Mose v. Stanley
| Decision Date | 02 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 81173-8-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | LYDIA MOSE, Appellant, v. TROY STANLEY and JANE DOE STANLEY, Respondents. CALVIN C. GRAY, Plaintiff, |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Lydia Mose sued Troy Stanley in district court for damages following a car accident. Stanley counterclaimed, alleging Mose drove negligently, seeking an unspecified amount of damages. Both parties requested attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250. And before trial, Stanley proposed exhibits showing damages less than $10, 000. A jury rejected Stanley's counterclaim and found he was solely liable for the collision. The trial court denied Mose's request for attorney fees as the prevailing party on Stanley's counterclaim because Stanley did not specifically plead damages in an amount under $10, 000. The superior court affirmed. Because Stanley's proposed exhibits showing damages less than $10, 000 were enough to bring his claim within the statutory purview of RCW 4.84.250, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Mose and her passenger Calvin Gray sued Troy Stanley and Jane Doe Stanley (collectively Stanley) in King County District Court alleging that Stanley's negligence caused a car accident. Mose and Gray sought an unspecified amount of special and general damages for personal injuries and damages to Mose's vehicle. They also sought attorney fees "including fees awardable under RCW 4.84.250," also known as "the small claims settlement statute."[1]
Stanley answered the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses and a counterclaim against Mose. Stanley claimed Mose's negligent driving caused the accident and resulting damages to the car he was driving.[2] Like Mose's complaint Stanley's counterclaim did not request a specific amount of damages, but he requested attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250.
About a month before trial, Stanley proposed to admit several trial exhibits under ER 904 (admissibility of documents in a civil case). Those exhibits included an estimate of $7, 568 to repair the car and a report listing the pre-collision fair-market value of the car as $2, 421.[3]
After a four-day trial, the jury found the collision resulted from Stanley's sole negligence and awarded damages to Mose of $6, 026.
Mose moved for attorney fees of $107, 100 under RCW 4.84.250. Mose requested fees as a "prevailing" defendant because Stanley recovered nothing on his counterclaim.[4] See RCW 4.84.270. Stanley also sought fees of almost $56, 000 under RCW 4.84.250 and .030 because he obtained a directed verdict dismissing Gray's claims after Gray was unable to appear for trial.
The district court denied both requests for fees and denied Mose's motion to reconsider that ruling. The court denied her motion, in part, because it was "unable to find that [Stanley's] cause of action fell under the $10, 000 limit."
Mose appealed the denial of attorney fees to the King County Superior Court.[5] Following a hearing, the superior court affirmed the decision of the district court not to award Mose fees. The superior court ruled RCW 4.84.250 "did not apply" because Stanley "never pled an amount of damages either in his counterclaim or pursuant to a request for [a] statement of damages from" Mose. Mose appealed the superior court order and we granted discretionary review.[6]
Mose challenges the denial of her request for attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250 and .270 as a prevailing defendant because Stanley pursued an unsuccessful counterclaim and asserted less than $10, 000 in damages.
When the superior court acts in an appellate capacity, we review its decision under the standards in RALJ 9.1.[7] State v Thomas, 146 Wn.App. 568, 571, 191 P.3d 913 (2008). We review the district court's decision de novo to determine whether that court made errors of law. Kyle v Williams, 139 Wn.App. 348, 353, 161 P.3d 1036 (2007); RALJ 9.1(a). We sit in the same position as the superior court without deferring to the superior court's decision. State v. Weber, 159 Wn.App. 779, 787, 247 P.3d 782 (2011). We review the legal basis for an award of attorney fees de novo. Hulbert v. Port of Everett, 159 Wn.App. 389, 407, 245 P.3d 779 (2011).
In Washington, courts may award attorney fees only when authorized by a private agreement, a statute, or a recognized ground of equity. Labriola v. Pollard Grp., Inc., 152 Wn.2d 828, 839, 100 P.3d 791 (2004). Under RCW 4.84.250, fees "shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party" in "any action for damages where the amount pleaded by the prevailing party" is less than $10, 000. RCW 4.84.250.[8]
Chapter 4.84 RCW encourages out-of-court settlements and penalizes parties who unjustifiably bring or resist small claims. Williams v. Tilaye, 174 Wn.2d 57, 61-62, 272 P.3d 235 (2012); Beckmann, 107 Wn.2d at 788; Harold Meyer Drug v. Hurd, 23 Wn.App. 683, 687, 598 P.2d 404 (1979)." 'The obvious legislative intent is to enable a party to pursue a meritorious small claim without seeing his [or her] award diminished in whole or in part by legal fees.'" Target Nat'l Bank, 180 Wn.App. at 173-74 (quoting Northside Auto Serv., Inc. v. Consumers United Ins. Co., 25 Wn .App. 486, 492, 607 P.2d 890 (1980)).
