State v. Walters
| Decision Date | 09 January 1917 |
| Docket Number | 31136 |
| Citation | 160 N.W. 821,178 Iowa 1108 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. WILLIAM WALTERS, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Polk District Court.--CHARLES A. DUDLEY, Judge.
CONVICTION for maintaining a nuisance by selling intoxicating liquor and keeping same with intent to sell within a building in Polk County, contrary to law. Defendant was ordered to pay a fine of $ 1,000 and the costs of suit, including an attorney's fee of $ 50, and appeals.
Affirmed.
Joseph D. Laws, for appellant.
George Cosson, Attorney General, and John Fletcher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I.
We have no quarrel with the law cited for appellant, but doubt its relevancy, here.
State v. Billings, 81 Iowa 99, 46 N.W. 862, decides: (1) Where the remarks of the trial judge indicate that, in his opinion the verdict was not supported by the evidence, it was his duty to set the verdict aside on that ground, and having failed to do so, the conviction should for that reason be reversed, independent of the views of the Supreme Court of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict; (2) where the undisputed facts are inconsistent with murder, but consistent with suicide, the burden is on the State to overcome the presumption arising from such facts with affirmative proof of guilt, and having failed to do this, a verdict of murder in the second degree was erroneous.
In State v. Saling, 177 Iowa 552, 159 N.W. 255, we approved and applied cases like State v. Woolsey, 30 Iowa 251; State v. Wise, 83 Iowa 596, 50 N.W. 59, and State v. Pilkington, 92 Iowa 92, 60 N.W. 502. They hold, in effect, that we will grant a new trial if a conviction is against a clear weight of the evidence. We agree with State v. Hilton, 22 Iowa 241, that, where the evidence is so lacking in affirmative value that it fails to generate a belief of probable guilt, a new trial should be ordered. These cases are analyzed, limited and applied in State v. Lyon, 10 Iowa 340, State v. Tomlinson, 11 Iowa 401, State v. Elliott, 15 Iowa 72, and State v. Quinn, 47 Iowa 368. Their effect is that, while we will interfere more readily on the weight of the evidence with a conviction than with a judgment on the civil side, there will be no interference on that ground unless the verdict is clearly and manifestly against the evidence--unless the Supreme Court is well satisfied of the insufficiency of the evidence to convince the judgment, reason and conscience of the jurors. Appellant contends that his conviction is within these cases because the proof of guilt is furnished by one witness who has made affidavit opposed to his testimony, and denial of guilt is made by defendant and two others, neither of the three being impeached. We do not agree that this situation necessarily makes a verdict of guilty violative of the clear weight of the evidence. But what is more to the point, we cannot find that this is the state of the evidence. It is true, Reeves alone gives direct testimony that defendant sold him beer, and has made affidavit that the only beer he got of defendant was borrowed. Also true that defendant, his son-in-law, and another, say no beer was sold, and that none of the three are directly impeached. But there is so much that supports Reeves and takes credit from the others as that here is no case of arbitrary verdict.
True, the two men who waited while Reeves got the beer do not know what house he went into. But it is admitted and undisputed that Reeves did go into the house of defendant and tried to get the beer and returned to those in waiting with four bottles of beer. As said, this is not disputed. But it is explained, and the explanation is disputed. It is that, just at the time when Reeves asked for beer, defendant had got some from an unknown and undescribed man in the alley. Defendant, however, kindly advised Reeves that he, too, could get beer in the alley, which implies that the jury should have believed the "bootlegger" was a fixture in that alley.
