State v. Warren
Decision Date | 31 May 2000 |
Citation | 5 P.3d 1115,168 Or. App. 1 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Timothy Neal WARREN, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Walter J. Ledesma, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was David E. Groom, Public Defender.
Kaye Ellen McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before LANDAU, Presiding Judge, and EDMONDS, and BREWER, Judges.
Defendant appeals from his convictions for attempted murder with a firearm, ORS 163.115(1), and assault in the first degree, ORS 163.185. On appeal, defendant makes several assignments of error. We affirm without discussion on all of his assignments of error, except regarding his contention that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on his convictions. We vacate and remand.
At the trial that resulted in the convictions, there was evidence that the victim encountered defendant and two friends as they were leaving a Portland nightclub. The victim exchanged words with the three men. The jury could have found that defendant took offense to the remarks and "walked" the victim outside the building, while his friends remained inside. Witnesses inside the building heard one or more gunshots. The victim then walked back inside, followed by defendant. At that time, defendant pulled a gun out and shot the victim in the back of the head at close range.
At sentencing, defendant urged:
The trial court disagreed with defendant's argument:
The issue is whether the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences for attempted murder with a firearm and assault in the first degree was error under ORS 137.123(5). That statute provides:
We do not conduct a de novo review of the record in determining whether a consecutive sentence is authorized under ORS 137.123. State v. Racicot, 106 Or.App. 557, 561, 809 P.2d 726 (1991). Rather, our standard of review is for errors of law appearing in the record or, in this case, for whether there is evidence to support the trial court's findings. Subsection (5)(a) requires that the criminal conduct for which a consecutive sentence is contemplated be not merely an "incidental" violation of a separate statutory provision but "an indication of defendant's willingness to commit more than one criminal offense." The statute focuses on a defendant's volition or the exercise of his or her will at the time of the commission of the crimes. Apparently, the trial court inferred from the fact that because defendant committed the crime of attempted murder, he also had the willingness to cause serious physical injury to the victim as well. The problem with the trial court's finding is that it could not reasonably infer from the fact that defendant shot the victim in the head at close range that defendant intended to kill the victim and that he acted volitionally to cause the victim serious physical injury. If defendant intended to kill the victim by the single shot to the victim's head, he could not have had the intent only to cause him serious physical injury. The statute requires more than an incidental violation of a separate statutory provision in the course of a commission of a more serious crime as a basis for a consecutive sentence. The firing of a single shot into the victim's head by defendant could demonstrate a willingness to commit the crime of murder, but in the absence of findings of other facts that demonstrate a willingness to commit the additional offense of first-degree assault, it was error to impose consecutive sentences under ORS 137.123(5)(a).
Our opinions in State v. Rojas-Montalvo, 153 Or.App. 222, 957 P.2d 163, rev. den. 327 Or. 192, 961 P.2d 218 (1998), and in State v. Sumerlin, 139 Or.App. 579, 913 P.2d 340 (1996), are not to the contrary. Both cases involve factual circumstances on which we relied to uphold consecutive sentences under ORS 137.123(5)(a). In Rojas-Montalvo, the defendant was sentenced to consecutive sentences for a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance and for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. The defendant argued that his possession of controlled substances was incidental to his constructive delivery of controlled substances. We observed that, in addition to the large quantities of cocaine in the defendant's possession, there were a small scale, a box of baggies, a pager, and some small plastic bindles containing cocaine. Those facts demonstrated that the defendant had a willingness to commit the crime of delivery of cocaine in addition to the crime of mere possession of cocaine.
In Sumerlin, the defendant was convicted of both reckless driving and driving under the influence of intoxicants. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences. On appeal, he challenged the consecutive nature of the sentences. We affirmed, pointing to the fact that "[b]y speeding while driving drunk, defendant showed a willingness to commit both [offenses]." Sumerlin, 139 Or. App. at 589, 913 P.2d 340. In both Rojas-Montalvo and Sumerlin, there were, unlike here, discrete facts that supported an inference that the defendants were willing to commit more than one crime.
Regarding its ruling under ORS 137.123(5)(b), the trial court here reasoned that "[h]aving the intent to kill creates a risk of causing greater and qualitatively different loss, injury, or harm than merely having the intent to cause serious physical injury." The court's reasoning assumes that defendant had the intent to cause serious physical injury, as well as the intent to kill the victim. Again, the trial court made no findings that support such an inference. Apparently, the only fact relied on by the trial court is the fact that defendant shot the victim in the head at close range with a gun. In the absence of a finding that reasonably leads to the inference that defendant intended to cause serious physical injury in addition to killing the victim, the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was error under subsection (b).1
Sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
The majority holds that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on defendant's convictions, following a jury trial for attempted murder with a firearm, ORS 163.115(1), and assault in the first degree, ORS 163.185. Because the trial court was...
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