State v. Walker

• Decision Date: 14 July 2022
• Docket Number: 99813-2
• Citation: 513 P.3d 111
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Mary Thelma WALKER, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

513 P.3d 111

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Mary Thelma WALKER, Petitioner.

No. 99813-2

Supreme Court of Washington.

Filed: July 14, 2022

Maureen Marie Cyr, Gregory Charles Link, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-1683, for Petitioner.

Sara I. Beigh, Lewis County Prosecutor's Office, 345 W. Main St. Fl. 2, Chehalis, WA, 98532-4802, for Respondent.

Mark Bruns Middaugh, Attorney at Law, 600 University St. Ste. 3020, Seattle, WA, 98101-4105, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

JOHNSON, J.

¶1 This case concerns the interpretation of the time-for-trial rule, CrR 3.3. More specifically, this case involves CrR 3.3(d)(3), which states, "A party who objects to the date set upon the ground that it is not within the time limits prescribed by this rule must, within 10 days after the notice is mailed or otherwise given, move that the court set a trial within those time limits." A party who fails, for any reason, to make such a motion shall lose the right to object to the set trial date. We are asked to interpret CrR 3.3(d)(3) as it applies to the particular factual circumstances of this case, where the defendant objected to an untimely trial date by filing a motion to dismiss within 10 days of trial setting but after the time-for-trial period had expired.

¶2 The trial court granted Walker's motion to dismiss with prejudice based on a violation of CrR 3.3. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that Walker waived the right to object to the trial date because, according to that court, defense counsel knew at the time of trial setting that the trial date set was untimely and failed to advise the trial court of the known time-for-trial violation. For different reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹

¶3 On January 17, 2018, the Centralia city prosecutor charged Mary Thelma Walker with fourth degree assault in municipal court for allegedly striking a child while babysitting. She was arraigned on February 13 and pleaded not guilty. On April 17 she waived her rule-based right to a speedy trial through June 11. When Walker failed to appear at a pretrial hearing on June 12, the matter was rescheduled for June 19. On June 19, Walker and her attorney appeared in court, and a new trial date was set for August 27. On August 28, the State moved to dismiss the municipal court charge so it could refile the charge in superior court. The municipal court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice.

¶4 Eight months later, on May 1, 2019, the State filed an information in Lewis County Superior Court, charging Walker with third degree assault of a child based on the same incident described in the previous charge. At the arraignment² and trial setting hearing on May 30, the court determined the time-for-trial period expired on August 28. At the State's request, the court set the trial date for August 19. The court asked defense counsel if he agreed to the trial date. He responded, "I[’]ll be here." Verbatim Tr. of Proceedings (May 30, 2019) (VTP) at 3. Defense counsel did not object to the trial date.

¶5 Seven days later, on June 6, defense counsel filed a "Motion and Declaration in Support of Motion to Dismiss" and an "Objection to Trial Date Pursuant to CrR 3.3(d)(3)." Clerk's Papers at 10-16. Defense argued that the time-for-trial period had actually expired on May 31 and requested dismissal of the charge with prejudice, citing CrR 3.3(b)(5) and (d)(3).

¶6 The trial court held a hearing on the motion. The parties agreed that the time-for-trial deadline was May 31.³ The State objected to dismissal, arguing that Walker lost the right to object under CrR 3.3(d)(3) because she raised the objection after the time-for-trial period expired, making it impossible to set the trial date within the time-for-trial period. Defense counsel countered that the objection was timely because it was made within 10 days of receiving notice of the trial date, notwithstanding the fact that it was no longer possible for the court to set a trial within the time-for-trial period. The court concluded the objection was timely because it fell within 10 days of receiving notice of the set trial date. The trial court dismissed the charge with prejudice based on the time-for-trial violation.

¶7 The State appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that a party has 10 days to object to an untimely trial date. However, it concluded that defense counsel knew at the trial setting hearing that the August 19 trial date was past the time-for-trial expiration date and held that counsel's failure to notify the trial court of a known time-for-trial violation constitutes a waiver of the defendant's right to object under CrR 3.3(d)(3). State v. Walker , 17 Wash. App. 2d 275, 287, 485 P.3d 970, review granted , 198 Wash.2d 1001, 493 P.3d 730 (2021). The Court of Appeals therefore reversed. Walker filed a petition for discretionary review with this court, and the State filed a cross petition for review. We accepted review of both petitions.