One of the two witnesses for defendant is his son-in-law. This son-in-law is the tenant on the farm of the other witness, Casady; and the wife of the son-in-law keeps house for Casady and his father. These two witnesses called on Reeves on Sunday morning while he was in bed and alone, except for the presence of his housekeeper somewhere in the house. The interview of that morning seems to have begun with a request that Reeves should help defendant out, to which he responded that he would do what he could, but that he couldn't do anything, and that defendant and he lived neighbors together for quite a while. He says he didn't say anything very much, gave them no satisfaction at all that morning, except to say that he would like to help defendant out if he could, but did not want to get into it himself. According to the son-in-law and Casady, the first position taken by Reeves was merely that he never bought any beer of defendant. The son-in-law says he can't remember when Reeves first told them that he borrowed it, but he did at some time say he borrowed it and paid nothing for it. Casady says that, when Reeves informed them he did borrow the beer, he, Casady, knew this was false. Knowing all this, these two inquired whether, if they brought a notary that Sunday afternoon, Reeves would make affidavit, and would in that live up to what he had said in the morning; and Reeves responded that he had no objection to the notary's being brought, and said: "Why certainly, I could not say anything else but the truth, and I will say it." The notary was Laws, the attorney of defendant, and an affidavit was made that Sunday afternoon, in which Reeves said what the others say they knew to be false--that he borrowed the beer. The son-in-law asked Laws to draw up the affidavit. It may not be denied that the jury might well be suspicious of testimony of Reeves, after being advised he had made such an affidavit. But it might well be as suspicious of the credibility of those who procured the affidavit, and testified for defendant. Moreover, Reeves said, and the jury might believe, he was utterly ignorant--could just sign his name; that the usual formalities of swearing, such as holding up the right hand and an acknowledgment that affiant was swearing, were not indulged in; and that Reeves would more readily make false statements under such conditions than when speaking under the sanction of an oath which he knew was a formal oath, to which the pains and penalties of perjury could attach. The very language of the affidavit--Reeves stated on oath bottles of beer found on him were borrowed from his friend W. J. Walters; he paid no money for the same; it was delivered to him under a promise to return; and that he promised to pay no money or other valuable consideration for it--indicates that it was the language of a draftsman having some knowledge of the law, rather than a statement which a man like Reeves would make voluntarily and spontaneously; and it is to be noted also that the two witnesses and the lawyer were there about an hour before the paper arranged for in the morning was finally executed.
1a
Again: Defendant wanted to go and see Mr. Laws, his attorney on the trial and on this appeal. Defendant's son-in-law claims he did not know there would be present Reeves and Daikens and Miller, who were with Reeves on the night on which it is claimed defendant sold beer, and who drank the beer obtained by Reeves, no matter how obtained. The witness Casady did not know "for sure" that Laws would be present. On reflection, he says that, while he hadn't seen Laws that evening, before he went up to the office, he had seen defendant, and knew from him that Laws was going to the office. Nobody told Casady "to get those fellows to go to Laws' office," but witness "just asked them to go up there myself;" thought he would take them to the office and see what they had to say--but he didn't talk to them after they got to the office. He asked Reeves to go, but didn't "ask" him what Laws wanted him for. When he got to the office, no one was there; later, Reeves and the two others arrived. Defendant, his son-in-law and Casady came later. Laws was introduced to Reeves, Daikens and Miller. The latter remembers Laws' saying that the boys all must be friends of Walters, because they had all come to meet him and talk to him. Then Laws said he wanted the facts in the case and the truth; heard nothing said about anybody's swearing to anything. The interest here shown by the witnesses for defendant bore on their credibility. The general trend of what occurred on this meeting so convoked leaves the impression it was to be announced the truth was sought for, and to be accomplished that testimony favorable to defendant was to be defined and obtained. In view of the fact that it was first of all recognized that the very presence of the witnesses was proof of a friendly desire "to let defendant out," the repeated announcement that it was to be done without perjury, and that nothing but the truth was to let him out, suffers somewhat from being in the nature of an anti-climax, or from being over-emphasis. All of it impresses us as an attempt at alibi--as self-serving declarations made for future use or protection--an attempt to arrange for perjury, disguised under protested desire to have the truth told. At all events, the jury could well find that it detracted from the weight of the evidence for defendant, and tended to overcome the fact that it preponderates numerically.
1b
Bearing both on the weight to be given the testimony of defendant's son-in-law and Casady, and the sincerity of the repeated declaration in the Laws office that perjury...
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