State v. Wallace

Decision Date22 July 2004
Docket NumberNo. 25894.,25894.
Citation94 P.3d 1275,105 Haw. 131
PartiesSTATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Terrence D. WALLACE, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Simone C. Polak, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, for plaintiff-appellant.

Joyce K. Matsumori-Hoshijo, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, for defendant-appellee.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, and DUFFY, JJ.; ACOBA, J., concurring separately.

Opinion of the Court by MOON, C.J.

Plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i [hereinafter, the prosecution] appeals from the June 12, 2003 findings of fact (FOF), conclusions of law (COL) and order of the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, the Honorable Shackley F. Raffetto presiding, granting defendant-appellee Terrence D. Wallace's motion to suppress statements. On appeal, the prosecution essentially contends that: (1) inasmuch as Wallace was not in custody, Miranda warnings, although given, were not required and statements made by Wallace were not obtained in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to counsel; and (2) even assuming that Wallace was in custody, Wallace knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, notwithstanding his refusal to execute a written waiver of rights. The prosecution argues, therefore, that the circuit court erred in granting Wallace's motion to suppress. For reasons discussed more fully infra, Section III, we find merit in the prosecution's contentions and vacate the circuit court's June 12, 2003 FOF, COL and order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 9, 2003, at approximately 6:01 p.m., Maui Police Department (MPD) Officer Leif Adachi and MPD Officer Greg Rowe received an assignment to look for "a possible reckless driver, DUI driver, driving a gray Nissan pickup truck in Wailuku[,]" with license plate number 4RTUTU. Suspecting that the vehicle was stolen "and due to past cases of stolen vehicles," Officers Adachi and Rowe "checked the address of 1718 Lehua Street."

Officers Adachi and Rowe parked their police vehicle on a private driveway running to the back of 1718 Lehua Street. Upon exiting their vehicle, the officers saw Wallace "coming from the back of the [1718 Lehua Street] residence walking toward the police car."

According to Officer Adachi, Wallace saw him and Officer Rowe and "looked like he was going to turn around because he turned his shoulders. And at that point I think he recognized my partner[, Officer Rowe]. They grew up together." Wallace then walked up to Officer Rowe, who asked Wallace what he was doing. Officer Adachi testified that Wallace replied that he was going to his uncle's house. "And at that point we said okay, and he left." According to Officer Adachi, he did not suspect Wallace of anything at that point.

After Wallace left, Officers Adachi and Rowe continued to look for the suspect vehicle, which they eventually located in an empty lot next to 1718 Lehua Street. Officer Adachi testified that "[t]he rear driver's side window [of the suspect vehicle] was shattered, and ... we found that the plates were fraudulent[ ]...." Officer Adachi confirmed with dispatch that the vehicle was stolen.

Soon thereafter,1 Wallace returned to the area and walked up to the officers. According to Officer Adachi, "[Wallace] asked what was going on, what we were doing, what's up with the truck." When asked if Wallace was a suspect at that point, Officer Adachi responded in the negative.

According to Officer Adachi, Wallace then walked around the vehicle, looked inside, and indicated that he wanted the cigarettes out of the vehicle, although he did not claim ownership of them. At that point, Officer Adachi considered Wallace to be a "person of information" with respect to the vehicle and asked him what he knew about it. Wallace "related he was there when the truck pulled up. This guy named — he knew as Jeff, called him haole Jeff was driving. Jeff parked the truck and then ran away." Officer Adachi observed that Wallace "appeared nervous, little bit jittery. He wasn't looking at us. He talked down or talked to the side, wasn't looking at our faces, kept playing with his clothes, his pants. And ... it looked like he knew more than what he was telling us."

