State v. Wise, 15170

Decision Date22 January 1988
Docket NumberNo. 15170,15170
Citation745 S.W.2d 776
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Danny E. WISE, Sr., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Susan L. Hogan, Columbia, for defendant-appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Jared Richard Cone, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.

MAUS, Judge.

Count I of an information charged the defendant committed rape by having sexual intercourse with R.J.L. who was less than 14 years of age and to whom he was not married. § 566.030.3. Count II of that information charged the defendant committed sodomy by having deviate sexual intercourse with R.J.L. § 566.060.3. A jury found him guilty of each count. The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment for 10 years upon each count as fixed by the jury. It further adjudged that such sentences should be served consecutively. The defendant presents four points on appeal.

The defendant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence. The following is a condensation of the testimony of R.J.L. She was born on September 9, 1972. The defendant is her uncle by marriage. She has known him as long as she can remember and considered him a friend. When she was in the fourth grade he started touching her through her clothing. He told her it was all right. "It just led where he'd take me to his house and make me take off my clothes and have sex with me." She was nine years old when the defendant first had sexual intercourse with her. She had sexual encounters with the defendant for about four years. Specifically in reference to recent occurrences, she said he had normal sexual intercourse with her in May, 1986. In June, 1986, he committed anal sodomy upon her. Also in June, 1986, he forced her to perform oral sodomy upon him.

The defendant did not testify. By cross-examination he established that he took R.J.L.'s deposition approximately one week before trial. In that deposition she testified the defendant made her perform oral sex a couple of times but she couldn't remember when. The state introduced a statement of the defendant given to officers of the Jasper County Sheriff's Department. In that statement, with the exception of the anal sodomy, the defendant substantially corroborated the testimony of R.J.L.

One of the defendant's points asserts the trial court erred in overruling his motion to discharge the jury because of an answer given by one panel member in the presence of the panel. That point is based upon the following. The state asked a general question if any member of the panel knew the defendant or any members of his family. A panel member knew he had a young son, stating the son's name. A second panel member then said a boy with that name at one time rode the school bus she drove. This panelist then volunteered the following:

I do recall something that, I don't even know his wife unless I happen to see her in the courtroom. One day she come [sic] up to the bus 'cause [sic] she was needing to pick her little boy up, had done, they were supposed to have had him on a rape charge. That's all I know. I don't know the lady's first name. Why she even told me all this, I guess because she had to pick her little boy up, and she thought she had to give me a reason for it.

Not every reply by a panelist unfavorable to a defendant, even though heard by a panel, requires the discharge of that panel. The appropriate standard for review has been succinctly expressed and applied by the Supreme Court.

Defendant complains of an incident where in qualifying the panel a prospective juror ... stated in response to questions by the court that he knew defendant was guilty and should have to serve on a rock pile the rest of his life. The court, on its own motion, excused [the venireman] instanter, and defendant then moved to discharge the entire panel. This was denied.... The trial court is in much better position than this court to evaluate the effect, if any, of such an unfortunate outburst upon the others, so it must be regarded as a matter to be confided to the discretion of the trial court. Upon the record before us, we are unwilling to say that there was any abuse of that discretion in denying the motion to declare a mistrial.

State v. Scott, 359 Mo. 631, 223 S.W.2d 453, 455 (banc 1949) (emphasis added), questioned on another subject by State v. Swinburne, 324 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. banc 1959).

The defendant argues the remark is a statement that his wife said he was guilty. This is a strained construction. The thrust of the statement was that the defendant had been charged with rape. This fact was known to all panelists. The trial court heard the manner in which the remark was delivered. It was obviously in the best position to determine its content and impact upon the members of the panel. It did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to discharge the panel. Cf. State v. Eidson, 701 S.W.2d 549 (Mo.App.1985).

The defendant's second point is that the trial court erred in giving an instruction which submitted his guilt of rape upon a finding that he had sexual intercourse with R.J.L. during the month of May, 1986. He contends this denied him notice of the accusation against him because "the state elected, prior to trial and in response to appellant's bill of particulars, to proceed at trial on an incident of sexual intercourse ... during the month of June, 1986."

The defendant incorrectly states the record. The information charged the rape occurred between May, 1986, and August, 1986. In a bill of particulars the state alleged the rape "occurred on one or more of the following days May 1, 3, 10-24, 20-31, June 7-26 or July 1-3, 5-31, 1986...."

The defendant filed a motion for an additional bill of particulars which was pending on the day of trial. At a conference preceding the trial the defense counsel said he expected R.J.L. would testify that a rape occurred on two occasions mentioned in the bill of particulars. He was concerned "which one is it that the jury has to decide whether they believe beyond a reasonable doubt, or can half of them decide they believe one and half of them decide they believe the other one?" The prosecutor then read to the court a portion of R.J.L.'s deposition in which the prosecutrix also said rape occurred once in May, 1986. The prosecutor added that she said it also happened in June, 1986. The trial court then required the state to elect which occasion would be submitted to the jury. The prosecutor chose June. The trial court gave an instruction submitting the defendant's guilt on Count I upon sexual intercourse occurring in the month of May, 1986.

