State v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 20 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 20110458.,20110458.
• Citation: 734 Utah Adv. Rep. 42,309 P.3d 209
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Anthony WATKINS, Defendant and Petitioner.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

309 P.3d 209

734 Utah Adv. Rep. 42

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Anthony WATKINS, Defendant and Petitioner.

No. 20110458.

Supreme Court of Utah.

May 10, 2013.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 2013.

John Swallow, Att'y Gen., Jeanne B. Inouye, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Michael K. Mohrman, Mitchell S. Maio, Jamie G. Pleune, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Justice PARRISH, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Anthony Watkins was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, H.C. His conviction was based on the holding that he occupied a “position of special trust in relation to the victim” under Utah Code section 76-5-404.1(4)(h). Because Mr. Watkins was temporarily staying in the spare bedroom of H.C.'s father's house, the district court and the court of appeals both held that he was an “adult cohabitant of a parent [of the victim].” Id.; State v. Watkins, 2011 UT App 96, ¶ 16, 250 P.3d 1019. The position of “adult cohabitant of a parent” is one of several positions specifically referenced in section 76-5-404.1(4)(h). The question before us is whether Mr. Watkins's status as an “adult cohabitant” of H.C.'s father was sufficient, as a matter of law, to support the conclusion that he occupied a “position of special trust in relation to [H.C.].”

¶ 2 We vacate Mr. Watkins's conviction and remand the case for further proceedings. The fact that a defendant occupies one of the positions listed in section 76-5-404.1(4)(h), such as “adult cohabitant of a parent,” is insufficient, standing alone, to aggravate the crime of sexual abuse of a child. Rather, to establish that a defendant occupies a “position of special trust in relation to the victim,” the State must establish that the defendant occupies “a position of authority” in relation to the victim and must further establish that “by reason of that position [the defendant] is able to exercise undue influence over the victim.” Utah Code § 76-5-404.1(4)(h).

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In September of 2008, Mr. Watkins temporarily moved in with his niece, Tristan Schoenberger; her husband, Joe Schoenberger; and their family. The Schoenbergers had three children of their own living in the home. In addition, Mr. Shoenberger's daughter from a prior relationship, H.C., regularly visited and stayed overnight on at least two occasions while Mr. Watkins was present.

¶ 4 During Mr. Watkins's stay, the Schoenbergers told their children to call Mr. Watkins “Uncle Tony.” But H.C. testified that she simply called him “Tony,” not understanding how he fit into the family. Though Mr. Watkins watched the children on at least one occasion and would speak up if he saw the children doing something inappropriate, Mrs. Shoenberger testified that Mr. Watkins did not have a formal role in the daily operations of the family.

¶ 5 On approximately October 15, 2008, H.C. stayed over at the Schoenbergers. After H.C. and her brothers had gone to bed in H.C.'s room, Mr. Watkins came into the room and lay down next to H.C. Mr. Watkins then “started kissing [H.C.'s] head and kind of pinching [her] butt.” H.C. “told him to leave” and when he did not, “[she] got mad and told him to leave again,” at which point Mr. Watkins left the room.

¶ 6 Later, “[Mr. Watkins] came back in and gave [H.C. a] $100 bill and told [her] not to tell anybody.” While H.C. told her father about the one hundred dollar bill the next morning, she did not tell him about the rest of the incident until a few weeks later.

¶ 7 The State charged Mr. Watkins with aggravated sexual assault of a child under Utah Code section 76-5-404.1(4)(h). State v. Watkins, 2011 UT App 96, ¶ 5, 250 P.3d 1019. The State asserted that Mr. Watkins's status as an “adult cohabitant of a parent” constituted an aggravating factor because he occupied a “position of special trust” under section 76-5-404.1(4)(h). Id.

¶ 8 The case was tried to a jury. At the close of the State's case, Mr. Watkins moved for dismissal, arguing that the State had failed to satisfy the statutory elements of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Utah Code section 76-5-404.1(4)(h) because it had failed to demonstrate that Mr. Watkins occupied a “position of special trust” in relation to H.C. and that under Utah Code section 76-5-401.1(2), he had not acted with the “intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.” Id.

¶ 9 The district court denied Mr. Watkins's motion to dismiss and concluded that “the position of trust was simply indicated by a mature adult and a 10–-ear-old child who had lived in the same home” and that the jury should decide the issue of intent. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The jury convicted Mr. Watkins as charged. Id.

