State v. Walker

• Decision Date: 08 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 12481,12481
• Citation: 35 Conn.App. 431,646 A.2d 209
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. William WALKER.

Page 209

646 A.2d 209

35 Conn.App. 431

STATE of Connecticut v. William WALKER.

No. 12481.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 25, 1994.

Decided July 8, 1994.

Certification Denied ^* Sept. 14, 1994.

Dennis F. O'Toole, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Leah Hawley, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, State's Atty., and William Bumpus, former Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and FOTI and LANDAU, JJ.

FOTI, Judge.

The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault of a correction officer pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-167c(a)(1), ¹ for which he was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. The defendant claims that he was punished twice for the same offense and, therefore, that his sentence should be vacated on the grounds of the double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On June 5, 1992, the defendant was being detained prior to trial at the Hartford community correctional center when he struck correction officer Christopher Novak in the head and jaw with his fist. The defendant was placed immediately in administrative detention in an isolation area pending disciplinary proceedings. Novak issued a disciplinary report and the defendant received a copy. The defendant was presented before the correction facility disciplinary board and, after declining the assistance of a correction staff employee as advocate, admitted the misconduct and received fifteen days punitive segregation and thirty days confinement to quarters. He has completed the sanctions imposed.

An officer of the Connecticut state police was assigned to investigate the incident. Subsequent to the disciplinary hearing, an arrest warrant was issued for the defendant for the charge of assault in the second degree pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-60. Ultimately, the defendant was charged by information with assault of an employee of the department of correction in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c(a)(1). The defendant moved to dismiss the information pursuant to Practice Book § 815(6) asserting that prosecution was barred by the principles of double jeopardy as contained in the Connecticut constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. The trial court denied the motion. The case proceeded to a jury trial and the defendant was convicted as charged.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the sanctions imposed on the defendant by the department of correction constituted punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy and thereby barred the subsequent criminal prosecution.

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." "This clause prohibits not only multiple trials for the same offense but also multiple punishments for the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, [2225] 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)." State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 693, 557 A.2d 93 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824, 110 S.Ct. 84, 107 L.Ed.2d 50 (1989). This constitutional provision applies to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2058-59, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); State v. Woodson, 227 Conn. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 386 (1993). Although the Connecticut constitution does not include a specific double jeopardy provision, the due process guarantee of article first, § 9, of our state constitution has been held to encompass protection against double jeopardy. Kohlfuss v. Warden, 149 Conn. 692, 695, 183 A.2d 626, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 298, 9 L.Ed.2d 235 (1962); see also State v. Anderson, 211 Conn. 18, 25 n. 8, 557 A.2d 917 (1989).

We must first resolve the threshold issue of whether multiple punishments were imposed. In denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court found, "[t]he 'punishment' which the defendant received as a result of this incident, by the department of correction, was an administrative matter, not punitive, was intended to enforce the security rules of the institution, to maintain order, and to maintain control of the institution. It was not a determination of innocence or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges, [that] the defendant has had to face here ... which is a violation of § 53a-167c(1), interfering with a correctional officer's performance of his duties, and causing physical injury to a correctional officer." The trial court concluded that the administrative sanction imposed did not constitute punishment for the purposes of the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishment. We agree.

The defendant argues that the administrative sanction imposed by the department of correction constituted punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy because the title of the sanction imposed was "punitive segregation," and because the segregation arguably served the punitive function of deterrence.

Civil sanctions are not exempt from double jeopardy analysis. A civil sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied to the individual case serves the goals of punishment, i.e., retribution and deterrence. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901-02, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). ² "[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purpose, is punishment...." Id. ³ In addition, when the severity of the sanction is so disproportionate to the harm caused, it may constitute punishment. Id., at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Labels do not control in a double jeopardy inquiry. Id., at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02. Thus, the fact that the sanction was labeled punitive does not make it so; rather we must make a particularized assessment of what purpose the penalty may fairly be said to serve. ⁴ Id., at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02.

" 'Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.' Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, [1060] 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948)." Roque v. Warden, 181 Conn. 85, 93, 434 A.2d 348 (1980). The institutional consideration of internal security in the correction facilities themselves is essential to all other correction goals. Id., at 97-98, 434 A.2d 348. General Statutes § 18-31a specifically mandates that the commissioner of correction "shall establish rules for the regulation and government of ... community correctional centers ... and for the discipline and employment of inmates." Because the realities of running a correctional institution are complex and difficult, the courts give wide-ranging deference to the decisions of prison administrators in considering what is necessary and proper to preserve order and discipline. Buckley v. Warden, 181 Conn. 286, 291, 435 A.2d 348 (1980).

In this case, the trial court found, and we agree, that the sanctions imposed on the defendant served the purpose of maintaining institutional order and security. The sanctions were imposed pursuant to the policy and procedures of the Hartford community correctional center. ⁵ The trial court heard the testimony of Lieutenant Eric Stewart, the disciplinary coordinator at the Hartford correction center. He testified that punitive segregation involves confinement of the inmate to a cell away from the general prison population twenty-three hours a day and the loss of other privileges such as telephone, visitation, recreation, and commissary visits. Confinement to quarters is a lesser sanction and generally some of the inmate's privileges will be restored. Stewart further testified that penalties imposed by correction department disciplinary proceedings cannot result in any additional jail time, only the loss of accrued good time credits.

The sanction of fifteen days of punitive segregation and thirty days of confinement to quarters was not disproportionate to the serious offense of assault on a correction employee. The defendant was never exposed to an extension of a sentence. Further, there was testimony that if the defendant, who was being detained pending trial, had made bond, he would have been released without having to serve what remained of the sanctions. It was not unreasonable to remove the defendant from the general prison population because his violent behavior could be detrimental to maintaining control throughout the correction facility. Correction authorities must be allowed to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of inmates and correction employees; they must be permitted promptly to sanction misconduct within the institution so as to preserve order and discipline. "Ensuring security and order at the institution is a permissible nonpunitive objective...." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

Further, our Supreme Court has previously characterized such actions by the department of correction as nonpunitive and, accordingly, declined to address a defendant's double jeopardy claim. In State v. Mead, 130 Conn. 106, 112, 32 A.2d 273 (1943), the court stated, "To the defendant's claim of double jeopardy because of solitary confinement upon his return after escape, a sufficient answer is that this was not imposed as punishment for the crime of escape from the prison but as a measure of...