Officer Adachi testified that he did not feel that he had probable cause to make an arrest yet and that Wallace was free to leave if he wanted. When asked whether Wallace was "crowded or restrained by officers while he [(Wallace)] was giving ... his brief report[,]" Officer Adachi replied in the negative, adding "I actually just told him to stand on the side, and we kept doing what we had to do with the vehicle." However, in view of Wallace's nervousness, lack of eye contact, and fidgeting, Officer Adachi made a decision at that point to read Wallace his Miranda rights, using MPD Form 103 (Form 103). The prosecution elicited the following testimony from Officer Adachi regarding Officer Adachi's use of Form 103 in advising Wallace of his constitutional rights:

A. [(By Officer Adachi)] I had him fill out his name at the top with his print or typed name of the person warned. I read each line to him out loud. Explained it to him each right. I had him initial the rights. After the right to make — indicate that he understood it. And then I had him sign that he was — understood his rights.
Q. [(By prosecutor)] Okay. Did he express any difficulty understanding the reading of his rights.
A. No.
Q. Did he appear to you to be coherent?
A. Yes. Sir.
Q. Did he have any problems speaking at that point?
A. No Q. And he did sign the understanding of rights [section of Form 103]; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When it came — well, first of all, let me ask you, did he — after informing him of his rights and having him initial those rights and signing that he understood those rights, were you able to determine whether or not he was willing to waive his right to remain silent and speak with you?
A. Yes.
Q. Was he willing to do that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And upon his willingness to speak with you and waive his rights to remain silent, did you inquire whether he was willing to sign the waiver of rights portion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was he willing — did he want to sign the portion?
A. At that point, no, he refused to sign. He said he'd still talk to us, but he wasn't signing it.
Q. Did he make any statement why he wasn't going to sign it?
A. He just refused. He didn't want to.
Q Now, his refusal to sign, though, did that affect his willingness to speak with you?
A. No.
Q. And he still continued to speak with you?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Even at that point, though, had you determined whether you had enough probable cause to make an arrest at that point?
A. No.
Q. And when you did continue speaking with the defendant, what was the gist of the information he provided?
A. The fact that we had a description of the driver. He fit the description, basic description anyway.[2] His actions there at the scene, and suspicious nature that he kept coming towards us and asking about the truck and whatnot. He appeared he had a personal interest in the vehicle.
Q. All right. I think I may have not made my question clear.
What statement did he give you after he waived his rights?
A. Oh, he eventually admitted that he was driving the vehicle, and that Jeff was with him in the vehicle.
Q. Okay. And after that basic admission of driving the vehicle, at that point, what did you do?
A. Informed him that he was being placed under arrest and take him into custody.
Q. Okay. And did you inform him that he was being placed under arrest for unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle?
A. Yes, sir.

(Emphases added.) Upon being transported to the Wailuku police station, Wallace indicated in a written statement that he had seen Jeff in the vehicle at 1718 Lehua Place around 6:00 p.m. and observed Jeff flee the scene.

On April 12, 2002, a Maui grand jury charged Wallace with one count of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-836 (1993 and Supp.1999).3 On April 15, 2003, Wallace filed his motion to suppress, arguing that his statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Wallace argued that he neither knowingly, intelligently, nor voluntarily waived the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to counsel, pointing to his refusal to execute the waiver of rights portion on Form 103.

At the suppression hearing on April 24, 2003, Officer Adachi was the only witness to testify. On May 13, 2003, the circuit court orally granted Wallace's motion to suppress, stating in relevant part:

After careful consideration of the record as a whole, the evidence produced at the hearing, the Court rules as follows.
The evidence shows that the defendant was administered the Miranda rights as a prelude to questioning by the police, and the [MPD] Form 103 was utilized for this purpose.
During the process of giving defendant his rights, he said he refused to sign the waiver of right[s] portion of the form which provides, among other things, that he's willing to make a statement and answer questions without talking to a lawyer or having a lawyer present. His refusal was acknowledged by Officer Adachi who entered the word, refused, quote unquote, on the waiver portion of Form 103.
Officer Adachi testified that the defendant, nonetheless, at the same time, stated that he desired to talk with the police. The burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's waiver of his rights was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given.
Taking into consideration the holding of the Hawaii Supreme Court in the case of State versus [v.] Hoey, H-O-E-Y, 77 Hawai'i, 17 [881 P.2d 504], 1994 case, this Court finds the statement of the defendant regarding his desire to waive his rights and talk to the police was ambiguous, and under the totality of the circumstances of
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