State v. Neumann
| Decision Date | 20 January 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 47069,47069 |
| Citation | 262 N.W.2d 426 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Dennis David NEUMANN, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Minnesota has broadly construed the statutory definition of "premeditation" in first-degree murder cases. No extensive planning is required, and premeditation may be inferred from other circumstances, such as the number of shots fired or the fact that the killer armed himself in preparation for the commission of another crime. Intoxication is a factor to be considered by the factfinder in determining whether a murder was committed with premeditation.
2. A trial judge who has presided over a partial trial and has heard defendant's testimony may properly base his acceptance of defendant's guilty plea on the evidence introduced during the trial and need not personally reexamine defendant as to the facts of the crime.
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Philip Marron, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Gary W. Flakne, County Atty., Vernon E. Bergstrom, Chief, Appellate Division, David W. Larson and Lee Barry, Asst. County Attys., Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard before OTIS, ROGOSHESKE, TODD and WAHL, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
Dennis Neumann and George Hatcher robbed a Clark service station at gunpoint. The 15-year-old station attendant was abducted and driven to the countryside where Neumann shot and killed him. Neumann was indicted for first-degree murder, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery and initially pleaded not guilty. After 2 days of trial, the plea of not guilty was withdrawn, and a plea of guilty to all three charges was substituted. Defendant was immediately sentenced to the mandatory life term. Neumann alleges on appeal that his guilty plea was improperly accepted by the trial court on several grounds. We affirm.
The record on appeal contains two somewhat conflicting versions of the events which transpired on October 18, 1975, the day of the robbery and homicide. Both versions were related by appellant Neumann. The first statement concerning Neumann's involvement in the homicide was a confession by him to the police shortly after he was arrested, Neumann retold that story with some variations from the witness stand at his trial. What follows is a composite version of Neumann's confession and subsequent trial testimony.
On the morning of October 18, Neumann and Hatcher purchased some ammunition for a .22-caliber pistol at a hardware store in their hometown of Annandale, Minnesota. Later, the two drove toward Minneapolis, each of them having first taken five or six "speed" tablets, an equal number of "Route 66" pills, and a few sinequan pills. Upon their arrival in Robbinsdale, the pair commenced a period of extensive drinking, during which time each of them spent $40 to $50 purchasing a variety of mixed drinks and beer. They also shared a marijuana cigarette.
Later in the evening, Hatcher suggested that he and Neumann rob the Clark service station located in Crystal, Minnesota. Apparently the two of them had previously been involved in an armed robbery of a different service station and in two or more burglaries of homes. Neumann claims he first declined because he was too intoxicated. Nevertheless, at approximately 10:30 p. m., the pair proceeded to the station in Hatcher's car. There they accosted the station attendant, robbed him, and forced him to lie face down in the back of the car. Enroute to a secluded area, Hatcher told the attendant that he would be released in the country.
When they reached their destination, Hatcher whispered to Neumann, "We will have to waste him." In his statement to the police, Neumann indicated that he was at first reluctant to carry out this suggestion but admitted that he ultimately agreed with Hatcher, apparently because the attendant had seen his abductors' faces and would be able to identify them. At trial however, Neumann testified that he complied with Hatcher's wishes because the latter threatened Neumann with the murder weapon. Neumann stated that because of previous experiences with Hatcher, he feared that Hatcher's threat would be carried out if he refused to kill the attendant.
In any event, the three got out of the car, and Hatcher bound the attendant's hands. While Hatcher turned the car around, Neumann walked with the attendant into the woods and, according to his confession, "emptied the gun into him." At trial a pathologist testified that he had removed six bullets from the attendant's head, neck, and upper back. The pathologist also opined that one of the shots had been fired with the muzzle of the murder weapon pressed against the skin of the victim's neck.
At trial, Neumann testified that he could not remember leaving the car or walking into the woods but that he did recall being in the woods with the attendant. While on the witness stand, he also admitted shooting the attendant but claimed he remembered firing only one shot. Neumann professed that he had no particular intention as he walked into the woods with his victim and stated that "things happened too fast."
Approximately 11 days after these events, Hatcher and Neumann were arrested and charged by complaint with second-degree murder, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. At their initial court appearance, both men attempted to plead guilty to the crime of second-degree murder. The prosecutor advised the court that a grand jury would be asked to consider an indictment for first-degree murder, and the defendants' pleas were rejected. The grand jury subsequently indicted both Hatcher and Neumann for first-degree murder.
Neumann's trial began on May 4, 1976. 1 After completion of the state's case, Neumann took the stand on his own behalf and was questioned by defense counsel concerning his role in the robbery and homicide. Neumann was also extensively cross-examined on the discrepancies between his prior written confession and his testimony on direct examination. The next morning, the jury was sequestered, and defense counsel made the following statement:
Neumann then exercised his right to withdraw his plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty to each of the charges against him, including the first-degree murder charge. 2 Following this interchange, counsel for the prosecution asked Neumann the questions required by Rule 15, Rules of Criminal Procedure. The substance of this questioning was repeated by Judge Crane Winton. Neumann steadfastly acknowledged his guilt and waived his right to a complete trial. He also stated that he understood the elements of the crime with which he was charged. The trial court accepted the guilty pleas and imposed the mandatory life sentence which Minn.St. 609.185 requires for first-degree murder.
1. Neumann's principal contention on appeal is that the trial court's acceptance of his plea of guilty to first-degree murder lacked the necessary foundation in fact. In particular, it is argued that the existence of the critical element of premeditation was not supported by the evidence before the trial court.
It is well established that before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the trial judge must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant's guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred. State v. Taylor, 288 Minn. 37, 178 N.W.2d 892 (1970); State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968); cf. State v. Hoaglund, 307 Minn. 322, 240 N.W.2d 4 (1976); see, generally, 5A Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 2441c. Thus, were it to appear that the evidence before the court below could not fairly have supported the inference that Neumann killed with premeditation, we would have no choice but to reject his guilty plea.
A similar situation was dealt with by this court in State ex rel. Fruhrman v. Tahash, 275 Minn. 242, 146 N.W.2d 174 (1966). In that case, defendant pleaded guilty to the first-degree murder of a gas station attendant and was convicted and sentenced to a prison term. Ten years later, a habeas corpus proceeding was begun in which the conviction was attacked on several grounds. Defendant appealed, arguing that his guilty plea should not have been accepted by the judge presiding at the original arraignment. Like Neumann, the defendant in State rel. Fruhrman v. Tahash, supra, contended that there was evidence on the record tending to negate the inference that the murder he committed was premeditated. This court rejected defendant's argument and stated (275 Minn. 249, 146 N.W.2d 179):
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