Robinson v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 738,738
• Citation: 695 A.2d 198,116 Md.App. 1
• Parties: James ROBINSON v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 1

116 Md.App. 1

695 A.2d 198

James ROBINSON v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 738, Sept. Term, 1996.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 18, 1997.

Sherrie B. Glasser, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellant.

Mary Ellen Barbera, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Baltimore, and Frank R. Weathersbee, State's Attorney for Arundel County, Annapolis, on the brief), for Appellee.

Submitted before HOLLANDER and THIEME, JJ., and ROBERT C. MURPHY, J. (Retired, Specially Assigned).

MURPHY, Judge.

James Robinson (Appellant), an inmate in the State penal system, was serving a 60-year sentence for robbery-related offenses when he assaulted an officer at the Maryland House of Correction at Jessup on October 4, 1994. This latter misbehavior netted Appellant administrative sanctions: 400 days in segregation and the loss of 400 days' good conduct time. It also resulted in his criminal prosecution. An Anne Arundel County Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant of battery. On February 14, 1996, the court sentenced him to a term of 12 years consecutive to the time he was already serving.

Appellant argues before us that the administrative action taken against him in the prison system was punishment within the contemplation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and thus barred the subsequent criminal prosecution. At sentencing, Appellant told the court:

Your Honor, I would like to say that I've been punished more than once for this offense. I was punished by the State and now I'm being punished by the State once again. I was told, and I've read that, you know, a person can't be prosecuted twice. I have been tried by the institution. I've stood trial in here again by another portion of the State. And, I don't feel as though what's been done to me is justifiable. I'm being punished more than once for an offense that occurred.... And, I would like to ask that you take that into consideration. The fact that I've been punished more than once.

The trial court responded:

You talk about having been punished once for this offense. I don't know of any law that says it's double jeopardy for the administrative team to exact some type of administrative sanction for what's happened in this case.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment proclaims that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." This constitutional guarantee is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2264, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980), citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). ¹ The Double Jeopardy Clause

protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.

United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). We are concerned with the last of the three. See Flaherty v. State, 322 Md. 356, 365, 587 A.2d 522 (1991).

For support of his contention that 400 days in segregation and the loss of 400 days' good conduct time barred his being criminally punished, Appellant directs us to Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). In Kurth, the Supreme Court held that the state could not tax illegal drugs at several times their market value after the defendants had been convicted for drug law violations, because the tax constituted an impermissible second punishment.

This drug tax is not the kind of remedial sanction that may follow the first punishment of a criminal offense. Instead, it is a second punishment within the contemplation of a constitutional protection that has "deep roots in our history and jurisprudence," ... and therefore must be imposed during the first prosecution or not at all.

511 U.S. at 784, 114 S.Ct. at 1948, citing U.S. v. Halper, supra, 490 U.S. at 440, 109 S.Ct. at 1897.

Appellant also draws our attention to State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 666 A.2d 128 (1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1265, 134 L.Ed.2d 213 (1996), which he says stands for the proposition that an administrative sanction survives double jeopardy scrutiny if it "can fairly be justified solely by remedial purposes...." Appellant misinterprets Jones and the Supreme Court cases upon which Jones relied.

Jones involved a man prosecuted for driving while intoxicated even though an administrative law judge had already suspended his driver's license. In determining that a subsequent criminal prosecution was not barred by the administrative action, the Court of Appeals noted "that license suspensions generally serve remedial purposes." 340 Md. at 251, 666 A.2d 128. The Court further observed that the legislative history of the statute permitting license suspensions "demonstrates that both punitive and remedial purposes motivated the legislators in enacting the amendments that created [Maryland Code, Transportation Article (1977, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.) ] § 16-205.1's administrative per se license suspension provisions." Id. at 259, 666 A.2d 128 (emphasis added). Rejecting the double jeopardy argument raised by Jones, the Court said:

In Halper, the Supreme Court examined a statute that served both punitive and remedial goals and determined that if the remedial goals by themselves justified the sanction imposed, then the statute did not impose a "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy.

Id. at 263-64, 666 A.2d 128 (citation omitted).

In other words, if an administrative sanction can be characterized as remedial rather than as one whose main purpose is deterrence or retribution, it may not be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. U.S. v. Halper, supra, 490 U.S. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Even if the sanction has some punitive effect, it can withstand constitutional scrutiny. "[F]or the defendant even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment." State v. Jones, supra, 340 Md. at 249, 666 A.2d 128, quoting United States v. Halper, supra, 490 U.S. at 447 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1901 n. 7. ²

United States v. Ursery, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), a case involving forfeiture and not prison regulations, recognized that a remedial sanction may have "certain punitive aspects" while at the same time serving "important nonpunitive goals." --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2148. A civil proceeding under Halper and Ursery would constitute double jeopardy only when the sanction is so punitive in form and effect as to negate the civil intent. Ursery, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2147-48. ³

Appellant is not the first inmate to contend that criminal prosecutions following administrative sanctions violate the double jeopardy clause. Of the courts that have entertained this question, the overwhelming consensus is that such claims are without merit. "It is now well settled that 'punishment' imposed by prison authorities for infractions of prison regulations does not generally bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct." United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1127, 115 S.Ct. 2288, 132 L.Ed.2d 290 (1995), citing United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir.1989); Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d 690 (8th Cir.1982); and United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 841, 92 S.Ct. 136, 30 L.Ed.2d 76 (1971). Accord United States v. Galan, 82 F.3d 639, 640 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1044, 117 S.Ct. 179, 136 L.Ed.2d 119 (1996) (agreeing with the "uniform conclusion" of other circuits that prison disciplinary proceedings do not bar future criminal prosecutions); Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1044, 115 S.Ct. 1420, 131 L.Ed.2d 303 (1995) ("We have previously held that prison discipline does not preclude a subsequent criminal prosecution or punishment for the same acts.... Every other Circuit that has addressed this issue has agreed."); State v. Harlin, 260 Kan. 881, 925 P.2d 1149, 1151-52 (1996) (jurisdictions that have considered whether a subsequent criminal prosecution can be brought "have unanimously rejected the application of double jeopardy in all but some rare extreme facts not before the court."); Commonwealth v. Forte, 423 Mass. 672, 671 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (1996) ("Opinions of the United States Courts of Appeal have unanimously agreed that the double jeopardy clause does not preclude both prison discipline and a criminal prosecution (and a further sentence) based on the same acts."); State v. McKenzie, 542 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn.1996) ("Several federal circuit courts and state appellate courts have applied Halper in the context of prison discipline and have unanimously held that no double jeopardy violation occurred."); State v. Nelson, 275 Mont. 86, 910 P.2d 247, 250-51 (1996) ("Typically, both state and federal jurisdictions have held that prison disciplinary proceedings are remedial in nature and present no impediment to subsequent criminal proceedings involving the same conduct"); Cordero v. Lalor, 227 A.D.2d 848, 642 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (3d Dept.1996) (discussing "the well-settled principle that 'punishment' imposed by prison authorities for infractions of prison regulations does not generally bar subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct ... "); State v. Rezin, 139 Or.App. 156, 911 P.2d 1264, 1265 (1996) ⁴ ("Every federal appellate court that has considered [the contention that prison disciplinary sanctions bar a subsequent criminal prosecution] has rejected that argument...."); State v. Beck, 545 N.W.2d 811, 815-16 (S.D.1996) (discussing jurisdictions that reject "the Halper test when determining whether prison discipline equals...