State v. Villeza

• Decision Date: 23 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. 14613,14613
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward Shawn VILLEZA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1054

817 P.2d 1054

72 Haw. 327

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward Shawn VILLEZA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14613.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Aug. 23, 1991.

Reconsideration Denied Sept. 9, 1991.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Appellate review of whether a defendant's statement to police was coerced requires determination of whether the trial court's factual findings are clearly erroneous as well as an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness.

2. To determine whether a defendant's statement to police is voluntary, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances in which the statement was made.

3. Where a jury reports that it is deadlocked or unable to reach a verdict, the trial court is obligated to exercise its broad discretion to obtain a verdict from the jury. However, in so doing, the court must not direct the jury to matters outside the evidence presented at trial.

4. It is error for the trial court to instruct the jury that it must unanimously decide that it is unable to reach a verdict. Such an instruction has no basis in the law and serves only to create a coercive environment incapable of supporting a meaningful verdict based solely upon the jury's consideration of the evidence.

Caroline M. Mee, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.

Judd Scott (William E. McGrath and Theodore Y.H. Chinn, on the briefs), Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

LUM, C.J., and PADGETT, HAYASHI, WAKATSUKI and MOON, JJ.

MOON, Justice.

Defendant Edward Shawn Villeza (Villeza) appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit following his conviction for murder in the second degree, a violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes § 707-701.5, and sentencing under § 706-656. Villeza argues that the trial court erred in admitting the statement he made to police on the ground the statement was coerced. Villeza also contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it must unanimously agree that it was deadlocked before so advising the court.

We affirm the trial court's admission of Villeza's statement because the totality of circumstances surrounding Villeza's statement indicate that it was freely and voluntarily given. We agree, however, that the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury on the ground that the instruction was prejudicial to Villeza's right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. Accordingly, we vacate Villeza's conviction and remand for a new trial.

I. FACTS

On January 5, 1989, Villeza shot his mother, Charlotte Villeza. He was arrested shortly after midnight on January 6, 1989. On January 7, 1989, Villeza gave a statement to homicide detectives Anderson Hee and Vernon Santos in which he admitted shooting his mother. Villeza was subsequently indicted for murder in the second degree.

On September 28, 1989, Villeza filed a motion to suppress his January 7, 1989 statement to police on the ground that the statement was coerced. The trial court found that Villeza's statement was not coerced and his motion to suppress was denied.

The trial record reflects that on January 5, 1989, Villeza had been drinking beer at Hau Bush Beach near his mother's home. He had his rifle with him and fired it between ten and twenty times while on the beach. Later, he walked to his mother's house, intending to pick up some things he had left there. Finding no one home, he waited in front of the house until Charlotte Villeza arrived home, and they both entered the house. According to Villeza, they sat in the dining room and talked while he brushed sand off his rifle with his hand. His finger accidentally touched the trigger and the rifle went off, striking his mother in the right temple. Villeza dragged her body into the yard and covered it with vines. Upon returning to the house, Villeza hid the rifle in the attic and did not know whether he should call the police.

At approximately 10:20 p.m., Villeza's brother, Ian, arrived home. Unable to ascertain his mother's whereabouts, Ian called the police. When the police arrived, Villeza was arrested for trespass. However, Villeza attempted to run away after police found Charlotte Villeza's body. Villeza was immediately apprehended and placed under arrest.

Jury trial commenced on April 25, 1990. It was undisputed that Villeza shot his mother; the issue at trial was whether the shooting was accidental. Villeza did not testify at trial, but his January 7, 1989 statement to the police, consisting of ninety-three pages, was admitted into evidence.

The jury began its deliberations on Thursday, May 3, 1990. During the course of its six days of deliberations, the jury sent five jury communications to the trial court. On Monday, May 7, 1990 at 3:45 p.m., the court received Communication Number 4, which stated, "[w]e cannot reach a unanimous verdict." The trial court considered this communication the next morning, at which time Villeza moved for a mistrial. Villeza's motion was denied. The court, in answer to Communication Number 4, submitted to the jury the following supplemental instruction:

Please review the attached instructions together with the instructions which have already been submitted to you [and continue your deliberations]. If at any time the jurors are unanimously of the opinion that further deliberation would not result in the unanimous verdict, you may so advise the Court.

At defense counsel's request, the trial court struck the words "continue your deliberations." Defense counsel had no further comments concerning the court's supplemental instruction.

On Wednesday, May 9, 1990, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Villeza's January 7, 1989 Statement

Villeza contends that the trial court erred in admitting the January 7, 1989 statement he made to police because it was the product of coercion. In the past, we have held that where evidence is conflicting concerning the admissibility of an inculpatory statement, "the reviewing court may not disturb the finding of admissibility unless the defendant demonstrates that there has been a clear abuse of discretion[.]" State v. Green, 51 Haw. 260, 264, 457 P.2d 505, 508 (1969). More recently, however, we have applied the clearly erroneous standard to the findings on which the decision to admit the statement are based. See State v. Kaahanui, 69 Haw. 473, 481, 747 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1987); State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51, 53, 731 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1987); Lono v. State, 63 Haw. 470, 629 P.2d 630 (1981).

In State v. Nelson, 69 Haw. 461, 469, 748 P.2d 365, 370 (1987) (citations omitted), we noted that

[w]hether the defendant invoked his right to counsel and whether he waived the right are primarily questions of fact. Thus, we would not disturb the trial court's determination of these questions "unless, after a review of the whole record, we are 'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' "

We further explained that "in a more technical sense, waiver is a question that requires 'application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.' " Id. at 471 n. 9, 748 P.2d at 371 n. 9 (citations omitted).

Therefore, in this case, our review of whether Villeza's statement was in fact coerced requires determination of whether the findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous. Moreover, we are required to examine the entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness. See State v. Kaahanui, 69 Haw. 473, 747 P.2d 1276 (1987); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1764, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966). After careful review of the record and the totality of circumstances surrounding his statement presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress, we agree with the trial court that Villeza freely and voluntarily made his statement.

At the suppression hearing, the evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of Villeza's statement consisted of Honolulu Police Department (HPD) form 81, Villeza's transcribed recorded statement, and the testimony of the detective in charge of the investigation, Anderson Hee. Villeza did not testify. The evidence revealed that when Villeza was arrested at approximately 12:30 a.m. on January 6, 1989, all of his clothing, except for his undershorts, was recovered as evidence and he was given a blanket. He was held in a windowless, air conditioned cell approximately eight to ten feet square. He remained in the above described state of dress for over twenty-four hours until detectives began taking his statement on January 7, 1989, at 9:03 a.m.

At the time of arrest and again before giving his statement, Villeza was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He also signed the HPD form 81 indicating that he understood and voluntarily waived those rights. During the interview, he stated that he was twenty-five years old, had a twelfth-grade education, and could read and write English. He answered no when asked if he was feeling intoxicated or tired. Throughout the interview, he wore the blanket around his waist. He did not complain of being cold or mistreated, but appeared calm and relaxed, showing no signs of duress. The interrogation lasted for one hour and forty-six minutes. At the conclusion of the interview, he stated that he had not been coerced or threatened into making his statement and that it was completely voluntary. Villeza, from our review of the transcribed recorded statement, showed no indication that he was reluctant to give a statement. Moreover, in relaying his version of the shooting, Villeza remained consistent, throughout the interview, that the shooting was accidental.

On appeal, Villeza asserts that, as a matter of law, a statement extracted from a...