State v. Walker
| Decision Date | 06 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | A15-1336 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Vincent Walker, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Affirmed
Hennepin County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Schellhas, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On appeal from his conviction of attempted first-degree premeditated murder, Appellant Vincent Walker argues (1) the state failed to prove premeditated intentional murder beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the district court erred in failing to suppress Walker's statement to the police because he did not waive his right to remain silent; and (3) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing argument. Walker also makes various arguments in his pro se brief. Because we conclude that (1) the circumstantial evidence, taken together with the direct evidence, was sufficient to prove premediated intentional murder, (2) Walker knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights before giving a statement to police and failed to unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent, (3) no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and (4) Walker's pro se arguments lack merit, we affirm.
For a number of years, Walker and J.W. worked together on various computer software projects. In 2011, they founded Securonet, which developed technology for sharing live video feeds from security cameras. Walker managed the software side, while J.W. managed network communications. Instead of receiving a salary, they both received Securonet stock. Securonet's office was in downtown Minneapolis, where it shared space with another company, Outsell, in the Capella building. During some of this time, Walker lived with J.W. and his family.
Starting in August 2013, Securonet's server was terminated, website access was affected, software was lost, and its domain name was appropriated, for which J.W. faulted Walker. Around September 2013, Walker resigned to provide income for his family. Although the termination appeared amicable to J.W., when he asked Walker for his laptopso he could attempt to recover the backup code, Walker refused, saying he wanted back pay.
J.W. continued to work on Securonet, starting "from scratch." In November 2013, J.W. completed a licensing agreement. In June 2014, J.W. relaunched Securonet with a new product. Securonet starting making sales in August 2014.
On September 18, 2014, J.W. received a text message at about 2:50 p.m. from an unknown phone number; the message said: "time to pay the piper." At 4:34 p.m., J.W. received a second text message from the same number; this message said: "I'm at Outsell waiting o[r] should I stop [at] your home?" Evidence at trial established that at 4:30 p.m., Walker was at the Outsell office in downtown Minneapolis, wearing a flowered shirt and asking for J.W.
After J.W. received the second message, he called the phone number sending the text messages. Walker answered, he was yelling and very angry, and demanded back pay. J.W. told Walker that there were no funds available to pay him, despite recent successes in the company. Walker told J.W that if he did not get his money "there will be blood." Walker then hung up.
Evidence at trial established that, at this time, an Outsell employee overheard Walker having a loud phone conversation with someone regarding money. Walker later told the same employee that, "if somebody owes me money either they pay me back my money or they pay me back with their blood."
Concerned, J.W. called his wife, Ms. J.W.,1 told her about the conversation with Walker, and told her to lock the doors at home. After he finished talking to his wife, J.W. received a third text message: the message stated, "R3d ruM!" At the time, J.W. did not know what the message meant. At trial, J.W. testified that he later understood the message was "murder!" spelled backwards with a "3" substituted for the "E."2
J.W. arrived home around 5:30 p.m. Ms. J.W. went to the grocery store leaving at home J.W. and their ten-year-old daughter, T.W., who was working on her homework in the family room.
At approximately 7:30 p.m., the doorbell rang. J.W. opened the front door and saw Walker, who was wearing dark clothing. Walker maced J.W. in the face, struck him in the head, knocked him unconscious, and attacked him with a knife. Walker fled and left J.W. bleeding in the front entryway. When he regained consciousness, J.W. went to the kitchen to grab a towel; T.W. saw him and began screaming for help. Ms. J.W. returned from the store, J.W. told her that Walker injured him, and Ms. J.W. called 911. An ambulance and police arrived. J.W. told both emergency medical responders and police that Walker caused his injuries.
The attack severed J.W.'s index finger, partially severed another finger, and caused lacerations to his scalp, neck, and arm. The laceration to J.W.'s neck measured 15 cm, or approximately 6 inches, and J.W.'s external jugular vein was lacerated. The laceration toJ.W.'s scalp was 18 cm, or 7 inches, and the force from the object that caused the injury was so significant that it penetrated the scalp and the skull. The arm laceration was 10 centimeters, or almost 4 inches in length. The lacerations were repaired by suture, but J.W.'s index finger could not be reattached.
The police contacted Walker and requested to speak with him regarding an assault. Walker agreed and, after a Miranda warning, gave a recorded statement. The state charged Walker with first-degree murder, which was later amended to attempted-first-degree murder. Evidence at trial established that Walker sold knives and mace for income, the police found these items in Walker's possession, but police never identified the knife used in the attack, nor was there any DNA evidence linking Walker to the crime.
On March 16, 2015, Walker filed a motion to suppress his police statement, arguing that there was no valid waiver of his constitutional rights. The district court denied Walker's motion. In April 2015, after a six-day trial, the jury found Walker guilty. Walker was sentenced to 240 months in prison. This appeal follows.
Walker argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he acted with premeditated intent to murder J.W. A defendant is guilty of attempted murder when he, "with intent to commit a [murder], does an act which is a substantial step toward . . . the commission of the [murder]." Minn. Stat. § 609.17 subd. 1 (2014). First-degree murder requires "caus[ing] the death of a human being with premeditation and [] intent to effectthe death of the person or of another." Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (a) (1) (2014). Criminal intent "means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result." Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2014). "'Premeditation' means to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to commit, the act referred to prior to its commission." Minn. Stat. § 609.18 (2014).
"Because intent and premeditation are states of mind, they are generally proved only by inferences drawn from a person's words or actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances." State v. Andrews, 388 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. 1986). Intent is "determined from all the objective facts and circumstances." State v. Whisonant, 331 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Minn. 1983). A jury may infer a person's intent to murder based on evidence demonstrating "deliberate and intentional use of a deadly weapon, the natural result of which could well have led to the victim's death." State v. Geshick, 283 Minn. 380, 382, 168 N.W.2d 331, 332 (1969) (). Premeditation may be inferred by evidence that shows planning, activity, motive, the nature of the killing, and a defendant's actions. State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Minn. 2016) (); State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Minn. 2005) ().
In this case, both appellant and respondent argue that the jury relied on inferential or circumstantial evidence in convicting Walker. Our review of the record and the applicable law leads us to conclude that direct evidence also was admitted to prove Walker's intent and premeditation. Direct evidence includes a defendant's own statementsbecause they allow the jury to find premeditation and intent without having to draw any inferences. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (); see generally State v. Clark, 739 N.W.2d 412, 421 n.4 (Minn. 2007) (). We must first analyze the direct evidence of intent and premeditation before considering the circumstantial evidence discussed by the parties. "[W]hen a disputed element is sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone," our review is governed by the traditional standard for sufficiency of the evidence. Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 39. Under the traditional standard, "we make a painstaking review of the record," State v. Brown, 732 N.W.2d 625, 628, to determine whether the evidence, "when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict...
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