State v. Wetherell
| Decision Date | 11 October 1973 |
| Docket Number | 42613,Nos. 42607,s. 42607 |
| Citation | 514 P.2d 1069,82 Wn.2d 865 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Dennis WETHERELL, Respondent. The STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Dennis C. WRIGHT, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
C. J. Rabideau, Franklin County Pros. Atty., Pasco, for petitioner.
Peterson, Taylor & Shea, Stanley D. Taylor, Edward F. Shea, Pasco, for respondents.
The instant cases, both arising from Franklin County, Washington, have been consolidated on appeal. The question in both is the propriety of the trial court's order suppressing the results of defendants' blood and breach alcohol tests prior to trial of negligent homicide charges levied against them.
Although the charges arose from separate and unrelated, single-car accidents, the facts relevant to the issues involved are somewhat similar. Each accident involved an automobile driven by a defendant and fatal injuries to a passenger therein. Both defendants were removed to local hospitals from the scenes of their accidents and were not then, nor until some 2 or 3 months later, placed under arrest. In each instance, an officer, other than the one investigating at the scene of the accident, was promptly dispatched to the hospital to question the defendant. At the time of questioning, neither defendant was unconscious, albeit each suffered varying injuries and was undergoing differing medical ministrations. On neither occasion did the officer involved give the statutory implied consent 1 or Miranda warnings before obtaining the blood sample or administering the breathalyzer test.
In case of defendant Wetherell, the officer asked by attending physician for a blood sample. Wetherell overheard the conversation and asked what the blood sample was for, to which the officer replied that the matter would be discussed later. Wetherell then stated they would discuss it now. The officer without further reply stepped from the room and, returning a short time later with knowledge of the death of Wetherell's passenger, and without further discussion with Wetherell, obtained a blood sample from the attending doctor. This blood sample was subsequently analyzed for alcohol content, the result of which testing was suppressed by the trial court.
Defendant Wright, on the other hand, when queried by the officer voluntarily consented to the administration of a chemical breath test commonly known as the breathalyzer test. Such a test was given and the results thereof suppressed by the trial court, as was the result of a second similar test administered with Wright's consent some 2 or 3 hours later by another officer who, prior to Wright's consent, gave the Miranda warnings.
The individual trial judges in both instances essentially predicated the orders suppressing the results of the respective tests upon the failure of the officers to give the implied consent warnings required by RCW 46.20.308(1).
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's order in the Wetherell case and reverse the order in the Wright case.
Implied consent statutes have been enacted in the great majority of our states and have, with substantial uniformity, withstood constitutional attacks. 45 Wash.L.Rev. 656 (1970); Note, Arrest Requirement for Administering Blood Tests, 1971 Duke L.J. 601; Suspension or Revocation of Driver's License for Refusal to Take Sobriety Test, Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1064 (1963).
The intent and purpose of such statutes is to prove fair, efficient, scientific, objective, and reasonably reliable data relating to the sobriety of an arrested motorist believed, upon reasonable grounds, to have been driving while under the influence of intoxicants. As an incentive to induce an apprehended driver's submission to a blood-alcohol test, most statutes provide that a refusal to take such a test will result in an administrative suspension or revocation of driving privileges. Thus, the aim of such statutes is to provide significant aid in the just and evenhanded enforcement of laws proscribing driving while inebriated, as well as to lend material assistance in reducing the serious hazard posed to life and property by the presence of drunk drivers on the highways.
Our current implied consent statute 2 was adopted by the people of this state through the initiative process on November 5, 1968. 3 Its language in general is derived from the Uniform Motor Vehicle Code, and is not unlike similar statutes found in other states. The constitutionality of our statute has been upheld by this court in State v. Moore, 79 Wash.2d 51, 483 P.2d 630 (1971).
RCW 46.20.308(1) provides:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of RCW 46.61.506, to a chemical test or tests of his breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood If arrested for any offense where, at the Time of the arrest, the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officier having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Such officer shall inform the person of his right to refuse the test, and of his right to have additional tests administered by any qualified person of his choosing as provided in RCW 46.61.506. The officer shall warn the driver that his privilege to drive will be revoked or denied if he refuses to submit to the test. Unless the person to be tested is unconscious, the chemical test administered shall be of his breath only.
(Italics ours.)
RCW 46.20.308(3), in relevant part, continues:
If, Following his arrest, the Person arrested refuses upon the request of a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test of his breath, after being informed that his refusal will result in the revocation or denial of his privilege to drive, no test shall be given. . . .
(Italics ours.)
Paraphrasing, these provisions in essence declare that the driver of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state: (1) impliedly consents to a sobriety test; (2) when arrested for any offense; (3) where the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe the driver was operating the motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; (4) if the arresting officer, or another upon like grounds, requests the driver to take the test after advising him of (a) his right to refuse the test, (b) his right to have additional tests administered, and (c) that his privilege to drive will be revoked if he refuses to submit to the test; and (5) upon refusal no test shall be administered.
In the context of the instant cases, the threshold question appears to be whether the foregoing provisions apply to motor vehicle drivers not under arrest for any offense at the time a law enforcement request is made for a sobriety test.
We are convinced from the language utilized in the quoted provisions--particularly such phrases as 'if arrested,' 'time of arrest,' 'arresting officer,' 'following his arrest,' and 'person arrested'--that the drafters of the legislation plainly and properly contemplated that the lawful arrest of an offending motorist would be the indispensable element triggering any implied consent to a sobriety test. Consequently, when a driver suspected of inebriation is not under arrest at the time of an official request for the administration of a sobriety test, no consent thereto on the part of such driver can be implied and no administrative suspension of license for refusal can...
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