An award of fees under RCW 4.84.250 is mandatory if the prevailing party meets the conditions of the statute. Kingston Lumber Supply Co. v. High Tech Dev. Inc., 52 Wn.App. 864, 867, 765 P.2d 27 (1988). A plaintiff is the prevailing party under RCW 4.84.250 only if the recovery exceeds the amount that the plaintiff offered to settle.[9] RCW 4.84.260. A defendant, on the other hand, is the prevailing party if the plaintiff recovers nothing at trial, even if the defendant made no settlement offer.[10] RCW 4.84.270; see Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. Burt, 56 Wn.App. 868, 871, 786 P.2d 300 (1990). While not a statutory requirement, a party may not be subject to fees under chapter 4.84 RCW unless the party received notice before trial of the potential request. Lay v. Hass, 112 Wn.App. 818, 824, 51 P.3d 130 (2002); Pub. Utils. Dist. No. 1 of Grays Harbor v. Crea, 88 Wn.App. 390, 393-94, 945 P.2d 722 (1997).
Stanley asserts RCW 4.84.250 does not apply to his counterclaim because he "did not assert any specific damages" and there was "no evidence of the actual amount" of damages he was seeking. We disagree.
In several key cases, our courts have addressed the timing, form, and content of the notice required under chapter 4.84 RCW. In Beckmann, the plaintiff sued for personal injuries and 11 days before trial, delivered to the transit authority an offer to settle for $3, 000. Beckmann, 107 Wn.2d at 787. Beckmann expressly tendered the offer under RCW 4.84.280, a statute related to RCW 4.84.250. Beckmann, 107 Wn.2d at 787. After the transit authority ignored the offer, the trial court ruled in Beckmann's favor, awarded $4, 360 in damages, and granted her request for fees under RCW 4.84.250. Beckmann, 107 Wn.2d at 787.
Upholding the superior court's ruling, our Supreme Court recognized that fulfilling the purpose of RCW 4.84.250 requires only "some type of notice" so that the opposing party would "realize the amount of the claim is small" and "should settle or else risk paying the prevailing party's attorney's fees." Beckmann, 107 Wn.2d at 788-89. The court overruled prior courts holding that RCW 4.84.250 requires notice of intent to request fees in the original pleading. Beckmann, 107 Wn.2d at 788-90. The court agreed with Beckmann that her offer to settle 11 days before trial pursuant to RCW 4.84.280 was sufficient notice to the defendant that the court may impose attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250. Beckmann, 107 Wn.2d at 789-90.[11]
Similarly, in Lay, the Lays sued their neighbors over a property line dispute, seeking damages and injunctive relief. Lay, 112 Wn.App. at 821. But they did not plead a specific amount of damages in their complaint. Lay, 112 Wn.App. at 824. Two months after they moved for summary judgment but before the trial court ruled on that motion, the Lays filed a motion seeking "nominal damages" and attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250. Lay, 112 Wn.App. at 822. The court granted summary judgment for the Lays, awarded them $433 in damages, and ultimately granted their request for attorney fees. Lay, 112 Wn.App. at 822-23.
Division Two of this court affirmed. Lay, 112 Wn.App. at 825. The court held that the Lays' pretrial motion for attorney fees and damages "was sufficient notice under RCW 4.84.250 to apprise [the defendant neighbors] that the amount in controversy was only $433, the true value of their case, and that the Lays sought attorney fees only if they prevailed." Lay, 112 Wn.App. at 825. The court noted that because the defendant neighbors knew of the potential for an award of fees a month before the court ruled on the summary judgment motion, they had an "opportunity to settle." Lay, 112 Wn.App. at 825.
Finally, Schmerer v. Darcy, 80 Wn.App. 499, 503-04, 910 P.2d 498 (1996), is particularly instructive because it involved a defendant's request for fees after the court dismissed the third-party plaintiffs' complaint. The third-party plaintiffs' original pleading was "silent as to the exact amount of their claim." Schmerer, 80 Wn.App. at 510. And unlike the facts here, it does not appear that any party cited RCW 4.84.250 in the pleadings. The court held that a prevailing defendant is entitled to fees under RCW 4.84.250 and .270 "if there was constructive knowledge that the amount of the claim was $10, 000 or less." Schmerer, 80 Wn.App. at 509-10.[12]
It is clear from Beckmann, Lay, and Schmerer that the failure to plead an exact amount of damages does not preclude fees under RCW 4.84.250. And the exhibits Stanley submitted before trial under ER 904 showed that he sought less than $10, 000 in...
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