State v. Vasquez
| Decision Date | 15 January 1987 |
| Docket Number | CA-CR,No. 2,2 |
| Citation | 736 P.2d 803,153 Ariz. 320 |
| Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ralph Edward VASQUEZ, Appellant. 4534. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This appeal presents the question of whether time spent in a residential treatment house as a condition of probation should be credited towards the sentence imposed after the probation is revoked. Additionally, appellant argues that his plea agreement was modified to require that such credit be given.
Appellant pled guilty to a class 6 felony, theft by control, and was sentenced to three years' probation. As a condition of his probation, the court ordered that he successfully complete the Amity House drug treatment program, which apparently lasts 18 months. After approximately nine months in the program, appellant was discharged from Amity House due to his failure to abide by program guidelines. The state filed its petition and the court revoked appellant's probation, sentencing him to the presumptive term of 1.5 years in prison, with credit for 114 days previously served in the Pima County Jail.
Initially, when appellant pled guilty to the theft offense, the plea agreement required that he spend 180 days in the county jail as a condition of probation. When the court suspended the imposition of a sentence and imposed the term of probation, the prosecutor agreed to allow appellant, as a condition of his probation, to successfully complete the drug treatment program at Amity House in lieu of the 180-day jail requirement. Appellant argues that the time he spent at Amity House was time spent "in custody" for purposes of the statutes which require that credit for such time be given against the term of imprisonment imposed for an offense. Alternatively, he argues that the substitution of the drug rehabilitation program for the required jail time altered his plea agreement to require that credit be given.
The issue before us is whether A.R.S. §§ 13-709(B), 13-901, and 13-903(E) mandate the inclusion of the Amity House time as credit against appellant's sentence. Subsection 13-903(E) requires that time spent "in custody" pursuant to § 13-901(F) shall be credited against any sentence of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of probation, recognizing that under subsection 13-901(F) a court may require a defendant to be "imprisoned in the county jail" as a condition of probation. Similarly, A.R.S. § 13-709(B) requires that all time "actually spent in custody" shall be credited against the term of imprisonment imposed for an offense. In determining whether time in a particular facility is required to be included as jail credit pursuant to the statutes quoted above, the crucial question is whether the person is in custody. The resolution of that issue varies widely among the states, since jail credit is a statutory matter. See Annot., 24 A.L.R. 4th 789 (1983).
Appellant cites Lock v. State, 609 P.2d 539 (Alaska 1980), in which the court interpreted Alaska's statute to allow credit for time spent by a defendant in a rehabilitation facility if the program "impose[d] substantial restrictions on one's freedom of movement and behavior." 609 P.2d at 545. While we are mindful of the Alaska rule, we believe that in determining whether time spent in a facility constitutes "custody" under our credit statute, the circumstances of placement are of greater significance than the nature of the facility itself.
A.R.S. § 13-903(E) requires that a defendant be given credit for time spent in jail. A.R.S. § 13-709(B) requires credit for time "actually spent in custody." Contrary to appellant's assertion that the statutes are ambiguous, we believe that the harmonious interpretation of those statutes requires credit only for periods in which a defendant is in the actual or constructive control of jail or prison officials. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 13-605, 13-606 and 31-335; see also Green v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 468, 647 P.2d 166 (1982) (). Thus, when a defendant remains within the control of jail or prison officials, credit must be given against his sentence for that time. Once a defendant leaves the custody and/or control of jail or prison...
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State v. Ritch
...be included as jail credit pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-709, the key question is whether the person is in custody. State v. Vasquez, 153 Ariz. 320, 321, 736 P.2d 803, 804 (App.1987). Resolution of this issue varies among the states, because incarceration credit is governed by statute. Id. [I]nte......
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State v. Reynolds
...24 A.L.R. 4th 789 (1983). CONTRARY AUTHORITY The only Arizona case directly on point is against the defendant. In State v. Vasquez, 153 Ariz. 320, 736 P.2d 803 (App.1987), Division Two of this court held that time spent in Amity House, a residential treatment facility, was not spent "in cus......
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King v. Crist
...spent in the control of jail or prison officials, this is not a case involving "multiple" punishments. See State v. Vasquez, 153 Ariz. 320, 321-22, 736 P.2d 803, 804-05 (Ct.App.1987). This court is bound by a state court's construction of the laws of that state. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.......
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State v. Reynolds
...The court of appeals acknowledged that there is Arizona case law directly at odds with its holding, specifically State v. Vasquez, 153 Ariz. 320, 736 P.2d 803 (App.1987). Because we believe the court of appeals erred in giving appellant credit for time he spent in a rehabilitation program, ......