State v. Weir, 93-576
| Decision Date | 19 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-576,93-576 |
| Citation | 645 A.2d 56,138 N.H. 671 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. William WEIR, Jr. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Jeffrey R. Howard, Atty. Gen. (Joseph N. Laplante, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief and orally), for State.
Twomey & Sisti Law Offices, Concord (Nicholas K. Holmes, on the brief and orally), for defendant.
The defendant, William Weir, Jr., was convicted on five counts of felonious sexual assault, RSA 632-A:3, II (1986), after a jury trial in Superior Court (Fauver, J.). The defendant argues that the trial court violated his right to a fair and impartial jury by refusing to disqualify one juror and by disqualifying another. We affirm.
The jurors in question will be referred to as Juror A and Juror B, respectively. Both jurors were selected after voir dire conducted by the trial court. As part of the selection process, the court read to the prospective jurors ten indictments against the defendant: five counts of felonious sexual assault for sexual contact with a girl between the ages of thirteen and sixteen years of age, and five counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault for the same acts but with the additional allegation of the use of physical force and violence. The trial court then questioned the panel of prospective jurors as to potential biases regarding witnesses or the subject matter of the trial. Neither juror at issue had any problem with the questions or statements propounded by the trial court in voir dire.
The defendant bases his claim on both the State and Federal Constitutions. Because we believe the principles are the same, see State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 646, 622 A.2d 1197, 1202, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 917, 114 S.Ct. 309, 126 L.Ed.2d 256 (1993), and because we believe that the New Hampshire Constitution provides at least as much protection as does the Federal Constitution on this issue, we address the defendant's claims under State law, looking to federal law only for guidance. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983).
"It is a fundamental precept of our system of justice that a defendant has the right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury." State v. VandeBogart, 136 N.H. 107, 110, 612 A.2d 906, 908 (1992). RSA chapter 500-A:12, II (1983) states that "[i]f it appears that any juror is not indifferent, he shall be set aside on that trial." If a juror is found to be disqualified at any time before or during the trial, he should be removed from further service. See State v. Wong, 138 N.H. 56, 67-68, 635 A.2d 470, 477-78 (1993). Indifference or impartiality Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1643, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961) (quotation omitted). "The trial court's determination of the impartiality of the jurors selected, essentially a question of demeanor and credibility, 'is entitled ... to special deference.' " Smart, 136 N.H. at 653, 622 A.2d at 1206 (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2892, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984)). As such, the trial court's determination on this issue will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion or upon a finding that the decision was against the weight of the evidence. Wong, 138 N.H. at 67, 635 A.2d at 477.
We first address the defendant's contentions regarding Juror A. Before trial commenced, Juror A reported to the trial court that she had informed her knitting instructor that she might not be in class the week of the trial because "I'm going to be on jury duty again, and it looks like it might be a pretty horrendous case." The knitting instructor responded that her son, a State trooper might have been the arresting officer. Juror A told her instructor that she did not believe it was the same case. The prosecutor, who knew the instructor's son by name, confirmed that he was not involved in the case at all. The trial court conducted a colloquy to determine whether the juror would be biased as a result of her conversation with her instructor. Juror A replied consistently that her conversation would not affect her impartiality.
Juror A also reported to the court that her instructor had said that if it were up to her, "I'd hang him by...." In response to questioning by defense counsel, Juror A, however, said that "I don't even know if she was talking about the [defendant], because [the police officer involved in the case] is not her son." The following colloquy ensued:
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to strike Juror A, contending that she had: (1) formed a belief that the case was "horrendous" before any evidence had been presented; (2) discussed the case with others after the jury had been empaneled; (3) been told by an acquaintance that the defendant was guilty and should be severely punished; (4) failed to reveal on voir dire that she does not believe that police officers ever knowingly testify falsely; and (5) made contradictory statements during voir dire.
The defendant's first and third contentions boil down to an argument that Juror A had prejudged the defendant. The record does not support this argument. Juror A's comment to her instructor that it "might be a pretty horrendous case" does not, as the defendant suggests, reflect that the juror prejudged the case before hearing any evidence, but rather reflects only what the jury pool was told by the judge; namely, that the case involved ten counts of sexual assault, including counts charging forcible anal, vaginal, and oral intercourse. It would be a strange juror indeed who would not suspect that the evidence to come might be somewhat horrendous.
As for the instructor's comment regarding punishment of the defendant, Juror A stated that she did not know if the instructor was even referring to the case that she was sitting on, and that it would not sway her own opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. To be indifferent, a juror need not come into the trial with no information or impression of the nature of the case. "It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside [her] impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." State v. Laaman, 114 N.H. 794, 800, 331 A.2d 354, 358 (1974). The trial judge, who listened to all of Juror A's responses and was able to view her demeanor and assess her credibility, did not abuse his discretion in finding that Juror A need not be excused.
The defendant's second contention is that because Juror A disobeyed the trial court's admonition not...
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...under the State and Federal Constitutions with respect to the right to a fair and impartial jury "are the same." State v. Weir, 138 N.H. 671, 673, 645 A.2d 56 (1994) ; see State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 646, 622 A.2d 1197 (1993). Indeed, we have explicitly adopted the federal standard for de......
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...under the State and Federal Constitutions with respect to the right to a fair and impartial jury "are the same." State v. Weir, 138 N.H. 671, 673 (1994); see State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 646 (1993). Indeed, we have explicitly adopted the federal standard for determining whether a juror is ......
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