State v. Weigold
| Decision Date | 26 July 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 40114,40114 |
| Citation | 281 Minn. 73,160 N.W.2d 577 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Darrell Roy WEIGOLD, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In a prosecution for indecent assault, testimony of the complainant, her mother, and her doctor Held sufficient to sustain a finding of guilty.
2. Testimony reciting complainant's version of an indecent assault, given by her 30 or 40 minutes after the offense, Held admissible as corroboration if not as part of the res gestae.
3. Counsel for the accused in a prosecution for indecent assault has implied authority to waive a public trial. Hence, the failure of the accused to give express consent to clearing the courtroom did not violate his constitutional rights.
4. The fact that Minn.St. 617.08 defining indecent assault may be unconstitutionally applied in a hypothetical fact situation does not render it invalid in a prosecution where the validity of its construction or application is not open to question.
5. Defendant in a criminal prosecution has no legal right to conceal the facts of the offense from the court in order to obtain leniency. Hence it was not error for the court to refuse a plea of guilty, even if it resulted in testimony which may have influenced the court to impose a prison sentence.
6. Defendant's claim of inadequate representation Held to be without merit.
Affirmed.
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Bruce D. Willis, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, George M. Scott, County Atty., Henry W.
McCarr, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.
Defendant was charged with indecent assault, Minn.St. 617.08, waived a jury trial, and appeals from a conviction for which he received a 5-year sentence. There are six issues raised: (1) The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction; (2) the admissibility of testimony relating the version of the crime given by the victim to her mother; (3) the propriety of granting a motion to clear the courtroom; (4) the validity of the statute defining indecent assault; (5) the propriety of accepting a plea of Not guilty; and (6) the adequacy of counsel for defendant.
1. The prosecutrix testified that on February 17, 1965, she met defendant at a bar on South Eighth Street in downtown Minneapolis and permitted him to buy her a drink. At 11 p.m., as she was about to leave the bar, defendant offered to walk with her to her car which was parked several blocks away. When they arrived at the car, defendant asked complainant for a ride back to the bar and she consented. Once in the automobile, defendant made advances which complainant resisted. He pushed her down on the seat and put his hand under her dress. She then attempted to protect herself by sounding the horn with her foot. Thereupon defendant broke the horn rim away from the steering wheel. Defendant then stated he would drive back to the bar but instead took the complainant to Nicollet Island where he parked the car. There he again forcibly and violently pushed her down on the front seat, hit her over the eye, slapped her, removed her undergarments, and sexually assaulted her. He then drove back to the bar, and the complainant drove home. She promptly reported the incident to her mother. The mother testified that her daughter's underclothing was torn, and that blood and bruises were revealed when she disrobed. The next day the police were notified and complainant was examined by a doctor.
The doctor testified that his examination revealed scratches on the inside of complainant's wrists, a bruise on her forehead approximately 1 1/2 inches in diameter and raised 1/8 of an inch, bruises inside of both thighs, a recent tear of the hymenal ring, and other injuries from which the doctor concluded that the complainant had been sexually attacked within the previous 48 hours. Defendant testified on his own behalf and admitted having intercourse with complainant, but asserted it was with her consent and without any force on his part. We hold that in this state of the record there was ample evidence from which the trial court could find the defendant guilty.
2. Defendant argues that at least 30 or 40 minutes elapsed between the time the offense was committed and the time the complainant recited her version of the crime to her mother. Under such circumstances, he contends that the mother's testimony was not admissible as part of the res gestae, citing as authority State v. Alton, 105 Minn. 410, 417, 117 N.W. 617, 620. We have examined the record and find that the testimony of the mother merely corroborated her daughter's, and did not include any facts which complainant had not already recited. Hence, even if the testimony is not a part of the res gestae, it is admissible in a prosecution for indecent assault or rape. State v. Toth, 214 Minn. 147, 150, 7 N.W.2d 322, 324.
3. After complainant, her mother, and her doctor had all testified, and while a detective in the Minneapolis Police Department was on the stand, the prosecutor moved the court for an order clearing the courtroom of anyone not directly interested in the proceedings. An objection on the part of defendant's counsel was thereupon sustained. Shortly thereafter, while another detective was testifying, the prosecutor made the same motion, to which defendant's counsel stated, 'I have no objection to this.' The bailiff then removed everyone who had no part in the case.
Defendant now complains that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a public trial, citing State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800. In the Schmit case defendant persisted in his objection to having the courtroom cleared, and it is therefore not authority for prohibiting such action where, as here, the defendant consents. See, State ex rel. Baker v. Utecht, 221 Minn. 145, 152, 21 N.W.2d 328, 332. It is not...
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