State v. Richards
| Decision Date | 25 May 1873 |
| Citation | 39 Conn. 591 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | State v. Harrison Richards. |
What degree of mental incapacity constitutes dementia and renders a person not criminally responsible for acts otherwise criminal.
Information for burning a barn; brought to the Superior Court for Windham County and tried to the jury, at its August term, 1873, on the plea of not guilty, before Seymour, J .
The defence was that the prisoner had not sufficient mental capacity to be criminally responsible for the act. The charge of the judge, which sufficiently states the facts of the case, was as follows:
Penrose State Attorney, and Richmond, for the State.
Hall for the prisoner.
Seymour's Judge charge.
The evidence seems ample to warrant you in finding that the burning complained of was caused by the prisoner. Your attention has been turned mainly to the question whether the act was done with the felonious intent charged, and this question depends mainly upon another, whether the accused has sufficient mental capacity to warrant us in imputing to him a felonious intent.
That he is considerably below par in intellect is apparent to us all. This is indicated by his countenance and general appearance.
The same thing is indicated by his extraordinary conduct at the fire. As the flames were bursting out he was seen on all fours crawling back from under the burning barn, with no clothing upon him except his shirt and trowsers. The day was excessively cold. He remained some half hour, thus scantily clothed, gazing stupidly at the blaze, until ordered into the house. All this took place in broad day-light, in plain view of Mr. Gallup's house.
But it is undoubtedly true, as the attorney for the state contends that mere inferiority of intellect is no answer to the prosecution. We are, therefore, called upon in this case to decide an interesting and difficult question, to wit, whether the accused has sufficient mind to be held responsible as a criminal.
He is not a mere idiot, nor does he appear to be a lunatic. He suffers from want of mind rather than from derangement or delusion, and the question is whether the want of mind is such as to entitle him to acquittal on the ground of what in law is termed dementia .
This enquiry is attended with inherent difficulties. Our knowledge of our own minds is imperfect; our knowledge of the precise mental condition of another is necessarily still more imperfect. We as triers are obliged to rely upon the evidence furnished us by witnesses whose means of knowledge are limited and who find great difficulty in communicating to us, on a subject of this nature, what they do know.
Our principal embarrassment arises however from the want of a definite measure of mental capacity. Eminent judges and learned commentators have attempted to furnish rules and tests for the guidance of triers in cases of this kind, but upon examination these rules and tests turn out to be imperfect and unsatisfactory.
It was formerly thought that the jury might properly convict if the accused had any sense of right and wrong, or if he was aware that punishment would follow the commission of an offence.
But children of very tender years have some sense of right and wrong, and fully understand that punishment will follow transgression. Such children are subjected by their parents to discipline, and are by gentle punishments restrained from wrong doing; but our sense of humanity would be greatly shocked at the thought of subjecting...
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Commonwealth v. Trippi
...146-148, 112 A. 400;People v. Day, 199 Cal. 78, 87, 248 P. 250;State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, 452,108 A. 391. If the decision in State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591, is not in accord with the view herein expressed, we cannot follow it. [2][3] ‘Criminal responsibility does not depend upon the ment......
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...of insanity will subject the accused to such restraint as to prevent his doing injury to the persons or property of others. State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591, 595. Usually where this instruction is given it is the purpose on the part of the judge that the jury may not find an insane person gu......
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Appeal of Kimberly
...capacity" and "dementia" by the language used by the late Chief Justice Seymour in a charge to a jury, reported in the appendix of 39 Conn. 591, 595 (State v. Richards), quoted, approved, and applied in Appeal of Richmond, 59 Conn. 242, 243, 22 Atl. 84: "If the prisoner's perception of cons......
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Commonwealth v. Trippi
... ... premeditate ... At the trial of an ... indictment for murder, it appeared that the defendant, a ... prisoner at the State prison, had been attempting to escape, ... and had shot one of the guards. The trial judge gave adequate ... and accurate instructions on the ... Schilling, 95 N.J.L. 145, 146-148. People v ... Day, 199 Cal. 78, 87. State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt ... 450, 452. If the decision in State v. Richards, 39 ... Conn. 591, is not in accord with the view herein expressed, ... we cannot follow it ... "Criminal ... responsibility does ... ...