State v. Wallace

• Decision Date: 26 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. CR–09–0341–AP.,CR–09–0341–AP.
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. James Granvil WALLACE, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

229 Ariz. 155

272 P.3d 1046

632 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,

v.James Granvil WALLACE, Appellant.

No. CR–09–0341–AP.

Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.

March 26, 2012.

Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation, Phoenix, Lacey Alexandra Stover Gard, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, Attorneys for the State of Arizona.

Arizona Capital Representation Project By Amy Sara Armstrong, Emily Skinner, and Law Office of Carla G. Ryan By Carla G. Ryan, Tucson, Attorneys for James Granvil Wallace.

OPINION

PELANDER, Justice.

¶ 1 This case is before us now for a fourth time on James Granvil Wallace's automatic appeal from two death sentences. See State v. Wallace ( Wallace III ), 219 Ariz. 1, 191 P.3d 164 (2008); State v. Wallace ( Wallace II ), 160 Ariz. 424, 773 P.2d 983 (1989); State v. Wallace ( Wallace I ), 151 Ariz. 362, 728 P.2d 232 (1986). For the reasons below, on independent review we find that the State has not established beyond a reasonable doubt that Wallace inflicted gratuitous violence on the two victims. The murders thus were not heinous or depraved under A.R.S. § 13–751(F)(6),¹ the sole aggravating factor alleged in this case. Accordingly, we vacate Wallace's death sentences and sentence him to consecutive life terms of imprisonment.

I.

¶ 2 In early 1984, Wallace was living with his girlfriend, Susan Insalaco, and her two children, sixteen-year-old Anna and twelve-year-old Gabriel. When Wallace came home drunk on January 31, 1984, Susan told him to move out. The next day, Susan went to work, and Anna and Gabriel left for school while Wallace stayed home.

¶ 3 When Anna returned from school, Wallace was hiding behind the front door with a small wooden baseball bat. He struck Anna in the head with the bat from behind. She fell to the ground but continued breathing and moaning. Wallace struck her in the head at least ten times, eventually breaking the bat, but Anna was still alive. Wallace dragged her into the bathroom and drove the broken bat into her throat.

¶ 4 After killing Anna, Wallace found an 18–inch pipe wrench and decided to use it to kill Gabriel because he “didn't want him to suffer like [Anna].” Gabriel arrived home shortly thereafter and walked into his bedroom. Wallace followed and hit Gabriel in the head with the pipe wrench. Gabriel fell to the floor, and Wallace hit him in the head approximately ten more times until he had “crushed his skull.”

¶ 5 When Susan arrived home from work a couple hours later, Wallace hit her in the head with the pipe wrench. She fell, and Wallace hit her several more times, ultimately killing her. Wallace reported the crimes to the police the next day. After waiving his Miranda rights, he confessed in detail to the murders but could not explain why he committed them.

¶ 6 Wallace pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the trial judge for all three murders. After this Court twice affirmed the convictions and death sentences on appeal, see Wallace I; Wallace II, the federal district court granted habeas corpus relief and ordered a new sentencing trial. That retrial before a jury in 2005 again resulted in the imposition of three death sentences.²

¶ 7 In 2008, we reduced the death sentence for Susan's murder to life in prison because the evidence was insufficient to prove an aggravating circumstance as to that murder. Wallace III, 219 Ariz. at 7–8 ¶¶ 36–39, 191 P.3d at 170–71. Finding error in the jury instructions, we also remanded the case for a new sentencing trial with respect to the murders of the children. Id. at 4–6 ¶¶ 18–25, 8 ¶ 39, 191 P.3d at 167–69, 171. In 2009, a jury found that Wallace murdered both children in an especially heinous or depraved manner through the use of gratuitous violence. The jury found that death was the appropriate sentence for each of those two murders.

II.

¶ 8 Because the murders occurred before August 1, 2002, this Court independently reviews the aggravation and mitigation findings, as well as the propriety of the death sentences. See A.R.S. § 13–755(A). In independent review, “we do not defer to the findings or decision of the jury, with respect to aggravation or mitigation, when determining the propriety of the death sentence.” State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 405 ¶ 82, 132 P.3d 833, 849 (2006) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The state must prove aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423, 433 ¶ 28, 984 P.2d 31, 41 (1999).

