State v. Vernon
| Decision Date | 05 October 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 48550,48871,48880 and 49788.,48550 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Harold VERNON, Appellant. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jeffrey E. CARLSON, Appellant. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Dennis Henry FINLAY, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Kurzman & Mahanan, Marc G. Kurzman, and Ronald S. Goldser, Minneapolis, for Vernon and Carlson.
Ellis Olkon, Minneapolis, for Vernon.
Kurzman & Mahanan and Marc G. Kurzman, Minneapolis, for Finlay.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for State in Nos. 48550, 48871, 48880.
Gary W. Flakne, County Atty., Vernon E. Bergstrom, Asst. County Atty., Chief, Appellate Section, and David W. Larson, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for State in No. 48550.
William B. Randall, County Atty., and Steven C. DeCoster, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for State in Nos. 48871, 48880.
Thomas W. Foley, County Atty., and Steven C. DeCoster, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for State in No. 49788.
Heard before SHERAN, C. J., and WAHL and KENNEDY, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
These consolidated appeals challenge the constitutionality of the regulation of cocaine in the controlled substances law, Minn.St. c. 152.
Jeffrey E. Carlson was charged in Hennepin County with possession with intent to sell, and sale of cocaine in violation of Minn.St. 152.09, subd. 1(1). Harold Vernon was charged in Hennepin County with possession of cocaine in violation of Minn.St. 152.09, subd. 1(2). Their motions to dismiss were denied; the trial courts certified the question of constitutionality as important and doubtful; and they appeal.
Jeffrey E. Carlson and Dennis Finlay were convicted in separate proceedings in Ramsey County of possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of cocaine in violation of Minn.St. 152.09, subd. 1(1). They appeal from the Ramsey County judgments and from denial of their motions to dismiss.
Appellants contend that the degree to which cocaine is regulated is irrational, stating that:
We agree with the trial courts that there is a rational basis for the legislation, and that the legislation offends neither equal protection, due process, nor privacy rights ensured by the United States and Minnesota constitutions; consequently, the orders and judgments are affirmed.
The evidence and the findings of the trial courts show that cocaine, a drug prepared from coca leaves, is a central nervous system stimulant; its short-term physiological effects include increase in heart rate and blood pressure, and pupil dilation; it lessens fatigue and hunger, produces euphoria, and can cause hyper-exciteability, insomnia, restlessness, and hallucinations, which are comparatively mild when compared with narcotic hallucinations, and which are considered by some to be pseudo-hallucinations which are non-psychotic. Prolonged use of cocaine can cause damage to membranes and psychological dependence with symptoms of depression and paranoia. It can be fatal when taken with narcotics, or injected into the blood, or ingested orally in large quantities.
Cocaine is not considered a narcotic pharmacologically because it is not related to opium and opiates, is not a depressant, does not produce tolerance or withdrawal syndrome, and is not physically addictive.
1. Minn.St. c. 1521 prohibits traffic in and possession of controlled substances, § 152.09, subd. 1, and establishes five schedules of such substances, § 152.02, subd. 1. Substances listed in Schedule II include, inter alia, opium, opiates, coca leaves, "and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves," and amphetamines. § 152.02, subd. 3.
Minn.St. 152.02, subd. 7(2), provides:
"The board of pharmacy shall place a substance in Schedule II if it finds that the substance has: A high potential for abuse, currently accepted medical use in the United States, or currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions, and that abuse may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence."
The objection to listing cocaine in Schedule II raises the question of whether there are facts which support the legislation. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). The statutory listing of cocaine in Schedule II carries, by implication, legislative findings that it has a high potential for abuse, and that its abuse may lead to severe psychological dependence. In seeking a rational basis for the legislation, we must accept those findings in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Minn. State Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd, 308 Minn. 24, 241 N.W.2d 624 (1976).
There seems to be little dispute about the nature of the substance cocaine or, in general, the physiological and psychological effects of its abuse. It is not disputed that cocaine has currently accepted medical uses in the United States, or that, like most drugs, it has a potential for abuse and psychological habituation or dependence. There is testimony in the record that abuse may lead to psychological dependence. The dispute is about degrees — whether it has a high potential for abuse, or something less, and whether abuse may lead to severe psychological dependence, or something less. These are judgments for the legislature to make with the aid of the social and scientific expertise it can enlist. The evidence furnishes no reason to believe that the factual propensities of cocaine and the consequences of its abuse were not known to the legislature when the statute was enacted.
The record contains abundant uncontradicted expert testimony to the effect that cocaine is regulated too severely, and that its potential for abuse and harmful consequences of abuse is less than that of alcohol, amphetamines, the opiates, and tobacco. But that testimony does not undermine the legislation in a constitutional sense because it does not overwhelmingly refute the implied legislative judgments that cocaine has a high potential...
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