State v. Watson

• Citation: 620 N.W.2d 233
• Decision Date: 16 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-0264.,99-0264.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Nathan Blake WATSON, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

620 N.W.2d 233

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Nathan Blake WATSON, Appellant.

No. 99-0264.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 16, 2000.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing January 2, 2001.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia A. Johnston, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, and Connie S. Ricklefs, County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

TERNUS, Justice.

The defendant, Nathan Watson, was convicted of murdering his father. On appeal, he claims that the trial court should have sua sponte held a hearing on whether his trial counsel suffered from a conflict of interest based on counsel's dual representation of the defendant and a key prosecution witness. We agree that such a hearing was required under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

At the time of the events giving rise to Watson's conviction, Watson lived with his father, Rocky Chase, in a converted school bus located on property belonging to Watson's aunt and uncle, Janet and Gene Chase. In the early morning hours of January 16, 1998, Watson ran to the next-door residence of his aunt and told her that his father had shot himself. Law enforcement authorities arrived and determined that Rocky had been shot in the forehead at close range with a shotgun. Disbelieving that Rocky's death was a suicide, the county attorney charged Watson with first-degree murder. See Iowa Code §§ 707.1, .2(1) (1997).

The defendant pled not guilty, maintaining that the shooting was accidental or self-inflicted. Tim Ross-Boon and Brian Sissel of the Linn County Public Defender's Office were appointed to represent the defendant.

The case was tried to a jury. The testimony of expert witnesses called by both sides was conflicting as to whether the shooting was intentional or accidental.

Of greater importance to the present appeal, however, was the testimony of a prosecution witness, David Grunewald. Grunewald testified on direct that he and Watson occupied adjoining cells at the county jail and that Grunewald overheard Watson say "demons made him shoot his dad." Grunewald also testified that his criminal record included, among other things, burglary, public intoxication and possession of marijuana. Grunewald said that he received no benefit for his testimony and came forth voluntarily.

Defense attorney Sissel cross-examined Grunewald. He brought out the fact that Grunewald was a friend of Rocky and saw Rocky almost every day, including the day before Rocky's death. Grunewald testified that when he heard of the shooting on the morning of the 16th, he called Janet and then visited her later that same day. Sissel also established on cross-examination that Grunewald was a substance abuser. Of significance to the issue on appeal was Grunewald's testimony that criminal contempt charges were pending against him at the time he came forward with information concerning Watson's incriminating statement. Grunewald testified that he and his attorney, Ross-Boon (the same Ross-Boon who represented the defendant), had discussed his sentencing with the county attorney before Grunewald told authorities of Watson's statement. Grunewald, however, acknowledged that his sentencing occurred after he told the jailer that Watson had admitted killing his father. Grunewald testified that he was sentenced to serve fourteen days in jail, although the maximum sentence possible was thirty days. It appeared from the record that Grunewald had served his sentence prior to testifying in Watson's trial.

As our review of Grunewald's testimony shows, Grunewald's cross-examination revealed that Ross-Boon simultaneously represented Grunewald and the defendant for some portion of the pre-trial period, including the period during which Grunewald overheard Watson's incriminating statement, reported it to the authorities, and was sentenced on his contempt conviction. No objections were made by anyone at trial concerning the propriety of Ross-Boon's representation of the defendant, and the trial court did not initiate an inquiry into the matter.

The jury returned a conviction of first-degree murder. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Watson asserts that his attorney, Ross-Boon, had an actual conflict of interest or a serious potential conflict of interest when he maintained dual representation of the defendant and Grunewald, a key prosecution witness whose interests were adverse to the defendant. Watson claims that this situation should have been apparent to the trial court upon Grunewald's testimony and that the trial court had a duty sua sponte to make an inquiry. The trial court's failure to do so, argues the defendant, requires automatic reversal of his conviction.¹ Because Watson raises a constitutional issue, our review is de novo. See State v. Vanover, 559 N.W.2d 618, 627 (Iowa 1997).

II. Applicable Legal Principles.

The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution requires that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. This constitutional guarantee is binding on the states. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 566 (1975). Defendants are entitled not only to counsel, but also to counsel that is "zealous and active." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58, 53 S.Ct. 55, 60, 77 L.Ed. 158, 165 (1932). The purpose of this Sixth Amendment provision is "`to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.'" Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1696-97, 100 L.Ed.2d 140, 148 (1988) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694 (1984)).

One of the first United States Supreme Court cases to consider a deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel due to a conflict of interest was Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). In that case, an attorney representing one defendant, Glasser, was appointed, over objection, to represent a codefendant, Kretske. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 68-69,62 S.Ct. at 464,86 L.Ed. at 698. During trial, counsel failed to undertake the cross-examination of a witness that might have been helpful to Glasser because of counsel's admitted desire to protect Kretske. Id. at 73, 62 S.Ct. at 466, 86 L.Ed. at 700. Similar conflicts were present with respect to the admission of other evidence. Id. The Court held that Glasser's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel had been denied and that this denial required that the defendant's conviction be set aside and a new trial ordered. Id. at 76, 62 S.Ct. at 468, 86 L.Ed. at 702. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that

[t]o determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a result of the court's appointment of Stewart as counsel for Kretske is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.

Id. at 75-76, 62 S.Ct. at 467, 86 L.Ed. at 702.

In a later case, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), the Court interpreted Glasser to mandate automatic reversal "whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection." 435 U.S. at 488, 98 S.Ct. at 1181, 55 L.Ed.2d at 437. Moreover, reversal is required "even if no particular prejudice is shown and even if the defendant was clearly guilty." Id. at 489, 98 S.Ct. at 1181, 55 L.Ed.2d at 437. In such situations, "prejudice is presumed regardless of whether it was independently shown." Id. The rationale underlying this presumed prejudice rule lies in the fact that "the evil [of representing conflicting interests] is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process." Id. at 490, 98 S.Ct. at 1182, 55 L.Ed.2d at 438. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a case of dual representation, gave a similar reason for presuming prejudice:

When there is a conflict of interest . . . the prejudice may be subtle, even unconscious. It may elude detection on review. A reviewing court deals with a cold record, capable, perhaps, of exposing gross instances of incompetence but often giving no clue to the erosion of zeal which may ensue from divided loyalty. Accordingly, where the conflict is real . . . a denial of the right to effective representation exists, without a showing of specific prejudice.

Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th Cir.1974); accord Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir.1979) ("A cold, dispassionate appellate transcript simply cannot provide an adequate basis for assessing [defense counsel's] performance, for subtle variations in demeanor and depth of cross-examination cannot be reflected in the pages of a transcript.").

In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the Court considered a Sixth Amendment claim made by a defendant who had not objected at trial to his counsel's joint representation of another defendant. The Court indicated that joint representation of codefendants does not always give rise to a conflict of interest, presumably because, as the Court noted later in its opinion, a common defense is often the best defense. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347, 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1717, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d at 345, 346. Therefore, the Court held that "[u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry." Id. at 347, 100 S.Ct. at 1717, 64 L.Ed.2d at 346. Moreover, if the trial court record shows merely a possibility of a conflict, prejudice...