State v. Watson

• Decision Date: 17 March 1943
• Docket Number: 145.
• Citation: 24 S.E.2d 540,222 N.C. 672
• Parties: STATE v. WATSON.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

24 S.E.2d 540

222 N.C. 672

STATE v. WATSON.

No. 145.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

March 17, 1943

The defendant was tried and convicted of murder in the first degree upon a bill of indictment drawn in conformity with C.S. § 4614.

The evidence of the State tended to show that the defendant fired at least one shot from a pistol in the hall of the house in which his wife, the deceased, was living, and then forced open the door of the living room in which his wife was standing near the stove, and fired another shot from the pistol which struck his wife in the breast, inflicting a mortal wound.

The evidence of the defendant tended to show that he did not fire his pistol before opening the door to the living room where his wife was, and that when the door was opened his wife immediately fired at him with a rifle, and he shot only one time in necessary self defense.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and from sentence of death predicated upon the verdict, the defendant appealed, assigning errors.

S Russell Lane, of Rich Square, and J.H. Spruill, of Windsor for defendant, appellant.

Harry M. McMullan, Atty. Gen., and George B. Patton and Hughes J Rhodes, Asst. Attys. Gen. for the State.

SCHENCK Justice.

The assignments of error appearing in the record and set out in the appellant's brief all relate to the charge of the Court.

The first exception discussed in the appellant's brief assails an excerpt from the charge addressed to the elements of premeditation and deliberation necessary to constitute the crime of murder in the first degree, which reads: "Ordinarily these elements (premeditation and deliberation) are not susceptible of direct proof, but are inferred from various circumstances such as ill will, previous difficulty between the parties, declaration of intent to kill either before or after striking the fatal blow, or where the evidence shows the killing was done in a brutal and felonious manner."

This was but another way of charging the jury that premeditation and deliberation are not usually susceptible of direct proof and are therefore, susceptible of proof by circumstances from which the facts sought to be proven may be inferred. That these essential elements of murder in the first degree may be proven by circumstantial evidence has been repeatedly held by this court. State v. McCormac, 116 N.C. 1033, 21 S.E. 693; State v. Roberson, 150 N.C. 837, 64 S.E. 182; State v. Cain, 178 N.C. 724, 100 S.E. 884; State v. Buffkin, 209 N.C. 117, 183 S.E. 543.

The defendant in his brief contends that his Honor's charge was tantamount to telling the jury that they must infer premeditation and deliberation upon the finding by them of any one of the facts enumerated, namely, ill will, previous difficulty, declaration of intent to kill, or killing done in a brutal and felonious manner. With this contention we do not concur. His Honor simply charged that the elements of premeditation and deliberation were usually not provable by direct evidence, and for that reason were susceptible of proof by circumstantial evidence, and gave the facts enumerated merely as examples of circumstantial evidence by which the essential elements of the crime might be proven. The excerpt from the charge to which the exception is addressed does nothing more than instruct the jury that the finding of any of the facts enumerated might be considered by the jury as circumstantial evidence of the existence of premeditation and deliberation.

The excerpt assailed is in accord with the utterances of this Court. In State v. Roberson, supra, this court affirmed a charge of the Superior Court in the following language AD150 N.C. 837, 64 S.E. 184]: "This premeditation and deliberation, like any other fact, may be shown by circumstances, and in determining there was such, the jury may consider evidence of absence of provocation, absence of a quarrel at the time of the killing, and threats, if there is such evidence. Not that you are compelled to find premeditation and deliberation from such evidence, but that, if there is such evidence, you may consider it in determining whether there was such premeditation and deliberation as I have indicated." The Court, continuing, said: "Almost every word in this charge has been repeatedly upheld by this court. It follows all the decisions from State v. Fuller, in 114 N.C. 885, 19 S.E. 797, to State v. Banks, 143 N.C. 652, 57 S.E. 174. The charge is substantially the charge which was approved by this court in State v. Teachey, 138 N.C. [587], 598, 50 S.E. 232." In State v. Cain, supra [178 N.C. 724, 100 S.E. 887], we find: "Premeditation and deliberation, like any other fact, may be shown by circumstances, and in determining as to whether there was such premeditation and deliberation the jury may consider the entire absence of provocation and all the circumstances under which the homicide is committed. State v. Roberson, 150 N.C. 837, 64 S.E. 182; Carr on Homicide, § 72. If the circumstances show a formed design to take the life of the deceased, the crime is murder in the first degree. This subject is so fully discussed in the many cases in our reports that it is useless to pursue the matter further." Again in State v. Evans, 198 N.C. 82, 150 S.E. 678, 679, there appears: "In determining the question of premeditation and deliberation, it is proper for the jury to take into consideration the conduct of the prisoner, before and after, as well as at the time of, the homicide, and all the attendant circumstances." And Devin, J., in State v. Buffkin, supra [[[209 N.C. 117, 183 S.E. 547], uses this language: "In determining the question of premeditation and deliberation, it is proper for the jury to take into consideration the conduct of the defendant, before and after, and all attendant circumstances, and it is immaterial how soon after resolving to kill the defendant carried his purpose into execution. State v. Evans, 198 N.C. 82, 150 S.E. 678, 680; State v. Miller, 197 N.C. 445, 149 S.E. 590. In State v. Evans, supra, Chief Justice Stacy quotes with approval from Kerr on Homicide, § 72: 'The want of provocation, the preparation of a weapon, proof that there was no quarreling just before the killing, may be considered by the jury, with other circumstances, in determining whether the act shall be attributed to sudden impulse or premeditated design.' "

This exception cannot be sustained.

The second exception discussed in the appellant's brief assails an excerpt from the charge which reads: "Intent is an act or emotion of the mind, seldom, if ever, capable of direct or positive proof, but is arrived at by such just and reasonable deductions from the acts and facts proven, as the guarded judgment of a reasonably prudent and cautious man would ordinarily draw therefrom." We do not concur in the contention made by appellant that this portion of the charge was tantamount to an instruction that the burden of proof resting upon the State of a criminal intent was of a less grade than beyond a reasonable doubt. The excerpt assailed by the exception is nothing more than an instruction that a criminal intent may be, in truth ordinarily is, proven by circumstantial evidence, that is, by proving the fact of such an intent by proving other facts from which the intent might be inferred, State v. Smith, 211 N.C. 93, 189 S.E. 175, accompanied by words suggesting the use of caution in finding the...