State v. Weber

• Decision Date: 03 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 28192–2–III.,28192–2–III.
• Citation: 247 P.3d 782,159 Wash.App. 779
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent,v.Bryan J. WEBER, Petitioner.

159 Wash.App. 779

247 P.3d 782

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Bryan J. WEBER, Petitioner.

No. 28192–2–III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.

Feb. 3, 2011.

Douglas Dwight Phelps, Phelps & Associates, P.S., Spokane, WA, for Petitioner.Andrew Kelvin Miller, Brendan Michael Siefken, Terry Jay Bloor, Benton County Prosecutor's Office, Kennewick, WA, for Respondent.KORSMO, A.C.J.

[159 Wash.App. 782] ¶ 1 The district and superior courts disagreed on the legal conclusion to be drawn from the trial court's findings on a suppression hearing. This court granted discretionary review to determine if the superior court applied the appropriate standard in its appellate review. While we are uncertain what standard was applied, we agree with the superior court's determination that the evidence did not support the district court's legal conclusion that a pretext stop occurred and affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 Washington State Patrol Trooper Steve Shiflett saw Bryan J. Weber drive his car out of an apartment complex at about 2:53 a.m. He noticed that the car entered the street without stopping before crossing over a sidewalk. Trooper Shiflett then paced Mr. Weber's car for about three blocks. Mr. Weber drove 47 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone.

¶ 3 Trooper Shiflett pulled the car over. Mr. Weber's eyes were bloodshot and watery and he smelled like alcohol. Mr. Weber agreed to perform field sobriety tests, but did not perform them well. The trooper arrested him for driving under the influence (DUI) and transported him to the jail. Breath tests showed Mr. Weber's breath alcohol level to be .115 and .118. Trooper Shiflett cited Mr. Weber for DUI, but did not cite him for the traffic infractions.

¶ 4 Mr. Weber moved to suppress the evidence obtained following the stop. He argued that the traffic stop for speeding and failure to stop was a pretext to investigate his possible driving under the influence. The matter was heard before a judge pro tempore. Trooper Shiflett was the only witness called by the prosecution at the hearing.¹ The trooper testified that he stopped Mr. Weber's vehicle for traffic infractions but is always on the lookout for DUIs when on duty:

JOHNSON [prosecutor]: What was the reason for the stop?

....

SHIFLETT: The combination of traffic violations. The failing to stop before the sidewalk and the speeding.

....

PHELPS [defense attorney]: What time of night was this.

SHIFLETT: I don't recall, oh, yeah, it was right before I was going home. 2:53 is when the stop happened.

PHELPS: A.M.?

SHIFLETT: Yes.

PHELPS: Was there any people out on the street as far as pedestrians?

SHIFLETT: I didn't indicate but there's not very many at 3:00 in the morning in that area.

PHELPS: Alright. Were there very many cars on the street?

SHIFLETT: I don't recall any other cars on the street.

.... PHELPS: And part of your duties is DUI enforcement?

SHIFLETT: Yes.

PHELPS: Were you working a special detail [the] night of this incident?

SHIFLETT: No.

PHELPS: And were you looking for DUI's?

SHIFLETT: Yes.

PHELPS: And it's not uncommon for people to be drinking and driving late at night, is it?

SHIFLETT: Very common.

PHELPS: And part of what you do as a state trooper is look for DUI's.

SHIFLETT: Yes.

PHELPS: Did that play a part in stopping this particular defendant?

....

SHIFLETT: I would have stopped him for those violations if it was at noon. The hour didn't make any difference, no.

....

JOHNSON: ... was DUI the basis for this stop?

SHIFLETT: I guess I don't know how to clarify that. I'm always looking for DUI's at all hours every time I work. I'm always on the look out for that, but, the reason for the stop was traffic violations.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 38–45 (emphasis added).

¶ 5 The district court took the matter under advisement. The court subsequently issued a written ruling that concluded that the stop was pretextual and granted the suppression motion. The district court entered five findings of fact: (1) the trooper ² testified he was looking for DUIs at the time he observed Mr. Weber; (2) the trooper testified that he observed Mr. Weber fail to stop at the crosswalk while leaving an apartment complex in violation of RCW 46.61.365; (3) the trooper did not immediately stop Weber; (4) the trooper paced him for three blocks at 48 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone before stopping him; (5) the officer did not cite for the traffic infractions, but did cite for DUI. CP at 2, 34.

