Sheldon v. State

• Citation: 100 S.W.3d 497
• Decision Date: 30 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 03-01-00660-CR.,03-01-00660-CR.
• Parties: Stephens Stratton SHELDON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

Page 497

100 S.W.3d 497

Stephens Stratton SHELDON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 03-01-00660-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

January 30, 2003.

Opinion Overruling Rehearing March 6, 2003.

Connie J. Kelley, Austin, for Appellant.

Shelley A. Scott, Assistant District Attorney, Austin, for Appellee.

Before Justices PURYEAR, DALLY^* and ABOUSSIE.^**

OPINION

CARL E.F. DALLY, Justice (Retired).

Appellant Stephens Stratton Sheldon, the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the injury and death of a person, was convicted of failing to stop and of failing to render reasonable assistance to the injured person. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 550.021, .023 (West 1999).¹ The trial court assessed appellant's punishment, enhanced by a prior felony conviction, at imprisonment for fourteen years. On appeal, appellant asserts that the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutional, the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction, and the trial court erred in assessing punishment. We will affirm the judgment.

In points of error two, three, and four, appellant urges that section 550.021 of the transportation code is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because the phrases "involved in an accident," "immediately," and "at the scene of the accident" are impermissibly vague. Questions involving constitutionality of a statute upon which a defendant's conviction is based should be addressed by appellate courts, even when such issues are raised for the first time on appeal. Holberg v. State, 38 S.W.3d 137, 139 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Rabb v. State, 730 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. Crim.App.1987). However, a contention that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to an accused because of vagueness and uncertainty must be asserted in the trial court or it is waived. See Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); Bader v. State, 15 S.W.3d 599, 603 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd); State v. West, 20 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet. ref'd). Here, appellant concedes that his claim that the statute is unconstitutional is raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we will consider only the facial constitutionality of the statute. See Battles v. State, 45 S.W.3d 694, 702-03 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, no pet.).

When as in this case First Amendment rights are not implicated, a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague unless it gives a person of ordinary intelligence reasonable notice of what is prohibited or required and establishes determinate guidelines for law enforcement officers. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 689 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); State v. Markovich, 34 S.W.3d 21, 25 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000), aff'd, 77 S.W.3d 274 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); State v. Wofford, 34 S.W.3d 671, 678-79 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). We will uphold a statute if we can determine a reasonable construction that will render it constitutional and carry out legislative intent. See Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). A statute is not vague because the words used in the statute are not specifically defined. See Ahearn v. State, 588 S.W.2d 327, 338 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Floyd v. State, 575 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). The terms "accident," "immediately," and "scene" are not defined by the transportation code or the penal code. Terms not defined in a statute are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Floyd, 575 S.W.2d at 23. Words defined in dictionaries and with meanings so well known as to be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence are not considered vague and indefinite. Id.; Powell v. State, 538 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex.Crim.App.1976).

The definitions and common usage of the words "accident," "immediately," and "scene" are found in the Merriam Webster and the Random House dictionaries. "Accident" may be defined as an unforeseen, unplanned event or condition. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 11 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1961). "Accident" is also defined as an undesirable or unfortunate happening, unintentionally caused and usually resulting in harm, injury, damage, or loss; a casualty; a mishap. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 9 (unabridged, Jess Stein ed., 1979). "Immediately" may be defined as without interval of time, without delay. Webster's at 1129. "Immediately" is also defined as without lapse of time; without delay; instantly; at once. Random House at 712. "Scene" may be defined as the place of occurrence or event. Webster's at 2020. "Scene" is also defined as the place where some action or event occurs. Random House at 1276.

The terms "accident," "immediately,"² and "scene" — as used in the statute — have plain ordinary meanings that may be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence and cannot be considered vague and indefinite. In this case, First Amendment rights are not implicated. Section 550.021 of the transportation code gives a person of ordinary intelligence reasonable notice of what is required and prohibited, and it establishes determinate guidelines for law enforcement officers. We hold that appellant's contention that the statute is unconstitutionally vague is without merit.³ Points of error two, three, and four are overruled.

In his first point of error, appellant asserts that the evidence is factually insufficient to prove that he was "involved in an accident." Appellant argues that the "overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that [he], as the operator of a motor vehicle, was not involved in an accident as contemplated by § 550.021 of the transportation code." Specifically, appellant argues that L.L.'s death was caused by her own intentional act of jumping out of the moving vehicle and that because her death was not caused by a collision, the State failed to show appellant was involved in an "accident" that required him to stop and render assistance to L.L. as provided by the transportation code.

Section 550.021 of the transportation code provides in relevant part that the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of a person shall: (1) immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close to the scene as possible; (2) immediately return to the scene of the accident if the vehicle is not stopped at the scene of the accident; and (3) remain at the scene of the accident until the operator complies with the requirements of section 550.023. Section 550.023, in relevant part, provides that the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the injury or death of a person shall provide any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including transporting or making arrangements for transporting the person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary, or if the injured person requests transportation. It was alleged that appellant, while driving a motor vehicle on a public road, was involved in an accident resulting in the injury and death of L.L., and that appellant intentionally failed to stop and failed to render reasonable assistance to L.L. when it was apparent that her injuries required medical treatment.

In determining factual sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court must consider and take a neutral view of all of the evidence, reversing the judgment if (1) the evidence demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the fact finder's determination, or (2) the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. See Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).

Appellant has framed his first point of error as one of sufficiency of the evidence; however, appellant's argument has narrowed the issue presented to his claim that no "accident" occurred; therefore, he contends the evidence could not be factually sufficient to prove his guilt of the charged offense. We have already held that the term "accident" as used in the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. We must now decide whether appellant was "involved in an accident" within the meaning of the transportation code provisions.

The evidence shows that appellant was having an affair with L.L., who was a dancer at "gentlemen's clubs" in Austin. Just before midnight on July 16, 2000, appellant was driving L.L. to her apartment. They became embroiled in an argument about an incident between L.L. and a man at the club where she was then working. Appellant told L.L. that he was going to stop seeing her because she worked at that club. L.L. told appellant that she was going to jump out of the vehicle and kill herself. L.L. then jumped from the moving vehicle, suffering a brain injury that caused her death. Appellant stopped and backed up; when he saw another motorist stop and approach L.L., appellant drove away from the scene. Appellant drove to a gasoline station one-half of a block away where he watched police and emergency personnel investigating and attempting to aid L.L. During this time, appellant who was in possession of L.L.'s cell phone, received a call from her friend, L.M. Appellant told L.M. what had happened. L.M. then came to the scene of the accident. She assisted one of the police officers in placing a call to appellant. Appellant told the officer what had happened. The officer tried to persuade appellant to return to the scene, but appellant would not do so. Appellant was later arrested and charged with the offense of which he has been convicted.

Our attention has been directed to only one reported decision in this state in which the facts are somewhat similar to those in this case. See Rivas v. State, 787 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.App.-Dallas 199...