State v. Warren

• Decision Date: 26 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. C3-87-369,C3-87-369
• Citation: 419 N.W.2d 795
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Donald William WARREN, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 795

419 N.W.2d 795

STATE of Minnesota, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Donald William WARREN, Respondent.

No. C3-87-369.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 26, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

A misdemeanor conviction, based on a guilty plea for which no factual basis is elicited, may not be used later in computing the defendant's criminal history score for a subsequent felony offense; but if the plea was counseled or the record as a whole affords an adequate factual basis for the plea, the misdemeanor conviction may be used.

James B. Early, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, John C. Hoffman, Mille Lacs Co. Atty., Milaca, for appellant.

Michael F. Cromett, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

SIMONETT, Justice.

This case concerns use of a misdemeanor plea in computing a defendant's criminal history score. We agree with the court of appeals that such a plea must have a factual basis, State v. Warren, 407 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn.App.1987), but, unlike the court of appeals, we conclude on the record as a whole that the factual basis requirement is satisfied in this case, and that the trial court's computation of the criminal history score was, therefore, correct.

Defendant Donald Warren, having pled guilty to rape of an 81-year-old woman, appeals the length of his 81-month prison sentence. This duration was set by the trial judge at the high end of the presumptive sentence range for first degree criminal sexual assault for a person with a criminal history score of three. Defendant claims his history score should be only two, which would reduce his sentence by some 11 months.

Defendant has two prior felonies, for two points, plus four misdemeanors, which, if all four misdemeanors are counted, add a third point to his history score. Defendant challenges, however, the trial court's use of a 1980 misdemeanor conviction for aiding and abetting an attempted theft. Defendant had waived his right to counsel when charged with the theft offense. Prior to accepting defendant's guilty misdemeanor plea, the trial court, in accordance with Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.02, advised defendant on the record of his trial rights, including the right to remain silent, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront his accusers. The trial court neglected, however, to comply with the last sentence of Rule 15.02 which reads, "The court shall then determine whether there is a factual basis for the plea."

The sentencing court in this case, without ruling on whether a factual basis existed for the theft plea, counted the theft conviction in computing defendant's history score. On appeal, the state concedes that the trial judge in the theft case failed to inquire of the defendant about the factual basis for his plea. We have, then, two issues: (1) Does lack of a factual basis disqualify a misdemeanor conviction for criminal history purposes? and (2) Notwithstanding the trial judge failed to ask questions of the defendant, was there a factual basis for the theft plea?

A sentencing court may not use an uncounseled misdemeanor plea in computing a defendant's criminal history score. State v. Edmison, 379 N.W.2d 85, 86-87 (Minn.1985); cf. State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901 (Minn.1983). By an "uncounseled plea" is meant a plea where the defendant has no lawyer and did not waive a lawyer. While in this case defendant validly waived counsel, he argues that the trial court's failure to ask him about the facts of the offense charged should subject his plea to the same infirmity, for enhancement purposes, as an uncounseled plea.

The purpose of the factual basis requirement of Rule 15.02 is to ensure the guilty plea is "accurate, voluntary and intelligent (i.e., knowingly and understandably made)." State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn.1983); see State v. Hoaglund, 307 Minn. 322, 240 N.W.2d 4 (1976); Beaman v. State, 301 Minn. 180, 221 N.W.2d 698 (1974). The requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to an offense more serious than defendant's conduct warrants and helps to ensure a defendant is not pleading guilty due to improper pressures or a misunderstanding of the charge. Trott at 251. An appellate court, on appeal, will reject a guilty plea if it concludes the trial judge could not fairly have concluded that the defendant's plea was accurate. See State v. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.1978). Likewise, a guilty plea will be set aside in a petition for post-conviction relief if a factual basis is lacking. State v. Hoaglund, supra; Beaman v. State, supra. The United States Supreme Court, in applying Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, also has ruled that guilty pleas without a factual basis will be set aside. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). See also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976).

The situation is not quite the same, however, when the defendant is not trying to set aside the prior conviction but is challenging the conviction collaterally, seeking only to prevent its use for enhancement purposes. Collateral attacks weaken the finality of judgments. Ordinarily, in computing a criminal history score, the sentencing court need not review the procedures that led to a prior conviction and a collateral attack will be allowed only in "unique cases." State v. Edmison, 379 N.W.2d 85, 86 (Minn.1985). See also Pilger v. State, 337 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Minn.1983). Violation of a defendant's right to counsel, which is violation of a pivotal constitutional right, qualifies as a unique case. Edmison. But when the defendant is represented by counsel, failure of the trial court, in accepting the plea, to inquire of the defendant whether he or she waives other constitutional trial rights will not invalidate the enhancement value of the guilty plea. State v. Simon, 339 N.W.2d 907 (Minn.1983).

Here, defendant Warren is not trying to set aside his theft conviction. Nor does he claim his misdemeanor guilty plea was inaccurate. He claims, rather, that Rule 15.02 was violated, and, whether or not his plea was accurate, the need to police strict rule observance requires that his conviction not be used for enhancement purposes.

If a misdemeanor guilty plea is accepted by the trial court without a factual basis determination, but the defendant is represented by counsel, we believe that the conviction should be immune from collateral attack and should count for purposes of the defendant's criminal history score. When defendant has counsel, it may be assumed that other important trial rights, including a factual basis for the plea, are being protected, at least for the purposes of a collateral attack. See State v. Simon, 339 N.W.2d 907 (Minn.1983) ("it is undisputed that the guilty plea was counseled, a fact that justifies the conclusion that counsel presumably advised defendant of his other rights"). It is not that other rights are unimportant, but that the court, confronted with a collateral challenge, has a basis for reasonably assuming the...