ANALYSIS

¶8 We review de novo the application of a court rule to a particular set of facts. State v. Kindsvogel , 149 Wash.2d 477, 481, 69 P.3d 870 (2003). We interpret court rules in the same manner as statutes, beginning with the plain language of the rule. State v. George , 160 Wash.2d 727, 735, 158 P.3d 1169 (2007).

¶9 The language of the specific provision at issue here provides:

A party who objects to the date set upon the ground that it is not within the time limits prescribed by this rule must, within 10 days after the notice is mailed or otherwise given, move that the court set a trial within those time limits. Such motion shall be promptly noted for hearing by the moving party in accordance with local procedures. A party who fails, for any reason, to make such a motion shall lose the right to object that a trial commenced on such a date is not within the time limits prescribed by this rule.

CrR 3.3(d)(3).

¶10 Both parties assert that the language of the rule is unambiguous and that we should adopt its literal meaning. However, the parties take a piecemeal approach to the language of CrR 3.3(d)(3). Walker argues that a party always has 10 days to raise a CrR 3.3(d)(3) objection but that the objection does not need to be raised in the form of a motion to set the trial within the time-for-trial period. The State contends that a CrR 3.3(d)(3) objection can be raised only by a motion to move the trial date. It also argues that this court should adopt the implied waiver rule from the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Austin⁴ and hold that a party waives their CrR 3.3(d)(3) objection if the trial setting procedure occurs within 10 days of the time-for-trial expiration date.

¶11 The Court of Appeals agreed with Walker but erred in analyzing the language of CrR 3.3(d)(3). The rule explicitly states, and repeats, that the CrR 3.3(d)(3) objection must be brought as a motion to the trial court to set the trial within the time-for-trial time limit.⁵ Therefore, the State is correct that CrR 3.3(d)(3) requires an objecting party to make the required motion within 10 days of notice of the trial date.⁶ An interpretation of the 10-day requirement that would permit a party to make such a motion as long as it is filed within 10 days of receiving notice of the trial date would result in absurd consequences: once the time-for-trial period has expired, it would make no sense for a party to move to "set a trial within" those expired time limits because the court can no longer grant that relief.

¶12 Therefore, once the time-for-trial period has expired, a party cannot object to the untimely trial date under CrR 3.3(d)(3) because it is no longer reasonably possible to comply with the rule's requirement to "object" in the prescribed manner, i.e., by moving to set the trial date within the time-for-trial period. This conclusion is further supported by the language of the final sentence of CrR 3.3(d)(3), which contemplates that any remedy under the rule will be lost if the party cannot comply "for any reason."

¶13 This plain language analysis also explains why we reject the reasoning of Austin , 59 Wash. App. 186, 796 P.2d 746. In Austin , Division One of the Court of Appeals embraced an implied waiver rule, concluding that former CrR 3.3(f)(2) (1986)⁷ does not apply when the trial setting procedure occurs fewer than 10 days before the expiration of the time-for-trial period. In that case, Austin's trial was initially set for July 12. Then, on July 12, trial was reset for July 14. On July 13, Austin discovered that his time-for-trial period expired that same day and filed an objection and a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that under former CrR 3.3(f)(2), "the defense must notify the prosecutor and the court of its speedy trial objection in sufficient time for the trial to commence within the proper speedy trial period." Austin , 59 Wash. App. at 200, 796 P.2d 746. The court held that former CrR 3.3(f)(2) "does not apply to a trial setting procedure which occurs fewer than 10 days before the expiration of the speedy trial period." Austin , 59 Wash. App. at 200, 796 P.2d 746. Under Austin ’s implied waiver rule, Walker would not have had the right to object to the untimely trial date under CrR 3.3(d)(3) at the time of trial setting because the trial date was set one day before the time-for-trial deadline.

¶14 The State argues we should adopt Austin ’s implied waiver rule. Walker disagrees, highlighting that the rule contains no language suggesting the 10-day deadline does not apply if the trial setting occurs within 10 days of the time-for-trial expiration. The Court of Appeals below disagreed with the State's arguments and rejected the reasoning and conclusion in Austin . The court correctly reasoned that Austin wrongfully places the burden and responsibility on the...