State v. Wade

• Decision Date: 04 May 1921
• Citation: 96 Conn. 238,113 A. 458
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. WADE.

113 A. 458

96 Conn. 238

STATE v. WADE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 4, 1921

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; George E. Hinman Judge.

Elwood B. Wade was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. No error.

In a prosecution for homicide, error in sustaining objection to one cross-question asked the state's expert alienist which occurred during a lengthy cross-examination, in which counsel for defendant was permitted to inquire in detail as to the capacity of accused, does not require a reversal where the other evidence satisfies the court that the exclusion of that question did defendant no harm.

William H. Comley, Jr., and Frederick E. Morgan, both of Bridgeport, for appellant.

Homer S. Cummings, State's Atty., Galen A. Carter, Asst. State's Atty., both of Stamford, and E. Earle Garlick, of Bridgeport, Asst. State's Atty., for the State.

WHEELER, C.J.

The accused, Wade, was tried upon an indictment charging him with the commission of murder in the first degree by the killing of George B. Nott at Bridgeport on the 29th day of August, 1920.

The state offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, that Wade killed Nott in the manner charged, and that the circumstances attendant upon the killing disclosed deliberation, preparation, and premeditation, and a cruelty so great as to characterize the homicide as one of singular ferocity. And from this evidence, together with evidence disclosing the calculated attempt of Wade to escape the consequences of his deed, the state claimed to have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty as charged of a willful, deliberate, and premeditated homicide, constituting in our law murder in the first degree. The defense did not contest the state's charge. Their claim was and is that Wade was insane when he committed this awful homicide, and that he represented a subnormal degree of mentality, a defective mental constitution with a deficient self-control, so much so that he cannot meet the reasonable demands of family and community life. This they claimed to have proved from the detailed picture of his life, from his heredity, from the observation and tests of competent experts, upon which they expressed an opinion upon his mental condition, and from the opinion expressed by them upon the man and the crime as detailed to them in the hypothetical question. The state joined issue upon these claims, and maintained that Wade possessed, at the commission of the homicide, mind enough to be the subject of punishment, since he fully met the test of our law having the mind, capacity, reason, and understanding to enable him to judge the nature, character, and consequences of the act charged against him, that the act was wrong and criminal and that the commission of it would properly and justly expose him to penalties, and that he could distinguish between right and wrong, and was not overcome by an irresistible impulse arising from disease.

The charge was a complete, clear, and capable presentation of the issues involved and the law applicable to those issues. A jury could not well help understanding it and finding in it a sufficient guide for the performance of the heavy responsibility which their duty as jurors cast upon them. In only four particulars has the counsel for the accused complained of the charge. Our most diligent reading of the charge has failed to find one other particular which could with any show of reason have formed the basis of another assignment of error by the accused.

The first assignment of error is the failure of the court to make this charge as requested:

" The defendant asks the court to instruct the jury that a verdict of not guilty in this case does not mean that the defendant would be entitled to be set at liberty. The state has ample power under the statutes now in existence to place him in such confinement and under such restraint as to protect the community against the consequence of his mental condition."

The trial court properly refused to comply with this request. The defense at no time in the trial claimed that the verdict should be not guilty. The record shows plainly that the one controverted issue was as to the mental responsibility of the accused. And the only verdict which the defense claimed was that of " Not guilty on the ground of insanity."

The form of the second sentence of the request was bad. It assumed that the mental condition of the accused was such as to justify his restraint. That was a fact to be proved, not an assumption to be made by counsel.

But, had the request been framed so as to avoid these fatal defects, we think the court was not obliged to give it to the jury. It is no part of the duty of the jury to pass upon the punishment of the accused. State v. Main, 75 Conn. 55, 63, 52 A. 257. The jury determines the guilt or innocence of the accused; the court pronounces sentence. If the jury find an accused guilty as charged, but are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the sanity of the accused at the time of the charge, their verdict should be, " Not guilty upon the ground of insanity." With the rendering of the verdict the duty and responsibility of the jury ends. The enforcement of the verdict by the pronouncement of sentence and the rendition of judgment is a duty resting wholly with the court. It will not help the jury in the performance of their duty to know what the penalty may be, nor what disposition will be made of the accused.

The precise question was decided adversely to the claim of the accused in State v. Daley, 54 Or. 514, 522, 103 P. 502, 104 P. 1. In some cases, where the insanity of the accused is clear, as well as the guilt, the trial judge has instructed the jury that a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity will subject the accused to such restraint as to prevent his doing injury to the persons or property of others. State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591, 595. Usually where this instruction is given it is with the purpose on the part of the judge that the jury may not find an insane person guilty, but guilty on the ground of insanity. Whether such an instruction, shall be given is for the trial judge to determine in the exercise of his sound discretion.

The second assignment of error in the charge is in part as follows:

" If the jury find that he [Wade] was under the influence of a woman who was prompting him and encouraging him either to kill or to make an assault upon her husband, and that except under that prompting and encouragement he exhibited no strong or adequate motive or intent to kill the husband, those facts should be regarded as having an important bearing upon the question of the defendant's mental condition."

The request assumes what the finding does not substantiate, that, except under the prompting and encouragement of Mrs. Nott the accused exhibited no strong or adequate motive or intent to kill her husband, and for this reason alone the request was properly refused. Further, the court charged the jury adequately upon the subject of the relation to and participation by Mrs. Nott in the homicide when it instructed them:

" You may consider the relation to and participation in the homicide by Mrs. Nott and Johnson and the influence or effect, if any, of them, or either of them, upon the acts and conduct of the accused so far as the same may properly be regarded as bearing upon or characterizing the mental capacity and condition of the accused at the time."

The third assignment of error in the charge is in the failure to give the request that-

" The facts and details of this homicide which make it peculiarly atrocious and shocking are to be taken into consideration in connection with the mental deficiency of the accused and his manner and conduct during the prior period of his life, as shown by the evidence in determining whether at the time of the act he had sufficient mind to understand the nature and consequences thereof."

The court was right in declining to give the charge in its exact terms, for it assumes the " mental deficiency" of the accused as one of the accepted facts in the case, instead of treating it as one of the facts to be found by the jury.

The remainder of the request might properly have been given. An adequate charge could not fail to call the attention of the jury to the necessity of their considering the details of the homicide, not only in determining its degree, but in determining the mental responsibility of the accused at the time of the commission of the homicide. And this the charge does do with as much particularity as our law requires. The reading of the charge makes this so patent that we shall not quote the passages which substantiate this. The claim of the defense that the charge " was inadequate because it did not lay sufficient emphasis upon the barbarity and cruelty of the deed as tending to indicate insanity" is without merit.

The fourth assignment of error in the charge is in the refusal to give the request that-

" In weighing the testimony of the witness Rooney, they are to give weight to his appearance and conduct on the witness stand, and to the depraved mind revealed by his own testimony."

The charge upon the credibility of witnesses was complete and exact; its error consists, the defense claims, in its failure to make specific reference to the testimony of Rooney and its unreliable character. This request assumes as a fact the depraved mind of Rooney as revealed by the testimony, but this was a fact to be found by the jury from the evidence. For this reason the request was an improper one. The court had the right to express its opinion upon the evidence and upon the testimony of a witness, so long as it did not amount to a direction of the verdict...