State v. Villacci, Docket: Fra–17–460

• Decision Date: 19 June 2018
• Docket Number: Docket: Fra–17–460
• Citation: 187 A.3d 576
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Wesley M. VILLACCI
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

187 A.3d 576

STATE of Maine

v.Wesley M. VILLACCI

Docket: Fra–17–460

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: June 13, 2018

Decided: June 19, 2018

Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant Wesley Villacci

Andrew S. Robinson, District Attorney, and Claire G. Andrews, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District III, Lewiston, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

GORMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Wesley M. Villacci appeals from a judgment of conviction of domestic violence assault (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. § 207–A(1)(B)(1) (2017), and violating a condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2017), entered by the trial court (Franklin County, Mallonee, J. ) after a jury trial. Villacci argues that the court erred by failing to fully instruct the jury on the State's burden to disprove the statutory justifications Villacci generated in defense of the charges or on the consequences of the State's failure to meet that burden. We vacate the judgment.¹

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the State, the jury rationally could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Jeskey , 2016 ME 134, ¶ 30, 146 A.3d 127. In 2015, Villacci and the victim began an intimate relationship. During a disagreement on October 1, 2016, Villacci hit the victim on her face, grabbed her by her hair and banged her head on the dashboard and side window of the vehicle he was driving, pushed her into the passenger side door, and kicked her. The vehicle went off the road and crashed into some trees; after exiting the vehicle, Villacci again hit the victim's head hard enough that her "vision went black" and she dropped to the ground, whereupon Villacci continued hitting and kicking her. When Villacci and the victim later reached the victim's home, Villacci slapped the victim, punched her, pushed her into a wall and onto the ground, and placed his hands around the victim's throat and strangled her until she passed out. Villacci then began hitting and pushing the victim again.

[¶ 3] Villacci assaulted the victim on multiple other occasions between October of 2016 and January of 2017—at least once per week and sometimes daily—by strangling her until she almost passed out; kicking her; hitting her; biting her; holding her face down in the snow; and slapping her face with an open palm, giving her a bloody nose. On one occasion in November of 2016, Villacci ripped the towel off the victim after she exited the shower, whipped her with the towel, pushed her head into a wall, pulled her down the hall by her hair, and hit her with a broom handle. On another occasion in January of 2017, Villacci pushed the victim onto a table and held her there face-down while he punched her on her back and arms. The victim suffered bruises, abrasions, soreness, ringing in her ear, bite marks, and other injuries as a result of these incidents.

[¶ 4] By criminal complaint filed on January 6, 2017, and then by indictment filed on May 18, 2017, Villacci was charged with aggravated assault (Class B), 17–A M.R.S. § 208(1)(C) (2017) ; domestic violence assault (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. § 207–A(1)(B)(1) ; and violating a condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A). He pleaded not guilty to all counts.

[¶ 5] The court conducted a jury trial on September 13 and 14, 2017. Villacci testified about, and his defense relied in large part on, the application of four statutory justifications: (1) self-defense, see 17–A M.R.S. § 108 (2017) ; (2) defense of premises, see 17–A M.R.S. § 104 (2017) ; (3) defense of property, see 17–A M.R.S. § 105 (2017) ; and (4) consent, see 17–A M.R.S. § 109 (2017).

[¶ 6] In its jury instructions, the court described the elements of aggravated assault and domestic violence assault by tracking the language of the applicable statutes and then further defining various terms used in those statutes. See 17–A M.R.S. §§ 35(1)–(3), 207–A(1)(B)(1), 208(1)(C) (2017) ; 19–A M.R.S. § 4002(4) (2017). In other portions of the jury instructions, the court stated that "[t]he State always has the burden to prove each element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt" and that "[y]our only interest is to determine whether the State has proved the pending charge beyond a reasonable doubt."

[¶ 7] With the State's agreement that there was sufficient evidence to generate a jury instruction on each of the four justifications, the court also instructed the jury on the elements of the justifications, again by tracking the applicable language of those statutes:

A person is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly force upon another person in order to defend ... the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person, and the person may use a degree of such force that the person reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose.

A person in possession or control of the premises, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be thereon, is justified in using nondeadly force upon another person when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises.

A defendant is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly force upon another person when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what is or reasonably appears to be an unlawful taking of the person's property, or criminal mischief, or to retake the person's property immediately following its taking.

It is a defense that when a defendant engages in conduct which would otherwise constitute a crime against the person or property of another, such other consented to the conduct and an element of the crime is negated as a result of consent.

When conduct is a crime because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such injury is a defense only if neither the injury inflicted, nor the injury threatened was such as to endanger life or to cause serious bodily injury.

Consent is not a defense within the meaning of this section if it is given by a person who by reason of intoxication, physical illness, mental illness or mental defect, including but not limited to dementia and other cognitive [impairments], or youth, is manifestly unable or known by the defendant to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the crime, or it is induced by force, duress or deception or undue influence.

See 17–A M.R.S. §§ 104(1), 105, 108(1), 109(1)–(3). No additional instruction was given regarding the statutory justifications. Neither party objected to the instructions as given.

[¶ 8] The court then presented the jury with the verdict form, which asked only whether Villacci was guilty or not guilty of aggravated assault and domestic violence assault and made no mention of the statutory justifications. The jury deliberated for almost four hours before reaching a verdict;² it found Villacci guilty of domestic violence assault but not guilty of aggravated assault. The court also found Villacci guilty of violating a condition of release by committing new criminal conduct.³ By judgment dated September 21, 2017, the court sentenced Villacci to four and a half years in prison with all but three years suspended and four years of probation for the domestic violence assault. For violating a condition of release, the court sentenced Villacci to six months in jail, concurrent with the domestic violence assault charge. Villacci appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 9] The sole issue before us regards the jury instructions given on the statutory justifications for domestic violence assault.⁴ When, as here, no objection was made to the instructions as given,⁵ we review the instructions only for obvious error, that is, "highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice." State v. Baker , 2015 ME 39, ¶ 11, 114 A.3d 214 (quotation marks omitted); see M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b). We review the jury instructions in their entirety to determine if the instructions "fail[ed] to inform the jury correctly and fairly in all necessary respects of the governing law." State v. Fox , 2014 ME 136, ¶ 22, 105 A.3d 1029 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶ 10] We have set out three categories of defenses in criminal matters: "a failure of the State's proof, an affirmative defense, and a justification or excuse." State v. Ouellette , 2012 ME 11, ¶ 8, 37 A.3d 921. "[A] justification places on the defendant a burden of production to generate an issue with sufficient evidence, and then imposes on the State the burden of persuasion to disprove the defense."⁶ Id. ; see 17–A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2017). Thus, when the defendant generates a justification, "[i]t is the State's burden to both disprove [the justification] beyond a reasonable doubt and prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." Ouellette , 2012 ME 11, ¶ 17, 37 A.3d 921. If the State fails to disprove at least one of the elements of the justification beyond a reasonable doubt, the justification constitutes a "complete defense, meaning that it negates the commission of the crime," even if the State otherwise proves all the elements of the crime charged. Id. ¶¶ 9, 17. Thus, to convict a defendant when a justification has been generated, the State must disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, at least one element of the justification and prove every element of the crime charged. Id. ¶ 17.

[¶ 11] Here, the State did not dispute that the evidence generated all four justifications as to the domestic violence assault charge, and Villacci does not argue that the court mischaracterized the elements of the justifications. Villacci contends, however, that the court's jury instructions failed to adequately...