State v. Webster

• Decision Date: 02 November 1897
• Citation: 121 N.C. 586,28 S.E. 254
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. WEBSTER et al.

28 S.E. 254

121 N.C. 586

STATE

v.WEBSTER et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Nov. 2, 1897.

Criminal Law —Trial —General Exceptions— Forcible Trespass—Title.

1. A general exception to the whole charge of the trial court will not be considered by the supreme court.

2. It is proper to exclude proof of title in de-

fendants, charged with forcible trespass, which is an offense against the possession of another.

3. Defendants went onto prosecutor's premises, and demanded certain machinery in his possession, which was refused. Next morning they began to take down the machinery, in prosecutor's absence, but about an hour afterwards he ordered them to stop, when one of them assaulted him, and then they continued their work until stopped by an officer. Held, they were guilty of forcible trespass.

Appeal from superior court, Chatham county; Allen, Judge.

E. L. Webster and another were convicted of forcible entry and trespass, and they appeal. Affirmed.

Murchison & Calvert, for appellants.

The Attorney General and Womack & Hayes, for the State.

DOUGLAS, J. This Is a criminal action, charging the three defendants with forcible entry and trespass. There was a verdict of guilty as to two of the defendants, the third defendant not having been taken. The convicted defendants appealed, assigning as error the exclusion of certain testimony tending to show title in the defendants, and for the refusal of the court "to give the instructions as asked, and for instructions given." We think that the defendants' prayers for instruction which were not given by the court were properly refused; and we cannot consider the "broadside exception" to the charge as given. This principle is too well settled to need the citation of the long line of authorities, and it is sufficient to say that it was reaffirmed in tnree different cases at the last term of this court, —in Hampton v. Railroad, 120 N. C. 534, 27 S. E. 96; Burnett V. Railroad, 120 N. C. 517, 26 S. E. 819; and State v. Moore, 120 N. C. 570, 26 S. E. 697. This rule becomes the more imperative as we ourselves fail to see any substantial error in the charge. The entire evidence, taken as a whole, discloses every element of the offense for which the defendants were convicted. The testimony offered by them as to the contract of April, 1896, If admitted, would have been of no avail; as forcible trespass Is essentially an offense against the possession of another, and does not depend upon the title. State v. Bennett, 20 N. C. 43; State v. McCauless, 31 N. C. 375; State v. Davis, 109 N. C. 809, 13 S. E. 883. The defendant E. L. Webster himself testified that he and the prosecutor, Thomas, had some kind of a contract in April, 1896, for the purchase of the property; that there was a dispute about the terms; that they (defendants) went to see Thomas on December 28th, the day before the offense was committed, and offered to him the mortgage and balance due according to their interpretation of the contract, which was refused; that Thomas refused to settle or do anything until he could see his lawyer; that next morning they went over, and began taking down the machinery, and were there about an hour when Thomas came and objected; and that, after being forbidden, they kept on until stopped by an officer. Thomas had testified that he had ordered the defendants to stop tearing down his property, and that the defendant R. B. Webster ran at him with an...