State v. Watkins

Citation648 P.2d 116,133 Ariz. 1
Decision Date22 June 1982
Docket NumberNo. 5457,5457
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ruth WATKINS, Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III and Gerald R. Grant, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Irwin, Jensen & Irwin by Bruce A. Jensen, Yuma, for appellant.

CAMERON, Justice.

On 4 November 1981, defendant Ruth Watkins was found guilty of first degree murder for the death of Walter Robinson. After an aggravation-mitigation hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years. A.R.S. § 13-703. The defendant appeals her conviction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4031.

The defendant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by permitting the State to impeach the defendant with a prior felony conviction?

2. Did testimony by a police officer that he had observed the defendant in an intoxicated condition on a previous occasion constitute reversible error as a comment on a prior bad act?

3. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's request for a jury instruction on the crime of manslaughter?

The facts necessary for a determination of these issues are as follows. On the morning of 26 June 1981, the defendant and two male companions drove to a grocery store in Yuma, Arizona. The driver of the car went into the store to shop, leaving the defendant in the front seat and the victim, Walter Robinson, in the back. A few minutes later, witness Jesus Torres was leaving the store with his groceries when he saw the defendant standing outside the car pointing a gun at Robinson in the back seat. Mr. Torres testified that the defendant was jabbing the gun at Robinson and shouting, "I'm going to kill you, mother-fucker." Mr. Torres then immediately returned to the store to escort his mother to his car and drove home where he telephoned the police.

When Officer Charles Pulliam arrived at the scene, he found the defendant in the front seat of the car with an open bottle of whiskey in her hand. Robinson was slumped across the back seat with a fatal .22 caliber gunshot wound in his chest. When questioned by Officer Pulliam, defendant remarked, "He must have been very sick, he's throwing up blood." When the driver of the vehicle returned and asked the defendant what had happened, the defendant allegedly said, "Robinson tried to grab me, so I shot him." After her arrest, a search of defendant's purse revealed a .22 caliber revolver which contained five bullets and one spent cartridge.

After a two day trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to first degree murder. At the aggravation-mitigation hearing, the trial judge found that one aggravating circumstance existed in that the defendant had previously been convicted of manslaughter in 1973. The trial judge found that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct was significantly impaired by her alcoholism and intoxication on the day of the murder and that this mitigating circumstance outweighed the prior aggravating manslaughter conviction. A life sentence was then imposed.

IMPEACHMENT WITH PRIOR FELONY

Before trial, a hearing was held on a defense motion to preclude the admission of defendant's prior conviction for involuntary manslaughter. The judge weighed the probative value of the prior conviction against its potential prejudicial effect as required by Rule 609, Arizona Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S. The judge concluded that evidence of the manslaughter conviction would be unduly prejudicial and therefore inadmissible. The judge did, however, find that the fact of a prior felony conviction was probative of the defendant's credibility. The court therefore permitted the State to inquire of the defendant whether she had a prior felony conviction, but the decision precluded the State from inquiring into or mentioning the nature of the felony committed. Over defense counsel's continuing objection, the defendant was asked on cross examination whether she had been convicted of a prior felony. No other inquiry into the nature of the prior offense was attempted.

The defendant argues that the trial court erred in permitting the defendant to be impeached with mention of the prior felony conviction. We do not agree. The rule of evidence dealing with impeachment by evidence of a prior conviction provides:

"Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime

"(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record, if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, and if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment." Rule 609, Arizona Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S.

The rule only requires the trial court to independently weigh the probative value of the prior conviction against the prejudicial effect. In this case, the court did all that

the rule requires. We find no abuse of discretion and no error. State v. Noble, 126 Ariz. 41, 612 P.2d 497 (1980); State v. Dixon, 126 Ariz. 613, 617 P.2d 779 (App.1980).

PRIOR BAD ACT

The defendant next contends that it was error for the prosecutor to elicit from a State's witness evidence of defendant's prior bad acts. The incident occurred during the testimony of Detective Richard Stallworth. The prosecutor questioned Stallworth about the defendant's state of intoxication on the day of the murder. In attempting to establish a foundation for the detective's opinion on this question, the prosecutor asked if he had observed the defendant for signs of intoxication at any other time. The detective responded, "At one time I did." Defense counsel objected to the question and moved for a mistrial out of the hearing of the jury.

The defendant's argument on this issue is summarized from her brief:

"The jury was left with the clear impression that the Defendant had had some prior criminal difficulty, in that she had been observed by a police detective for signs of intoxication. ...

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12 cases
  • State v. Reffitt
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • July 10, 1985
    ...the victim." A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(2). As to heat of passion manslaughter, there was insufficient evidence. As in State v. Watkins, 133 Ariz. 1, 4, 648 P.2d 116, 118-19 (1982), appellant denied killing the victim or claimed an inability to remember the events at the time of the murder. There ......
  • State v. Harding, 5742
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • May 30, 1984
    ...the convictions at issue outweighed their prejudicial effect. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. See State v. Watkins, 133 Ariz. 1, 2-3, 648 P.2d 116, 117-18 (1982) ("The rule only requires the trial court to independently weigh the probative value of the prior conviction against......
  • State v. Perkins
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • July 17, 1984
    ...trial courts on occasion have limited the admissible evidence to the fact of a prior felony conviction, see, e.g., State v. Watkins, 133 Ariz. 1, 2, 648 P.2d 116, 117 (1982), such a procedure is not required, see Sullivan, supra; State v. Woratzeck, 130 Ariz. 499, 502, 637 P.2d 301, 304 (Ap......
  • State v. Hankins
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • June 14, 1984
    ...of the firearm charge by perhaps allowing impeachment with the fact of the felony but not with its nature. See, e.g., State v. Watkins, 133 Ariz. 1, 648 P.2d 116 (1982). Trial counsel testified at the rule 32 petition hearing that, given the trial court's denial of a rule 609 motion by appe......
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