To support this point the defendant cites cases determining whether or not an information alleges the date of an offense with sufficient specificity to support a conviction. See Rule 23.01 and 23.11. Applicable principles have been summarized. Unless time is of the essence of an offense, an allegation of time in general terms does not render an indictment invalid. State v. Murray, 609 S.W.2d 192 (Mo.App.1980). Time is not of the essence of rape or of statutory rape, State v. Bowers, 29 S.W.2d 58 (Mo.1930); State v. White, supra [674 S.W.2d 551 (Mo.App.1984) ]; State v. Kammerich, 550 S.W.2d 931 (Mo.App.1977). Time is not of the essence of deviate sexual intercourse. State v. Allen, 622 S.W.2d 275 (Mo.App.1981).

State v. Ellis, 710 S.W.2d 378, 383-384 (Mo.App.1986).

"[A] variance between allegation and proof is not fatal unless the variance was material to the merits of the case and prejudicial to the defense of the defendant." State v. Jarrett, 481 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Mo.1972).

These principles are applicable even though the state filed a bill of particulars. United States v. Francisco, 575 F.2d 815 (10th Cir.1978); People v. Steele, 124 Ill.App.3d 761, 79 Ill.Dec. 884, 464 N.E.2d 788 (1984); State v. Borucki, 505 A.2d 89 (Me.1986); State v. Ellis, supra. The proof was that one act of rape was committed during the month of May, 1986, a time within the period stated in the information and more specifically stated in the bill of particulars. Within the principles set forth in the cases cited above, the information was sufficient to support the instruction in question.

The pretrial election by the state required by the trial court does not cause the instruction to be erroneous. It is not the office of a motion to elect to require an amendment of an information. Frequently, in a trial upon a charge of a sex offense involving a minor, evidence of multiple similar sex acts will be properly admitted. State v. Baker, 434 S.W.2d 583 (Mo.1968). In such circumstances the office of a motion to elect is to require the state to elect by an instruction "on what specific act of intercourse it would stand for a conviction." State v. Foster, 299 Mo. 366, 225 S.W. 671, 672 (1920). Also see State v. Taylor, 335 Mo. 460, 73 S.W.2d 378 (banc 1934), 95 A.L.R. 476. Such a motion to elect between multiple acts is properly made at the close of the evidence. "At the beginning of the trial the court overruled an oral request to require the State to elect 'as to the specific incident' with which defendants would be charged. This involved a matter of evidence, not an election between different statutory offenses. There was no error." State v. Gillespie, 336 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Mo.1960). In view of the evidence and instruction, a motion to elect at the close of the evidence would have served no purpose. State v. Cobb, 359 Mo. 373, 221 S.W.2d 745 (1949). There was evidence of one act of rape in May, 1986, none in June, 1986.

The trial court's untimely order to elect could not have prejudiced the defendant. Until the morning of trial the defendant was aware the state would rely upon a rape in May, 1986. The prosecutrix testified without objection that the defendant did not rape her in June, but did in May, 1986. At the...

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7 cases
  • State v. Stewart
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • October 15, 2009
    ...to the defendant necessitates the discharge of the entire venire panel, even though heard by the panel at large. State v. Wise, 745 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Mo.App.1988). "Usually, disqualification of an individual juror for bias or expression of an opinion is insufficient for challenging the entir......
  • State v. Edwards
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • October 31, 2000
    ...of the jury and a finding by the court that the confession was voluntary before it is admitted in evidence." State v. Wise, 745 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Mo. App. S.D. 1988). In the present case defense counsel objected to the court's decision to take the motion with the case. Defense counsel's oral......
  • State v. Garner, 15498
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • November 10, 1988
    ...remand the case to the circuit court for the procedure outlined above. State v. Gower, 418 S.W.2d 10, 14-15 (Mo.1967); State v. Wise, 745 S.W.2d 776, 780-82 (Mo.App.1988). If the new judge, upon making the factual findings necessary to resolve the issue of admissibility, rules that appellan......
  • State v. Weston
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • March 21, 1989
    ...was voluntary. State v. Lytle, 715 S.W.2d 910, 915 (Mo. banc 1986); State v. Washington, 399 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Mo.1966); State v. Wise, 745 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Mo.App.1988). Once the trial court has held the required evidentiary hearing, the record must show, with sufficient clarity, the trial ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Motions to Suppress and the Problem of “taking with the Case” in Criminal Case
    • United States
    • Objections Guidebook Part 2 Making a Proper Record in Criminal and Civil Cases
    • Invalid date
    ...to result in waiver of the issue for appeal. Pretrial hearing especially important when accused’s statement is at issue · State v. Wise, 745 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Mo. App. S.D. 1988) (quoting Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 (1967) (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)); State v. Washing......

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