State v. Washington
| Decision Date | 02 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 27992,Appellate Case No. 2018-001878 |
| Citation | 848 S.E.2d 779,431 S.C. 394 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Sha'quille WASHINGTON, Petitioner. |
Jack B. Swerling, of Columbia, and Katherine Carruth Goode, of Winnsboro, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.
Sha'quille Washington ("Petitioner") was indicted for the murder of Herman Manigault and was convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction. State v. Washington , 424 S.C. 374, 818 S.E.2d 459 (Ct. App. 2018). We granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision. We hold the trial court erred in giving an accomplice liability instruction, and we hold Petitioner was prejudiced by this error. Therefore, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and reverse in part, and we remand to the circuit court for a new trial on the charge of voluntary manslaughter.
On August 25, 2013, a large crowd gathered at "A Place in the Woods," a nightclub in Huger, South Carolina. Herman "Trey" Manigault (the victim in this case) and his cousin, Larry Jenkins, were among those present. According to trial testimony, Manigault told multiple people that Petitioner and Larry Kinloch, Petitioner's uncle, were following him around the establishment and staring him down. Arianna Coakley, Manigault's girlfriend, testified Manigault told her he was about to "snap" because Petitioner kept looking at him. Aja Williams, the bartender, testified Manigault said to her, "[Kinloch] going to shoot me, they going to kill me."
At closing time, a multitude of club patrons, including Manigault, Jenkins, Kinloch, and Petitioner, exited the building to the parking lot. A fight ensued in the parking lot. Testimony as to the participants in the fight, the specifics of the fight, and the shooting of Manigault varied greatly between the State's witnesses, Petitioner's witnesses, and Petitioner's statement to law enforcement.
Jenkins testified he joined the fight after at least two people hit Manigault. He could not identify who those two people were, but he testified Petitioner was "out there" during the fight. Jenkins testified he heard gunshots near the end of the fight. He checked himself for wounds
and saw Manigault on the ground. Jenkins testified he saw Petitioner holding a small silver revolver in his right hand and firing towards Manigault. He testified he was 100% sure Petitioner shot Manigault.
Ms. Coakley testified that moments before the shooting, Petitioner said something to Manigault. Coakley testified Manigault responded by asking Petitioner, "what's up" and Petitioner struck Manigault with his left hand. Coakley testified Manigault slid towards the ground and Petitioner continued to hit him. Coakley said she raised a glass beer bottle to hit Petitioner but backed down when Petitioner held a gun to her face and said, "I ain't playing, I ain't playing." Coakley testified Petitioner turned and ran, and then she heard four gunshots.
Petitioner's written statement to the police was read to the jury. Petitioner stated he arrived at the club around 2:00 a.m. and spoke to "a few ladies." He stated he walked outside, heard a commotion, and saw three people fighting. According to Petitioner, "the victim" (presumably Manigault) walked off, and an unknown person Petitioner termed "the suspect" fired a shot from a revolver at Manigault. Petitioner said he was four to five feet away from them at this point. Petitioner stated he was several feet further away from them when he heard two more shots. Petitioner stated he called the police the next morning to give a statement and clear his name after his grandmother informed him people accused him of shooting Manigault.
Kinloch testified for the State and initially denied any participation in the fight, but he eventually described his involvement as holding onto Larry Jenkins without throwing any punches. During its questioning of Kinloch, the State played a nine-minute post-shooting recorded phone conversation between Kinloch and his incarcerated brother Patrick. The solicitor quoted portions of the call while questioning Kinloch, but neither the recording nor a transcript of it was introduced into evidence. Kinloch, clearly a reluctant witness, testified he did not remember the phone call, and he did not respond to many of the solicitor's questions about the call. Apparently, Kinloch told his brother he initially fought a big, "light-skinned dude" (probably Jenkins) and then Kinloch also apparently told his brother he saw Petitioner shoot Manigault.
During cross-examination, Petitioner pressed Kinloch to admit he was the one who shot Manigault. Kinloch denied he shot Manigault. Petitioner asked Kinloch if he told Kenneth Quinton Grant and Darlene Washington (presumably Petitioner's grandmother) he shot Manigault. Kinloch denied this as well.
