State v. Webb

• Decision Date: 03 June 2022
• Docket Number: S-21-356.
• Citation: 311 Neb. 694,974 N.W.2d 317
• Parties: STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Yohan WEBB, appellant.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

311 Neb. 694

974 N.W.2d 317

STATE of Nebraska, appellee,

v.Yohan WEBB, appellant.

No. S-21-356.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Filed June 3, 2022

Joshua D. Barber, of Barber & Barber, P.C., L.L.O., Lincoln, for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust, Lincoln, for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Funke, J.

Yohan Webb appeals from an order of the district court for Lancaster County, Nebraska, which affirmed the county court's decision to overrule Webb's motion for absolute discharge on statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds. We affirm in part, and in part dismiss.

BACKGROUND

The State of Nebraska filed a criminal complaint against Webb on June 3, 2019, in the county court for Lancaster County. On August 5, Webb filed several pretrial motions, including a motion for disclosure of intention to use evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts; a motion for disclosure of intention to use evidence of prior convictions for impeachment; a motion to allow Webb to wear civilian clothing when in the presence of the jury; a request for a Jackson v. Denno¹ hearing; a motion to remove Webb's restraints when in the presence of the jury; a motion for sequestration of the witnesses; and a motion in limine. Webb's filings did not include a notice of hearing and were not heard or ruled upon by the court.

On August 9, 2019, Webb filed a motion for a competency evaluation. At a hearing held September 5, the court found Webb incompetent to stand trial and ordered him committed to a psychiatric hospital for appropriate treatment to remove the disability. On February 5, 2020, a doctor opined Webb was competent to stand trial. The court set a hearing regarding Webb's competency for March 17, but the matter was continued three times, until May 8, when the court found Webb competent to stand trial and scheduled the case for a jury trial during the court's July 6 jury term.

On July 1, 2020, Webb requested appointment of substitute counsel and filed numerous pretrial motions, like those filed on August 5, 2019. On July 9, 2020, the court sustained Webb's motion for substitute counsel and continued trial to August 5. Also on July 9, Webb filed a motion for discovery which, to date, has not been ruled upon. On August 5, Webb moved for a continuance, which the court granted. That same day, the court set the matter for a pretrial conference to be heard on August 10 and a jury trial for the September jury term. Webb failed to appear for the pretrial conference, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Webb was arrested on October 10. On October 24, Webb filed a motion for absolute discharge, alleging violations of his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights.

The county court issued an order overruling Webb's motion, generally finding that Webb's August 5, 2019, motions had stopped the speedy trial clock under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) (Reissue 2016). Webb appealed, and the district court affirmed, agreeing with the county court that Webb's August 5 motions had stopped the speedy trial clock. For completeness, the district court found there were additional time periods that would be excludable from the speedy trial calculation.

Webb appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Webb assigns, restated and consolidated, that the district court erred in affirming the county court's decision, because (1) the State did not meet its burden of proving that time periods were excludable under § 29-1207(4), (2) time attributable to Webb's competency proceedings should not have been excluded, and (3) the length of delays in bringing the case to trial violated Webb's constitutional speedy trial rights.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, a trial court's determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.² Both the district court and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county court for error appearing on the record.³

When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court's inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.⁴ However, an appellate court independently reviews questions of law in appeals from the county court.⁵

ANALYSIS

Webb contends that he was entitled to discharge because the State violated his statutory right to a speedy trial. The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in § 29-1207 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1208 (Reissue 2016).⁶ Under § 29-1207(1), "[e]very person indicted or informed against for any offense shall be brought to trial within six months, and such time shall be computed as provided in this section." Section 29-1207(2) generally provides that the "six-month period shall commence to run from the date the indictment is returned or the information filed." This court has held that Nebraska's speedy trial statutes are applicable to prosecutions in county court which are commenced by the filing of a criminal complaint.⁷ Certain periods of delay are excluded from the speedy trial calculation. Section 29-1207(4)(a) excludes all time between the time of the filing of a defendant's pretrial motions and their final disposition.

To calculate the time for statutory speedy trial purposes, " ‘a court must exclude the day the complaint was filed, count forward 6 months, back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under § 29-1207(4) to determine the last day the defendant can be tried.’ "⁸ The State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under § 29-1207(4).⁹ If a defendant is "not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial as provided for in section 29-1207, as extended by excluded periods, he or she shall be entitled to his or her absolute discharge from the offense charged."¹⁰

The timeline in this matter is uncontroverted. The State filed a criminal complaint against Webb in county court on June 3, 2019. In county court, at the hearing on Webb's motion for discharge, the court stated in oral findings that the original speedy trial deadline was December 3. As of August 2, Webb's trial was scheduled for the August 5 through 16 jury term. On August 5, Webb filed seven pretrial motions that remain pending. The court found, pursuant to § 29-1207(4)(a), that Webb's pretrial motions stopped the speedy trial clock on August 5, meaning Webb had awaited trial for only 64 days. The court therefore overruled Webb's motion for absolute discharge based on statutory speedy trial rights. Additionally, the court denied Webb's motion based upon his constitutional speedy trial right.

Webb appealed to the district court. Webb's amended statements of errors asserted the county court erred in (1) overruling his motion for discharge, (2) determining that the State met its burden of proof, and (3) applying the statutory grounds for excluding time under § 29-1207(4)(a). The district court concluded that Webb's appeal "offer[ed] no authority and has no real argument disputing the County Court's determination that the pretrial motions stopped the clock on August 5, 2019." The district court agreed with the county court's analysis that the August 5 pretrial motions stopped the speedy trial clock and affirmed the county court's decision to overrule Webb's motion for absolute discharge based on statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights.

On appeal from the district court's order to this court, Webb contends his August 5, 2019, motions should not be considered when calculating excludable time because the motions were not specifically enumerated in § 29-1207(4)(a) and because the motions did not cause any delay in bringing his case to trial.

Section 29-1207(4)(a) provides:

(4) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial:

(a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including, but not limited to, an examination and hearing on competency and the period during which he or she is incompetent to stand trial; the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial motions of the defendant, including motions to suppress evidence, motions to quash the indictment or information, demurrers and pleas in abatement, and motions for a change of venue; and the time consumed in the trial of other charges against the defendant.

Webb's argument that his August 5, 2019, motions did not cause any delay in bringing his case to trial is inapposite to our jurisprudence. Moreover, Webb candidly admitted in his brief that his argument has previously been rejected by this court.

We have consistently held the plain terms of § 29-1207(4)(a) dictate the exclusion of all time between the filing of a defendant's pretrial motion and the final disposition of such motion, regardless of the delay of disposition.¹¹ Additionally, we have recognized that under § 29-1207(4)(a), the period of delay is defined by the statute itself as the period between the filing and final disposition of the pretrial motion.¹² Because a period of delay is generally synonymous with a period of time, excludable periods can result from delays in the progression of a criminal case regardless of whether the trial date was postponed or remained unchanged.¹³ As such this argument is without merit.

Webb's argument that because his motions were not the same type of motions as those specifically listed in § 29-1207(4)(a), the motions do not qualify as pretrial motions for purposes of calculating excludable time, is also without merit.

On August 5, 2019, Webb filed a motion for disclosure of intention to use evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts; a motion for disclosure of intention to use evidence of prior convictions for impeachment; a motion to allow Webb to wear civilian clothing when in the presence of the jury; a request for...