[159 Wash.App. 785] ¶ 6 From these findings, the court entered four conclusions of law: (1) the trooper “was not motivated by a perceived need to make a community caretaking stop aimed at enforcing the traffic code,” (2) “the traffic violations were not the real reason for the stop,” (3) “the stop was an unlawful pretext stop,” and (4) the motion to suppress was granted and all evidence was suppressed. CP at 3, 35.

¶ 7 The district court entered an order that the practical effect of the suppression order was to terminate the case. The State then appealed the ruling to the superior court pursuant to the Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ). The superior court reviewed the district court transcript and the briefing of the parties. After hearing argument, the superior court reversed the district court. Its oral remarks discussed the factual basis for the stop before deciding that a pretext stop had not occurred. The written superior court ruling simply stated that there was “sufficient evidence introduced to reverse the Findings of Fact entered October 17, 2008,” and reversed the district court order suppressing the evidence. CP at 56.

¶ 8 Mr. Weber sought discretionary review from this court on the issue of whether or not the superior court applied the appropriate standard of review in the RALJ process. One of this court's commissioners denied review. A divided panel modified that ruling and accepted discretionary review.

ANALYSIS

RALJ Standards

¶ 9 Mr. Weber contends that the superior court applied the wrong legal standard of review. He argues that the proper test is whether substantial evidence supports the district court's findings, not whether substantial evidence supported reversal. His argument is correct as far as it goes.

¶ 10 RALJ 9.1 governs appellate review by a superior court of a decision of a district court. State v. Ford, 110 Wash.2d 827, 829–830, 755 P.2d 806 (1988);

[159 Wash.App. 786 , 247 P.3d 786]

State v. Brokman, 84 Wash.App. 848, 850, 930 P.2d 354 (1997). RALJ 9.1(a) states that the superior court reviews the lower court ruling to determine if there are any errors of law. In the course of its review, the superior court “shall accept those factual determinations supported by substantial evidence in the record (1) which were expressly made by the court of limited jurisdiction, or (2) that may reasonably be inferred from the judgment of the court of limited jurisdiction.” RALJ 9.1(b). The superior court does not consider the evidence de novo. State v. Basson, 105 Wash.2d 314, 317, 714 P.2d 1188 (1986).

¶ 11 These rules likewise apply to appellate courts that grant discretionary review of a superior court's RALJ decision. Ford, 110 Wash.2d at 829, 755 P.2d 806; State v. Jim, 156 Wash.App. 39, 41, 230 P.3d 1080, review granted, 170 Wash.2d 1001, 245 P.3d 226 (2010). Appellate courts also will treat mislabeled findings or conclusions in accord with what they actually are. Willener v. Sweeting, 107 Wash.2d 388, 394, 730 P.2d 45 (1986).

¶ 12 We consider Mr. Weber's challenge with these standards in mind. He rightly complains that the focus of the superior court should have been on whether the evidence supported the district court's findings. The superior court's written ruling is not very helpful. To the extent it can be read as determining its own facts, the ruling would run afoul of RALJ 9.1(b). We are not sure that is what actually happened however. Part of the problem is that the district court made only a few factual findings and they do not squarely touch on why this was a pretext stop. It appears from the first two conclusions of law that the district court did not accept the trooper's testimony that he stopped the car because of the observed violations. The trial court did not make any express statement about the trooper's credibility, nor did it squarely find what motivated him to make the traffic stop. While we have an obligation to reasonably infer facts from the trial court's judgment, it is difficult to determine what should be inferred here. Perhaps it could be inferred that the officer was motivated by something other than enforcing the speeding law, although there is not much in the record to support such an inference. To go any further and infer a specific motivation, however, fails on two accounts. First, nothing in the record would support such an inference, and a reviewing court must only infer facts that have substantial evidentiary support in the record.³ RALJ 9.1(b). Second, it is a long-recognized logical fallacy to draw an affirmative conclusion from a negative premise. I. Copi & C. Cohen, Introduction to Logic, at 277–278 (10th ed., Prentice Hall, 1998); J. Brennan, A Handbook of Logic, at 79–81 (2d ed., Harper & Row, 1961). Thus, even if a reviewing court infers that the trial court factually found the trooper was not motivated to enforce the traffic law, it is not in a position to infer what the motive actually was.

¶ 13 In light of the court's oral remarks, a more plausible interpretation is that the superior court concluded that the factual findings did not support the legal conclusion that a pretext stop occurred. Our commissioner read the record that way.⁴ While that reading is a fair one for the oral remarks, it is hard to square with the written ruling's statement that there was “sufficient evidence to reverse” the suppression order.

¶ 14 This court sits in the same position as the superior court in review of the district court decision. Ford, 110 Wash.2d at 829, 755...