State v. Weston

• Decision Date: 21 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 769 S.W.2d 164
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Arnold WESTON, Jr., Appellant. 40765.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 164

769 S.W.2d 164

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Arnold WESTON, Jr., Appellant.

No. WD 40765.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Western District.

March 21, 1989.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied May 2, 1989.

Sean D. O'Brien, Public Defender, Terry Wheeler, Asst. Public Defender, Kansas City, for appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth L. Ziegler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before FENNER, P.J., and SHANGLER and BERREY, JJ.

BERREY, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and armed criminal action. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment on each count, with said sentences to run consecutively. He now appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in admitting his confession into evidence.

The judgment is affirmed.

On October 10, 1987, two men robbed the International House of Pancakes at 3620 Broadway in Kansas City, Missouri. A cook at the restaurant told police that he knew one of the two robbers, and identified him as appellant. Appellant was also identified by a waitress, who picked him from a photo array and from a lineup.

Appellant was arrested around noon on October 15, 1987, and after spending eight and a half hours in jail, was interrogated by detectives. Following one and a half hours of questioning, appellant confessed to the robbery. His confession was then transcribed into a formal written statement, which was signed by appellant.

Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress his confession, claiming that it was involuntary. Appellant contended that the statement was the result of duress and coercion insofar as his mental health was "seriously deteriorated" after spending over eight hours in jail with little or no opportunity to sleep. Appellant also alleged that, because of his limited ability to read, he was unaware of the nature and meaning of the statement he had signed.

An evidentiary hearing was then held before Judge Donald L. Mason. The interrogating officers testified at the hearing, and stated that no threats, violence, or promises were used to induce appellant to confess to the robbery. They also testified that appellant's Miranda rights were read to him aloud, and appellant stated that he understood them. The officers further testified that the entire written statement was read to him aloud, and he was given the opportunity to make any changes he thought necessary. The officer who conducted the actual questioning testified that appellant was alert, and that he did not appear to be suffering from lack of sleep or any kind of drug or alcohol withdrawal. According to the officer, appellant did not have any trouble understanding what was being said to him.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified that he was coerced into writing the statement, and that he was slapped and threatened by one of the interrogating officers. Appellant, who had difficulty reading, stated that the statement was read to him aloud only after he had already signed it. He stated that he did not know that he was signing a confession.

At the close of the hearing, Judge Mason stated that the "[m]otion will be overruled." At the ensuing trial, which was held before Judge William F. Mauer, appellant objected to the admission of the confession. Judge Mauer allowed the confession to be admitted, stating, "For the record, I am going to overrule it but I have to tell you that I did not hear that motion. It was heard by Judge Mason. I am simply affirming his ruling in your motion." At the conclusion of the trial, appellant was found guilty of both first degree robbery and armed criminal action.

As his sole point on appeal, appellant claims that the trial court erred in admitting his confession into evidence without a sufficient finding by either the hearing court or the trial court that the confession was voluntary. In his brief, appellant does not claim that his confession was, in fact, involuntary; instead, he simply challenges the sufficiency of the hearing and trial courts' record on the finding of voluntariness.

When an accused challenges the admission of a confession on the grounds of involuntariness at the trial level, as appellant did in this case by filing a motion to suppress his statement to police, the trial court must make a clear-cut determination of voluntariness before the statement can be considered by the finder of fact. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Missouri practice contemplates a full hearing on the voluntariness question held outside the presence of the jury, at which the burden of proof is on the state to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary. State v. Lytle, 715 S.W.2d 910, 915 (Mo. banc 1986); State v. Washington, 399 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Mo.1966); State v. Wise, 745 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Mo.App.1988).

Once the trial court has held the required evidentiary hearing, the record must show, with sufficient clarity, the trial court's conclusion that the defendant's confession was voluntary. The record must "show the judge's conclusion in this regard (voluntariness) and his findings upon the underlying facts may be express or ascertainable from the record." Jackson v. Denno, supra, 378 U.S. at 378, n. 8, 84 S.Ct. at 1781, n. 8. In Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639, 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967), the court further described the trial court's duty to make a clear-cut determination of voluntariness, stating, "Although the judge need not make formal findings of fact or write an opinion, his conclusion that the confession is voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity."

In the case at bar, the required evidentiary hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court overruled appellant's motion to suppress his statement, stating merely that the "[m]otion will be overruled." Appellant contends that such a statement is not a clear enough determination of voluntariness to satisfy the criteria of Jackson v. Denno, supra, and Sims v. Georgia, supra.

Appellant's claim is supported by the earlier Missouri Supreme Court cases which have dealt with this subject. In these cases, when an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of a confession was followed by the trial judge's bare statement that the defendant's motion to suppress was denied or overruled, the Supreme Court remanded the cases to the trial court for an express finding on the issue of voluntariness. State v. Edwards, 435 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo.1968); State v. Auger, 434 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Mo.1968); State v. Devoe, 430 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo.1968); State v. Glenn, 429 S.W.2d 225, 237-239 (Mo. banc 1968). Other Missouri decisions have ordered remands in similar cases because of the lack of an explicit finding of voluntariness. State v. Bridges, 491 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Mo.1973); State v. Taggert, 443 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Mo.1969).

However, later Missouri decisions questioned whether a remand is always necessary in cases where the trial judge failed to make express findings on the issue of voluntariness. For example, in State v. Hull, 595 S.W.2d 49, 53 (Mo.App.1980), the Missouri Court of Appeals examined the requirement that the trial judge's "conclusion that the confession is voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity." Sims v. Georgia, supra, 385 U.S. at 544, 87 S.Ct. at 643. The court interprets this language to mean that "an express ruling on voluntariness is not always required. On the contrary, a ruling on voluntariness can be inferred from the record as a whole." State v. Hull, supra, 595 S.W.2d at 53 (quoting United States v. Medina, 552 F.2d 181, 186 (7th Cir.1977).

More recent Missouri Supreme Court decisions follow this line of reasoning. In State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946 (Mo. banc 1981), the defendant filed a motion to suppress statements which he alleged were made after he had requested legal counsel which was not provided. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the...