Petitioner called Erin Presnell, M.D., the forensic pathologist who conducted Manigault's autopsy, to testify as to Manigault's blood alcohol content at the time of autopsy. Before the jury, Petitioner asked Dr. Presnell, "What was the alcohol level --," and the State interjected, obviously a reference to Rule 404 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. The trial court then held an off-the-record bench conference1 to discuss the issue. The trial court then excused the jury and sustained the State's objection, explaining, "There has been abundant testimony as to the fact that there was drinking or not drinking by the victim, and so I have excluded this testimony, but you may continue [with a proffer of the testimony]." During the proffer, Dr. Presnell testified Manigault "had a blood-alcohol level of .235," which she categorized as "high." She testified that while she "imagined" Manigault "acted intoxicated," she could not give an opinion as to "whether he was aggressive or subdued or what his actual mannerisms were." She testified such a high blood alcohol level could have resulted in impaired judgment. The record contains no argument from the parties as to why the testimony was or was not admissible, and the trial court did not further explain its ruling. The State argued to the court of appeals that the context of the trial court's ruling made it clear the trial court excluded the testimony as irrelevant under Rule 402, SCRE. The court of appeals held the testimony was irrelevant and further held that even if it was relevant, any probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403, SCRE. Washington , 424 S.C. at 406-07, 818 S.E.2d at 476. The court of appeals also held that even if the trial court erred in excluding the testimony, Petitioner suffered no prejudice because the jury found Petitioner guilty of only voluntary manslaughter, which carried with it a finding Petitioner acted with sufficient legal provocation. Id. at 407, 818 S.E.2d at 476.
Petitioner called Kevin Watson to testify, but the trial court refused to allow him to testify after concluding he disobeyed a pre-trial sequestration order. Three other witnesses called by Petitioner were Robin Williams, Tyson Singleton, and Kenneth Quinton Grant. Robin Williams testified she was talking to her cousin as they walked out of the club at closing time when she heard "a lot of fussing" and saw a young lady holding a glass bottle in Petitioner's face. According to Robin Williams, there was a van parked nearby. She testified there was a fight taking place on one side of the van, and Petitioner and the young lady were on the other side of the van. She testified Petitioner "never had a gun." She also testified she heard two gunshots about five seconds after she saw the lady holding the bottle in Petitioner's face and Petitioner "ran on the second shot." She testified she then heard two more shots about three seconds apart but Petitioner was not anywhere near where those two shots were fired.
Tyson Singleton testified he was talking to Robin Williams in the parking lot when he heard three shots fired in the parking lot. He testified he did not see who fired the shots because a van blocked his view. He testified he saw Petitioner "in the road" next to some woods before the first shot was fired and Petitioner was nowhere near where any of the shots were fired. He also testified he saw Kinloch inside the club before closing time but did not see him in the parking lot after closing.
Petitioner called Kenneth Quinton Grant, Petitioner's second cousin and—according to Grant—Kinloch's best friend, to testify about a conversation Grant claimed he had with Kinloch after the shooting. Grant testified he was not present at the club when the shooting occurred; however, he testified he saw Kinloch at Kinloch's house twenty to twenty-five minutes after the shooting, and Kinloch admitted to him he shot Manigault. The State objected on hearsay grounds, and the trial court asked Petitioner if there was an exception to the hearsay rule that would allow the testimony. Petitioner responded, Petitioner also argued Kinloch's statement to Grant qualified as a present sense impression under Rule 803(1), SCRE. The trial court sustained the State's hearsay objection and instructed the jury to disregard Grant's statement. Despite this ruling, Petitioner again asked Grant whether Kinloch admitted to shooting Manigault, and Grant confirmed. The State again objected, and the trial court again sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the testimony.2 Before the court of appeals, Petitioner...
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......I respectfully disagree with the majority's efforts to disavow the supplemental instruction based on its speculation—without any shred of proof—that the jury intuitively chose to ignore the supplemental instruction. See State v. Washington , 431 S.C. 394, 410, 848 S.E.2d 779, 788 (2020) ("[J]urors are presumed to follow the law as instructed to them." (quoting 436 S.C. 658 State v. Grovenstein , 335 S.C. 347, 353, 517 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1999) )). Moreover, I reject the suggestion that members of the jury could have been under the ......
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