State v. West

• Decision Date: 20 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 05-99-00910-CR,05-99-00910-CR
• Citation: 20 S.W.3d 867
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000) THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. DENNIS VINCENT WEST, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 867

20 S.W.3d 867 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000)

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. DENNIS VINCENT WEST, Appellee

No. 05-99-00910-CR

In The Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas

at Dallas

June 20, 2000

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 002-83238-98

Reversed and remanded.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Justices Lagarde, Moseley, and FitzGerald

OPINION

Opinion By Justice FitzGerald

At issue in this appeal is whether it is reasonable for a police officer to arrest an individual based only on his commission of the traffic offense of failure to wear a seat belt. During a search incident to appellee Dennis Vincent West's arrest for a seat belt violation, a police officer discovered marijuana on appellee's person. As a result, appellee was charged with possession of marijuana.¹ He filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court granted. The State appeals the trial court's granting of appellee's motion to suppress. We conclude that appellee's lawful arrest for failure to wear a seat belt was reasonable because police had probable cause to believe that the traffic violation had occurred and the officer was authorized to conduct a search incident to arrest. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

Background

The following facts are taken from the affidavit of Allen police officer Robert Darin Smith. Smith observed appellee driving a pickup truck without wearing a seat belt and performed a traffic stop. Upon Smith's request, appellee got out of his truck and stepped to the rear of the vehicle. Appellee admitted to Smith that he had been driving without his seat belt and had put on his seat belt only after Smith stopped him. Smith then requested consent to search appellee's vehicle, and appellee consented. Before searching the vehicle, Smith patted appellee down and asked him to remove the contents of his pockets. Appellee removed from his pockets a money clip, a pocketknife, a coin purse, and keys. Because appellee's pants were baggy, Smith patted him down again and felt an object in appellee's pants pocket. Smith asked appellee to show him what remained in his pocket, and appellee refused. Smith had appellee stand in front of the squad car with his hands out of his pockets while Smith called for back-up. Smiththen told appellee's passenger that appellee had consented to Smith's searching the vehicle. For safety reasons, Smith had the passenger stand and face opposite of Smith. Smith found nothing in appellee's vehicle. Then Smith arrested appellee for failure to wear a seat belt and searched him. Smith found a clear plastic bag of marijuana in appellee's pants pocket.

After he was charged with possession of marijuana, appellee moved to suppress the contraband as the result of an unreasonable search and seizure. In his motion to suppress, appellee alleged that Smith (1) stopped him without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, (2) arrested and searched him with neither a warrant, probable cause, nor authority under any warrantless search exception, and (3) searched his vehicle with neither a warrant nor authority under any warrantless search exception. The motion alleged the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, article one, section nine of the Texas Constitution, and articles 1.06 and 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

The trial court afforded the parties an opportunity only to file affidavits and to submit arguments. The State presented Smith's affidavit, and appellee's attorney filed an unverified statement containing only legal arguments, not facts. After a hearing, the trial court granted appellee's motion. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

We review motions to suppress under the standard set forth in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The standard of appellate review depends on the type of question presented. Guzman recognizes three types of questions: (1) historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court's fact findings are made on the basis of an evaluation of credibility and demeanor; (2) application of law to fact questions, i.e., mixed questions of law and fact, whose ultimate resolution turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor; and (3) mixed questions of law and fact whose resolution does not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. at 89. When reviewing the first two types of questions, we show almost total deference to the trial court's determination because of the trial court's exclusive fact finding role and because a trial court is in an appreciably better position to decide the issue. Id. When reviewing the third type of question, one whose resolution does not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we will determine the issue independently, or de novo. Id.

Before we determine which standard is appropriate in this case, it should first be observed that this case does not involve the typical scenario. In many reported cases, after the accused filed a motion to suppress, the trial court conducted a hearing, considered the live testimony presented, and made a ruling. In the instant case, the trial court ordered the matter to be determined upon written affidavits. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 28.01, § 1(6) (Vernon 1989) (authorizing trial courts to determine merits of motions to suppress on motions themselves, upon affidavits, or upon oral testimony).

The court in Guzman reviewed the available standards, either deference or de novo, and the circumstances that would dictate which standard to employ. Guzman instructed appellate courts to afford almost complete deference to the trial court's (1) determination of the historical facts that the record supported and (2) rulings on application of law to fact questions (mixed questions of law and fact) if the determinations and rulings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Otherwise, the appellate court may review de novo mixed questions of law and fact which "do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor." Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89; see also Lane v. State, 971 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd); Walter v. State, 997 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. granted).

Issues involving probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and consent in the search and seizure domain generally involve mixed questions of law and fact. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-99 (1996); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87-89. If the facts are undisputed, the appellate court should employ de novo review.² See Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Maestas v. State, 987 S.W.2d 59, 62-63 & n.8 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 93 (1999); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 85, 89; Brown v. State, 986 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.). The critical inquiry is whether the issue "turns" on an evaluation of "credibility and demeanor." Loserth v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 772-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). On appeal, the appellate court is limited to deciding whether the trial court erred in applying the law to the facts. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87-89. A de novo review is proper in this case.

Applicable Law

The movant on a motion to suppress has the initial burden to produce evidence that defeats the presumption of proper police conduct. Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Once the defendant establishes that the actions of police were not supported by an arrest or search warrant, the burden shifts to the State to prove the reasonableness of the search and seizure. Id. at 9-10.

A search incident to a lawful arrest requires no additional justification. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). With certain exceptions not applicable here, an officer may arrest without a warrant a person he finds committing a traffic violation.³ See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 1977). Operating a motor vehicle without wearing a seat belt is a traffic violation. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.413 (Vernon Supp. 2000). Thus, an officer may arrest a driver for failure to wear a seat belt. Madison v. State, 922 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, pet. ref'd); Valencia v. State, 820 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).

When an officer has probable cause to believe a suspect is committing an offense, even a traffic offense, an arrest of the suspect is reasonable. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (driving while license revoked); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1973) (driving without license in possession); see also Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). The validity of an arrest or stop should be determined solely by analyzing objectively the facts surrounding the event. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 673-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810-11 (1996) (cited by appellee).

Discussion

The State argues that because Officer Smith had probable cause to believe appellee had committed the traffic offense of failure to wear a seat belt, he was authorized to arrest appellee and conduct a search of his person incident to the arrest. Thus, the State contends, the marijuana taken from appellee's pocket was lawfully seized.

Appellee contends on appeal, as he did in the trial court, that a custodial arrest for the minor offense of failure to wear a seat belt is unreasonable. Appellee concedes the transportation code authorized Smith to make a custodial arrest for appellee's failure to wear a seat belt. He does not claim the police were abusive in the arrest or conducted the arrest in an extraordinary manner. Rather, he contends it was...