State v. Walden, 63992-2
| Citation | 932 P.2d 1237,131 Wn.2d 469 |
| Decision Date | 13 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 63992-2,63992-2 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. John WALDEN, Petitioner. |
Jim H. Krider, Snohomish County Prosecutor, Edward Stemler, Deputy, Everett, WA, for Respondent.
John Walden was convicted of two counts of second degree assault arising out of a fight with three teenagers. At trial, Walden asserted self-defense. Walden argues the definition of grave bodily harm in the jury instruction addressing the reasonable use of force in self-defense improperly required the jury to use a purely objective standard. We agree, reverse his convictions, and remand for a new trial.
On October 23, 1993, Walden left a tavern in Arlington, Washington and got on his bicycle. He rode past The Castle video arcade, outside of which several teenagers were standing, including the three victims: Josh Adams, Grant Howell, and Casey Hill. As he rode past, Walden either fell or was pushed off his bicycle. According to the teens, Walden fell off the bicycle, got angry when they laughed at him, and came after them with a knife. On the other hand, Walden testified the teens pushed him off his bicycle and were then looking to beat him up.
At some point during the altercation, Walden produced Following the close of Walden's case, the judge issued jury instructions, including seven instructions on self-defense. 1 Walden objected to the definition of "great bodily injury" in the second paragraph of instruction 18. In its entirety, instruction 18 reads:
and opened a folding knife with a 3 1/2-inch locking blade. The teens and several witnesses testified Walden attempted to use the knife. Walden, however, testified he only produced the knife to scare the teens off, and did not actually try to use the knife. No evidence or testimony was offered by either side that the three teens were armed. However, there was testimony Walden and these same three teens had been involved in an altercation on at least one previous occasion.
One has the right to use force only to the extent of what appears to be the apparent imminent danger at the time. However, when there is no reasonable ground for the person attacked or apparently under attack to believe that his person is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and it appears to him that only an ordinary battery is all that is intended, he has no right to repel a threatened assault by the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner.
Great bodily injury as used in this instruction means injury of a graver and more serious nature than an ordinary battery with a fist or pounding with the hand; it is an injury of such nature as to produce severe pain, suffering and injury.
Clerk's Papers at 37. The judge noted Walden's objection but allowed the instruction, stating that the case from which it was taken, State v. Foster, 91 Wash.2d 466, 481, 589 P.2d 789 (1979), had not been overruled. Apparently the jury believed the State's version of the events, returning a verdict of guilty on both counts of second degree assault.
Walden appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the Under the facts of this case, we hold the definition of "great bodily injury" used in instruction 18 could have impermissibly restricted the jury from considering Walden's subjective beliefs about the possible consequence of an assault by the teens. Because the law of self-defense was not made manifestly apparent, i.e., because Walden was forced to argue to the jury regarding the correct legal standard, we reverse Walden's convictions and remand for a new trial.
trial court erred in submitting jury instruction 18, specifically the second paragraph, because it injects an impermissible objective element into the definition of self-defense and constitutes a comment on the evidence by the court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdicts in an unpublished opinion. Walden then petitioned this court for review solely on the issue of the impermissible objective standard created by the second paragraph of instruction 18.
Jury instructions on self-defense must more than adequately convey the law. State v. LeFaber, 128 Wash.2d 896, 900, 913 P.2d 369 (1996). Read as a whole, the jury instructions must make the relevant legal standard manifestly apparent to the average juror. LeFaber, 128 Wash.2d at 900, 913 P.2d 369; State v. Allery, 101 Wash.2d 591, 595, 682 P.2d 312 (1984); State v. Painter, 27 Wash.App. 708, 713, 620 P.2d 1001 (1980), review denied, 95 Wash.2d 1008 (1981). "A jury instruction misstating the law of self-defense amounts to an error of constitutional magnitude and is presumed prejudicial." LeFaber, 128 Wash.2d at 900, 913 P.2d 369.
To be entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense, the defendant must produce some evidence demonstrating self-defense; however, once the defendant produces some evidence, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Janes, 121 Wash.2d 220, 237, 850 P.2d 495 (1993) (defendant bears initial burden of Evidence of self-defense is evaluated "from the standpoint of the reasonably prudent person, knowing all the defendant knows and seeing all the defendant sees." Janes, 121 Wash.2d at 238, 850 P.2d 495 (citing Allery, 101 Wash.2d at 594, 682 P.2d 312). This standard incorporates both objective and subjective elements. The subjective portion requires the jury to stand in the shoes of the defendant and consider all the facts and circumstances known to him or her; the objective portion requires the jury to use this information to determine what a reasonably prudent person similarly situated would have done. Janes, 121 Wash.2d at 238, 850 P.2d 495.
producing evidence killing occurred in circumstances amounting to self-defense); State v. Acosta, 101 Wash.2d 612, 619, 683 P.2d 1069 (1984) ().
