State v. Welton

• Decision Date: 14 January 1981
• Docket Number: No. 64116,64116
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. David L. WELTON, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 157

300 N.W.2d 157

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. David L. WELTON, Appellant.

No. 64116.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 14, 1981.

Martha Shepard, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Lona Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and William Thomas, Asst. Polk County Atty., for appellee.

Considered by LeGRAND, P. J., and UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK, LARSON and SCHULTZ, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

A jury found defendant David L. Welton guilty of the crime of willful injury in violation of section 708.4, The Code 1979. He appeals challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and a jury instruction. We affirm.

Section 708.4 provides: "Any person who does an act which is not justified and which is intended to cause and does cause serious injury to another commits a class 'C' felony." " 'Serious injury' means disabling mental illness, or bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." § 702.18, The Code 1979. To prove the element of "serious injury" the State relied exclusively on the "protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ" portion of the definition.

The facts are largely undisputed, and we shall summarize them. On May 16, 1979, the victim, Deborah Clutter, and the defendant, David L. Welton, were living together in a hotel room in Des Moines, Iowa. That afternoon defendant accused the victim of involvement with other men. That evening he accompanied her to a tavern. Defendant left for a period of time and became intoxicated by inhaling glue. When he returned to the tavern, he and the victim argued, apparently because defendant did not approve of the victim's frequenting the tavern.

Defendant and the victim left the tavern together and returned to their room. They continued to argue. The argument apparently became more heated, and defendant threw the victim down on the bed and struck her at least several times with his fist.

Someone called the hotel clerk, complaining of the noise, and the clerk went to their room and entered it. The victim ran from the room and later testified that the defendant kicked and hit her while she was going down the stairs.

The victim was taken by ambulance to Broadlawns Hospital. She was bleeding from the mouth and had contusions and bruises around the mouth area. She was examined, and it was determined that she had two breaks in her mandible, or lower jaw bone. One was a verticle fracture of the horizontal portion of the mandible on the left side, and the other was an oblique fracture through the angle of the mandible on the right side involving at least one molar tooth. It appeared that the fracture on the left side was through the entire mandible.

She was hospitalized overnight and sent to the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics in Iowa City for alignment of her jaw. Oral surgery was performed in which her jaw was wired shut. She remained a patient at the University Hospital for five days and was released. Six weeks later she returned and was hospitalized for two more days while the wires were removed. Medical testimony indicated that without alignment and wiring the fractures would probably have healed, but the teeth would not have been occluded, or properly aligned. Further, the injuries would have caused intense pain.

After her jaws were wired, her face was swollen, and she had pain and nausea. She could breathe, smoke, take liquid between her teeth, barely talk, but she could not chew food. She lost twenty to twenty-five pounds while her jaw was wired shut. Medical testimony indicated that even though the wires were removed after six weeks, the repair process of her mandible would take approximately one year. The medical testimony established that it would have taken a blow with tremendous force to fracture the bone.

I. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant contends that the injury sustained by the victim did not constitute a "serious injury" within the meaning of section 708.4. This contention was raised by a motion for a directed verdict, which was denied by the trial court.

Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution; however, the evidence must be such that, when considered as a whole, a reasonable person could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Iowa 1980). Viewing the evidence as a whole, we must determine if the injury sustained by the victim meets the requirements of the statutory definition of "serious injury." We believe that the injury falls within this definition; therefore, a jury issue was engendered.

We have not previously interpreted either the section on willful injury or the definition of serious injury as set out in The Code. These provisions are part of the Iowa Criminal Code, which became effective January 1, 1978.

Although the definition of serious injury bears some resemblance to the injury included in the crimes of assault with intent to inflict bodily injury, § 694.6, The Code 1977, and mayhem, ch. 693, The Code 1977, there are substantial differences between the new crime and its antecedents. Previous Iowa case authority does not bind us in construing the provisions before us. The legislature has provided us with guidelines in construing statutes, however: "Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be construed according to such meaning." § 4.1(2), The Code 1979. In addition, it is well established that penal statutes are to be interpreted strictly with doubts therein being resolved in favor of the accused, State v. Lawr, 263 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Iowa 1978), and must give fair warning of what is prohibited, State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Iowa 1976). However, when a statute is plain and its meaning is clear, courts are not permitted to search for meaning beyond its expressed terms. State v. Hocker, 201 N.W.2d 74, 74 (Iowa 1972). Applying these principles we will examine defendant's allegations.

Defendant claims that the victim's injuries were not of such serious nature as to qualify as a "protracted loss or impairment." Protracted is defined as "to draw out or lengthen in time or space." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1826 (1966). It is undisputed that the fractures of the mandible of the victim prevented her from chewing food for six weeks, which medical testimony indicated was one of the important functions of the lower jaw. Under a similar statute in New York it was held that one who could not open his hand for two months because of a stab wound had a protracted impairment of health. People v. Gray, 47 A.D.2d 674, 675, 363 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (1975). In Wisconsin a skull fracture resulting in a quarter-sized hole that caused a loss of feeling on a victim's right side for six days, with no further effects, was held to be sufficient evidence for a jury to find a permanent or protracted loss. Cheatham v. State, 85 Wis.2d 112, 119, 270 N.W.2d 194, 198 (1978). We believe that a jury question was engendered as to the issue of a protracted loss or impairment of function.

Defendant further contends that the injuries shown do not rise to the level of a "serious injury." He points out that the first three definitions, disabling mental illness, substantial risk of death, and serious permanent disfigurement by comparison are much more serious. We do not agree with the inference of invalidity based on such argument, nor do we find such a great variance in the gravity of the definitions.

The legislature has the power and responsibility to define crime. State v. Fuhrmann, 261 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Iowa 1978). The legislature may be its own lexicographer and write its own definition of words and terms. State v. Di Paglia, 247 Iowa 79, 84, 71 N.W.2d 601, 604 ...