State v. Vigne
| Decision Date | 21 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 2001-KK-2940.,2001-KK-2940. |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Byron VIGNE. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Ron A. Austin, Westwego, Ike Spears, New Orleans, Counsel for Applicant.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, Stephenie J. Louthan, New Orleans, Counsel for Respondent.
The trial court found that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to show that, absent an inculpatory statement defendant made to police, the officers would inevitably have discovered narcotics in a cooler in the ceiling tiles of a bedroom when they searched the residence pursuant to a valid search warrant. In a split decision, the court of appeal granted the State's application for supervisory writs and reversed the trial court's decision. We granted this writ of certiorari to determine whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court's decision. After a review of the transcripts and documents contained in the record, we conclude that the trial court's ruling was supported by the record. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeal's decision.
The transcript of the suppression hearing reveals that Detective Lawrence Jones of the New Orleans Police Department received a tip from a confidential informant that a man nicknamed "Booney," who lived at 1223 Marigny Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, was selling wholesale quantities of crack cocaine. Detective Jones subsequently learned that defendant, on probation for a narcotics conviction, lived at that address. The computer at the police station showed that defendant, Byron Vigne, used the nickname "Booney." Subsequently, Detective Jones obtained defendant's photograph and presented it to the informant, who then identified defendant as the individual selling the narcotics.
The informant agreed to participate in a controlled drug buy on or about February 9, 2000. Accordingly Detective Jones searched the informant's person, gave him $50.00, and took him to the 1200 block of Marigny. Detective Jones observed from an unmarked car parked within a block of defendant's residence as the informant met with defendant outside the house. Defendant and the informant conversed briefly, then defendant went inside the residence alone. Shortly thereafter, he returned outside and gave the informant a small object in exchange for currency. The informant then returned to the car and gave Detective Jones a rock of cocaine he had purchased from defendant.
Based on the foregoing evidence, Detective Jones obtained a search warrant for 1223 Marigny Street. The warrant, issued on February 10, 2000, specifically authorized the officers to search the premises, "including all curtilage" for "all contraband, controlled dangerous substances, more particularly crack cocaine, along with any concomitant physical evidence, either substantive or trace, associated with its use, possession, packaging, and/or distribution."
The warrant was executed on February 14, 2000. Detective Jones testified that when the officers arrived at the residence, several people, including defendant, were standing outside of the house. Some of the officers detained the bystanders while others entered the residence to execute the warrant. Everyone was ordered inside the house, where the officers advised the detainees of their Miranda rights. The officers determined that the other persons had no connection with the residence and released everyone but defendant and his girlfriend, Dinah Dedmond, who also lived at the house.
Detective Jones stated that he re-administered Miranda warnings to defendant and Dedmond, provided them with a copy of the search warrant, and informed them that the officers planned to search the residence. The colloquy was as follows:
The detective then described the ceiling, stating that it had removable panels, which could be pushed up manually. Detective Jones stated that when he mentioned the ceiling, defendant "became very nervous" and started "shaking his feet and moving his legs and started looking up and down." He then asked defendant again whether he wanted to declare the presence of narcotics. Defendant then gestured with his head toward "the second bedroom."1 Detective Jones, accompanied by two other detectives, walked from the living room to the second bedroom, where defendant told them that "the narcotics [were] in the ceiling." The detective testified that defendant directed him to the second panel in the bedroom, and he and the other detectives pushed it open. A blue and white cooler then fell to the floor and when the officers opened it, they found that it contained "large bags of narcotics, a scale and several razor blades."
According to the police incident report, defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights and taken into police custody. Defendant's girlfriend was released after the officers determined the she "had no nexus to the narcotic trafficking," and she had no outstanding warrants.
On cross-examination, Detective Jones indicated that each time he administered the Miranda warnings, he read them from a card that he carries in his pocket when executing search warrants. However, he neither indicated exactly what "rights" he recited to defendant in the ensuing police report, nor did he include a copy of the card with it. He also admitted that he could not recite the rights required by Miranda from memory. Nonetheless, the detective claimed that he recited the Miranda warnings, and defendant made no indication suggesting that he did not understand them.
Detective Jones also admitted on cross that he did not count the number of tiles in the ceiling. However, he indicated that by pushing up a single tile, it was possible to see whether anything was stored in the ceiling in the entire room. He stated that he did not personally search the ceiling areas of the remaining rooms nor did he have first-hand knowledge of whether the other rooms had been subsequently searched. However, because the police report indicated that a search of the residence had been conducted, he stated that "[i]f there were drop ceilings in other bedrooms, I'm sure they also was checked."
The trial court granted the motion to suppress. The trial court was unconvinced that defendant had been properly Mirandized before making his statement. The trial court stated:
The trial court also found that the State failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the officers would inevitably have discovered the evidence had defendant failed to alert them to its precise location.
The State sought supervisory review of the trial court's decision. In a split decision, the court of appeal granted writs and found that the state's failure to introduce evidence demonstrating that defendant understood his rights "could have rendered" his subsequent gesture and statement indicating the location of the drugs in the house involuntary. However, the majority concluded, even assuming as much, the evidence should have been admitted pursuant to the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule. The majority reasoned that Detective Jones testified that defendant only alerted the officers to the exact location of the narcotics after the detective informed him that pursuant to the warrant, the officers planned on searching the area above the ceiling tiles.
Judge Love dissented, noting that "[i]mplicit in the judge's finding is a belief that the officers would not have searched the ceiling without [defendant's] statement." Ultimately, because the dissenter did not detect manifest error in the court's finding of fact, she concluded that the inevitable discovery doctrine was inapplicable, and accordingly, she would have denied the state's writ application and left the ruling suppressing the evidence undisturbed.
A trial judge's ruling on whether or not a statement is voluntary is given great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly unsupported by the evidence. State v. Thornton, 351 So.2d 480, 484 (La.1977). Before a confession may be introduced into evidence, the state must establish that the accused was advised of his constitutional rights under Article 1, Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution and the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Simmons, 443 So.2d 512 (La.1983). In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court recognized the coercive atmosphere created by police custody and established a procedural mechanism to safeguard the exercise of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights....
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