Accordingly, the degree of force used in self-defense is limited to what a reasonably prudent person would find necessary under the conditions as they appeared to the defendant. See State v. Bailey, 22 Wash.App. 646, 650, 591 P.2d 1212 (1979); 13A Royce A. Ferguson, Jr. & Seth Aaron Fine, Washington Practice, Criminal Law § 2604, at 351 (1990). Deadly force may only be used in self-defense if the defendant reasonably believes he or she is threatened with death or "great personal injury." 13A Ferguson, supra § 2604, at 351; RCW 9A.16.050(1); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 5.7(b) (1986). 2
While the above principles regarding self-defense are well settled in Washington, the application of these principles in the context of the use of deadly force in self-defense against an unarmed assailant is somewhat One has the right to use force only to the extent of what appears to be the apparent imminent danger at the time. However, when there is no reasonable ground for the person attacked or apparently under attack to believe that his person is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and it appears to him that only an ordinary battery is all that is intended, he has no right to repel a threatened assault by the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner.
unsettled. In the case at bar, the first paragraph of instruction 18 adequately conveys the relevant law on the amount of force allowed in self-defense:
Clerk's Papers at 37 (emphasis added). The problem lies in the second paragraph of instruction 18's attempt to define "great bodily harm." The second paragraph states: "Great bodily injury 3 as used in this instruction means an injury of a graver and more serious nature than an ordinary battery with a fist or pounding with the hand; it is an injury of such nature as to produce severe pain, suffering and injury." Clerk's Papers at 37 (emphasis added). Walden argues this instruction excludes as a matter of law all ordinary batteries from the definition of [great personal injury] and, therefore, prevents the jury from properly considering the defendant's subjective perception of the battery.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals, relying on State v. Foster, 91 Wash.2d 466, 589 P.2d 789, both found instruction 18's definition of [great personal injury] a correct statement of the law. While our opinion in Foster did address substantially Whether the definition of [great personal injury] used in the second paragraph of instruction 18 is proper has not been directly addressed by this court. 4 However, the Court of Appeals in State v. Painter, 27 Wash.App. 708, 620 P.2d 1001, addressed this exact issue. In Painter, the defendant, a frail, small female, shot and killed a larger, stronger but unarmed male who had abused and threatened her on earlier occasions. Painter, 27 Wash.App. at 709-10, 620 P.2d 1001. The jury instructions defined self-defense in accord with WPIC 16.02 and RCW 9A.16.050(1), but went on to define [great personal The effect of instruction No. 14, however, is completely undermined by the court's definition of [great personal injury] given in instruction No. 15. By instructing the jury that " '[great personal injury]' means an injury of a more serious nature than an ordinary striking with the hands or fists" the trial court ... injected an impermissible objective standard into the instructions....
similar language, the proper definition of [great personal injury] was not addressed. Rather, Foster dealt solely with the issue of whether the definition in the instruction was an impermissible comment on the evidence. Foster, 91 Wash.2d at 481, 589 P.2d 789. Noting this court's prior treatment of similar language with approval, the court in Foster held the definition was not an impermissible comment on the evidence. Foster, 91...To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Arbogast
...bodily harm, and imminent danger");2 State v. Espinosa , 8 Wash. App. 2d 353, 362, 438 P.3d 582 (2019) (citing State v. Walden , 131 Wash.2d 469, 473, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997) (justifiable homicide requires "some evidence" demonstrating self-defense or defense of another)); State v. Box , 109 W......
-
State v. Studd
...instruction as we have squarely held any attempt to cure a misstatement results in an impermissible ambiguity. State v. Walden, 131 Wash.2d 469, 478, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997). Since I cannot reconcile this court's well-reasoned and long-standing rule as articulated in Walden with its erroneous ......
-
In re Urlacher
...664, 254 P.3d 803 (2011) (double jeopardy case); Kyllo , 166 Wash.2d at 864, 215 P.3d 177 (self-defense case); State v. Walden , 131 Wash.2d 469, 473, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997) (self-defense case); State v. LeFaber , 128 Wash.2d 896, 900, 913 P.2d 369 (1996), abrogated by , 167 Wash.2d 91, 217 P......
-
State v. McCreven
...evidence, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Walden, 131 Wash.2d 469, 473–74, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997) (citing State v. Janes, 121 Wash.2d 220, 237, 850 P.2d 495 (1993); State v. Acosta, 101 Wash.2d 612, 619, 683 P.2d 1......