¶ 10 Prior to sentencing, Mr. Watkins filed a motion for a new trial, asserting in part the same theories he had raised in his motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Mr. Watkins to a prison term of ten years to life.

¶ 11 Mr. Watkins appealed the denial of his motions to dismiss and for a new trial to the court of appeals. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Mr. Watkins argued, among other things, that he was not in a “position of special trust” in relation to H.C. and could not therefore have used such a position to exert undue influence over her. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11 n.5.

¶ 12 The court of appeals rejected Mr. Watkins's argument, holding that Mr. Watkins held a “position of special trust” under its interpretation of section 76-5-404.1(4)(h). Id. ¶ 9. It ruled:

[A] position of special trust may be established in two ways:

either by occupying a position specifically listed by statute or by fitting the definition of a position of special trust, which the statute clearly defines as a position occupied by a person in a position of authority, who, by reason of that position is able to exercise undue influence over the victim.

Id. ¶ 11 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Mr. Watkins was a cohabitant of H.C.'s father, a position specifically listed in the statute, the court of appeals concluded that he held a “position of special trust” in relation to H.C. as a matter of law. Id. ¶ 16. And it rejected Mr. Watkins's argument that the temporary nature of his residence with H.C.'s father was relevant. Id.

¶ 13 On certiorari, Mr. Watkins argues that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of section 76-5-404.1(4)(h). Specifically, he contends that the court erred when it held that proof of Mr. Watkins's position as a cohabitant of H.C.'s father created an irrebuttable presumption that Mr. Watkins both occupied a “position of authority, [and], by reason of that position [was] able to exercise undue influence over the victim.” Utah Code § 76-5-404.1(4)(h).

¶ 14 We granted certiorari and have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A–3–102(3)(a).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 15 On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ¶ 9, 22 P.3d 1242. Likewise, a question of statutory construction is reviewed for correctness and we accord no deference to the legal conclusions of the court of appeals. State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ¶ 5, 52 P.3d 1276.

ANALYSIS

I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE SECTION 76-5-404.1(4)(h) PRESENTS THREE POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS THAT AFFECT ITS APPLICATION TO MR. WATKINS

¶ 16 Utah Code section 76-5-404.1 articulates the elements of sexual abuse of a child. Under subsection (4)(h), the crime of sexual abuse of a child is aggravated if “the offense was committed by a person who occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim.” Utah Code § 76-5-404.1(4)(h) (emphasis added). Subsection (4)(h) states that a

“position of special trust” means that position occupied by a person in a position of authority, who, by reason of that position is able to exercise undue influence over the victim, and includes, but is not limited to, a youth leader or recreational leader who is an adult, adult athletic manager, adult coach, teacher, counselor, religious leader, doctor, employer, foster parent, baby-sitter, adult scout leader, natural parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, legal guardian, grandparent, aunt, uncle, or adult cohabitant of a parent.

Id. (emphasis added).

¶ 17 Mr. Watkins argues that the court of appeals erred when it held that he occupied a “position of special trust” based solely on the fact that he occupied the enumerated position of “adult cohabitant of a parent” of the victim. Specifically, Mr. Watkins argues that the State was required to show both that he occupied a “position of authority” over H.C. and, “by reason of that position [was] able to exercise undue influence over [her].” The State responds that

proof that a person occupies one of the statute's twenty listed positions in relation to a child, including the position of “adult cohabitant of a parent,” is, as a matter of law, proof that he stands in a position of authority, by which means he has the capacity to exercise undue influence over the child.

¶ 18 “When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.” State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ¶ 8, 52 P.3d 1276 (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, “[w]e first interpret the statute according to its plain language.” Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21, ¶ 8, 70 P.3d 85. Here, the statute reveals three possibilities as to the legal significance of a finding that a defendant occupied the position of an “adult cohabitant of a parent.” Specifically, the statute raises a question of whether the enumerated positions are “position[s] of special trust” or “position[s] of authority.” Utah Code § 76-5-404.1(4)(h). This question leads to three possible interpretations of the statute that impact the elements of the crime of which Mr. Watkins was convicted.

¶ 19 The first possible interpretation of the statute is advocated by the State and was adopted by the district court and the court of appeals. Under this interpretation, the...