¶ 9 The sole aggravating circumstance here, heinousness or depravity of the murders, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Wallace inflicted gratuitous violence in murdering Anna or Gabriel. ³ Wallace argues that the State failed to prove that aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. “The term ‘heinous or depraved,’ ” as used in § 13–751(F)(6), describes “the defendant's state of mind.” State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19, 31 ¶ 59, 97 P.3d 844, 856 (2004). The state can prove heinousness or depravity by showing that a defendant inflicted gratuitous violence on his victim. State v. Womble, 225 Ariz. 91, 99 n. 7 ¶ 27, 235 P.3d 244, 252 n. 7 (2010).⁴

¶ 10 In State v. Bocharski, this Court clarified the standard for gratuitous violence, recognizing that our “prior cases ha[d] not been entirely consistent in describing the showing needed to establish” that factor. 218 Ariz. 476, 494 ¶ 85, 189 P.3d 403, 421 (2008); see also Wallace III, 219 Ariz. at 6 ¶ 28, 191 P.3d at 169 (noting that Bocharski “clarif[ied] the principles governing” gratuitous violence). Bocharski established a two-pronged test. First, the state must show that the defendant used “violence beyond that necessary to kill.” 218 Ariz. at 494 ¶ 85, 189 P.3d at 421. Second, “[t]he State must also show that the defendant continued to inflict violence after he knew or should have known that a fatal action had occurred.” ⁵ Id. at ¶ 87.

¶ 11 In Bocharski, this Court found on independent review that the State failed to prove gratuitous violence beyond a reasonable doubt even though the defendant had stabbed the victim twenty-four times in the head, including eight wounds that penetrated deep into the victim's face and head. 218 Ariz. at 494 ¶¶ 85–86, 189 P.3d at 421. Although we could infer that the defendant used more violence than necessary to kill, we could not conclude that the State established the knowledge requirement. Id. at 495 ¶ 91, 189 P.3d at 422. A medical examiner testified that the immediately fatal wound “probably” occurred early in the sequence of wounds, but was uncertain precisely when. Id. at 494 ¶ 88, 189 P.3d at 421. The doctor also testified that the knife injuries occurred in “quick succession and that all the injuries were likely inflicted within a minute.” Id. at 495 ¶ 89, 189 P.3d at 422. This Court concluded that “[b]ecause Bocharski only used a knife to inflict the wounds and completed his attack very rapidly, we find it unlikely he knew or should have known he had inflicted a fatal wound but continued nonetheless to inflict more violence.” Id. at ¶ 90.

¶ 12 Even before Bocharski, this Court had made clear that multiple, rapid attacks on a victim, although reprehensible, do not necessarily establish gratuitous violence when the attacks were made in attempting to kill the victim. In State v. Cañez, for example, the defendant “attempted to strangle [the victim], stabbed him six times, and delivered 21 blunt force injuries, ten of them to the head.” 202 Ariz. 133, 161 ¶ 106, 42 P.3d 564, 592 (2002). The defendant attacked the victim “with his fist, a frying pan, a laundry bag, and a knife.” Id. Because the State asserted that the stabbing occurred last, however, the evidence demonstrated that the defendant “merely escalated his attacks until he succeeded in killing” the victim. Id. at 161–62, 42 P.3d at 592–93. Thus, this Court could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the violence exceeded that necessary to kill. Id.

¶ 13 Similarly, in State v. Anderson, even though it was a “close [ ] question,” we could not find gratuitous violence. 210 Ariz. 327, 355 ¶ 123, 111 P.3d 369, 397 (2005). This Court reasoned:

[Two victims] were subjected to prolonged and varied attacks before they succumbed. [One] had his throat slashed, a knife pounded into his ear, and his head beaten with a rock. [The other] was shot through the jaw, hit over the head with a rifle butt and a lantern, and then killed by blows to the head from a cinder block. While these multiple attacks were reprehensible, they do not meet the (F)(6) test of gratuitous violence. Each attack came in an attempt—albeit clumsy—to kill the victim, not engage in violence beyond that necessary to kill.

Id.

III.

¶ 14 Although this Court has previously considered whether Wallace inflicted gratuitous violence on his victims, the law, most notably in Bocharski, has evolved in this area. In Wallace III, we disavowed the reasoning used in Wallace I and Wallace II and held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to consider “whether the defendant had available less violent alternatives to cause death” in evaluating gratuitous violence. 219 Ariz. at 4 ¶¶ 15, 18, 191 P.3d at 167. Without any showing that Wallace actually intended to inflict greater violence than that necessary to kill, the State had not proven the “killer's vile state of mind” as required to establish heinousness or depravity under § 13–751(F)(6). Id. at 4–5 ¶ 19, 191 P.3d at 167–68 (internal quotation omitted).

¶ 15 This Court also concluded in Wallace III that the issue of gratuitous violence should not have been submitted to the jury with respect to Susan's murder. Id. at 7 ¶ 36, 191 P.3d at 170. We noted that the attack on her involved four or five blows to the head “over a relatively brief period,” and “the blows were apparently struck in rapid succession with the same implement that caused death.” Id. Although the medical examiner had...