted her older sister, J.D. Nevertheless, Philadelphia authorities returned the child to defendant and directed him to immediately bring the child with him to the Atlantic City police station.
Instead, defendant absconded with L.V. and the other children in the home. Wendling visited defendant's home on several occasions looking for the family, but no one answered the door. The landlord told Wendling that the rent was paid by HUD through direct deposits. Wendling obtained an arrest warrant for defendant after learning from a neighbor that defendant had moved the family out of the house.
Wendling was concerned with the condition of the home. The landlord did not have a key, the doorknob on the front door was missing, and there were metal gratings over the outside windows preventing anyone from leaving the house. Wendling notified Phin Nguyen, the City code enforcement officer.
Nguyen was "very concerned" and contacted the landlord for permission to enter the house to conduct an inspection. The landlord consented. Nguyen wanted to make sure the heat was on and nothing was leaking in the house, which was part of a set of rowhomes. Because he was afraid someone might be hiding in the house, Nguyen asked Wendling and another detective to come on the day of the inspection in case there was a problem.
When Nguyen arrived, the landlord fixed the doorknob on the front door and Nguyen went into the house. When he got to the second floor, Nguyen saw there were padlocks on all of the bedroom doors. Because he was afraid there could be people in the rooms, or even dead bodies, he asked Wendling and the other detective to take a look. They went in the house and knocked on each of the locked doors. No one answered and the detectives did not attempt to break into any of the rooms. They then left the house. Neither Nguyen nor the officers removed anything from the house.
About a week after the inspection, Wendling secured a search warrant so he could enter the rooms and search for bodies. The FBI later found defendant hiding his family in a cottage he rented in Avon-by-the-Sea.
The State's case against defendant on the three endangering charges was based primarily on the testimony presented by J.D., I.D., and G.V. concerning defendant's long-term mistreatment of all of the children in his care. Defendant kept them locked in their separate rooms. Inside the rooms, they frequently had to stay inside tents, which were equipped with an air mattress. They were not allowed to leave the rooms to use the bathroom or to get food. Sometimes, the children remained in their rooms for months at a time.
Defendant refused to permit the children to attend school and told them their mother would "homeschool" them. They received no formal education and sometimes did not receive needed health care. On the few occasions they were able to go outside the home, defendant scolded them if they talked to anyone outside the family. "There was a lot of verbal abuse." Defendant's wife testified that L.V. was suicidal at the time she ran away.
In Point I, defendant argues that the trial judge should have granted his "motion to suppress the physical evidence seized as a result of the warrantless entry to his home." This argument lacks merit.
In our review of defendant's suppression motions, we defer to the trial judge's findings so long as they are "supported by sufficient credible evidence. "State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)). Appellate courts defer to the trial judge's credibility and factual findings because of the trial court's ability to see and hear the witnesses, and thereby obtain the intangible but crucial "feel" of the case. State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 543 (2015) (quoting State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 382 (2014)). We will not reverse a trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous or mistaken. See S.S., 229 N.J. at 381. We review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. State v. Dorff, 468 N.J.Super. 633, 644 (App. Div. 2021).
Here, the "search" that was the subject of defendant's suppression motion, was a code enforcement inspection Nguyen conducted to determine if there were any safety hazards in the rental property after defendant abandoned it. This "administrative search" of the premises was plainly permissible because it was related to suspected code violations. See State v. Heine, 424 N.J.Super. 48, 60 (App. Div. 2012) ()." (footnotes omitted). Contrary to defendant's argument, Wendling and the other detective did not direct Nguyen in his inspection and Nguyen did not seize anything from the house. Although the two detectives went to the second floor to knock on the locked bedroom doors to determine if anyone was hiding or injured, they did not seize any evidence from the house, and left as soon as they determined there was no danger. See State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 469 (2015). Under these circumstances, we are satisfied the trial judge properly denied defendant's suppression motion.
In Point Two, defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the State's "repeated references" to the arrest and search warrants it obtained deprived him of a fair trial. After reviewing the entire record, however, we are convinced that the State's references to the warrants did not prejudice defendant.
In Point Three, defendant argues that the trial judge erred by denying his motion to dismiss count six of the indictment, charging him with endangering the welfare of I.D. by abusing and neglecting him. Defendant argues that unlike the similar charges involving his treatment of G.V. and L.V., the charge involving I.D. specified that defendant abused and neglected the child by inflicting excessive corporal punishment upon him. Because I.D. testified that the corporal punishment stopped after the family moved to Atlantic City, defendant asserts the judge should have dismissed this charge. We disagree.
As the judge explained in her decision, the gravamen of the charge involving I.D. and the other two children was that defendant abused and neglected them while the family was in Atlantic City during the years-long periods set forth in each separate count. As defendant's attorney conceded during oral argument on the motion to dismiss, defendant...
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