State v. Wheatland
Decision Date | 17 January 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 25947.,25947. |
Citation | 888 A.2d 1098,93 Conn.App. 232 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Paige WHEATLAND. |
Mark Diamond, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Joan K. Willin, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, Robert J. O'Brien, supervisory assistant state's attorney, and Eugene R. Calistro, Jr., assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
LAVERY, C.J., and DRANGINIS and McLACHLAN, Js.
The defendant, Paige Wheatland, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, entered pursuant to the doctrine of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970),1 to one count of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a)(3). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made, (2) the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the plea and (3) his sentence is illegal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The relevant facts are as follows. The defendant was arrested and charged with assault in the first degree following an altercation that transpired in Meriden on July 14, 2000.2 On April 5, 2001, the defendant entered a guilty plea pursuant to an agreement under State v. Garvin, 242 Conn. 296, 699 A.2d 921 (1997).3 Significantly, the agreement provided that if the defendant failed to appear for sentencing, the court could impose a sentence of up to twenty years. The court canvassed the defendant to ensure that his decision to plead guilty was knowing and voluntary, and then deferred acceptance of the plea pursuant to Practice Book § 39-7. The matter was continued for sentencing on July 13, 2001. On that date, the defendant did not appear. Consequently, the court accepted the defendant's guilty plea forfeited his bond and ordered his rearrest. Sometime in 2002, the defendant was arrested out of state and convicted on federal drug possession charges. He later was extradited to Connecticut and, on October 23, 2003, entered a plea of not guilty to a charge of failure to appear for sentencing. The defendant thereafter filed a motion to withdraw his April 5, 2001 plea, which the court denied. The court sentenced the defendant to a term of fifteen years imprisonment, and this appeal followed.
The defendant first contends that the April 5, 2001 plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. We disagree.
State v. Carter, 243 Conn. 392, 397, 703 A.2d 763 (1997). "Boykin requires the court to address the defendant concerning only [those] core constitutional rights." State v. Higgins, 88 Conn.App. 302, 307, 869 A.2d 700, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 913, 879 A.2d 893 (2005). "[T]he federal constitution ... does not require that the trial court go beyond these constitutional minima." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We conduct a plenary review of the circumstances surrounding the plea to determine if it was knowing and voluntary. State v. Groppi, 81 Conn.App. 310, 313, 840 A.2d 42, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 916, 847 A.2d 311 (2004).
The following additional facts are uncontested and relevant to our inquiry. At the April 5, 2001 plea hearing, the court canvassed the defendant. The court inquired as to whether the defendant had had enough time to discuss the matter with his attorney and whether he was satisfied with his attorney's advice and counsel, to which the defendant answered affirmatively. The court asked whether the defendant was under the influence of drugs, alcohol, medication or any other substance; the defendant replied no. The court then asked whether the defendant understood that The defendant again answered affirmatively. The court asked whether the defendant was "pleading voluntarily and of your own free will"; the defendant answered "yes." Asked whether anyone had forced or threatened him in any respect to enter the plea, the defendant answered, "No, sir." The court further inquired whether the defendant had had "a chance to discuss with your attorney the elements of the offense and the evidence the state claims to have in connection with the elements," and the defendant replied affirmatively. The court also inquired whether the defendant understood that "the maximum penalty you could get for the ... charge [of assault in the first degree] is from one to twenty years [incarceration] and [a fine of] up to $15,000 so that the maximum is twenty years and $15,000." The defendant answered "yes."
The court then addressed the terms of the Garvin agreement, explaining that the defendant was facing either "a ten after five with five years probation or five years to serve followed by six years special parole...." The court continued: "Yes, sir," the defendant replied. The court therefore concluded that the "plea is found to be voluntarily made and understandingly made with the assistance of competent counsel."
In support of his claim, the defendant first refers to the portion of the plea canvass in which he indicated that he did not understand the concept of special parole. At the outset of the canvass, the following colloquy occurred:
The defendant claims that this colloquy demonstrates that he "did not understand the nature of the plea proceedings or the proposed sentence." The defendant does not identify any specific rule of practice or decisional law in support of that contention. The salient provisions of our rules of practice are contained in Practice Book §§ 39-19 and 39-20. Section 39-19(1) requires that a defendant understand the "nature of the charge to which the plea is offered ...." Special parole, however, pertains to the nature of the defendant's sentence and has little bearing on the nature of the charge, in this case assault in the first degree. Practice Book § 39-19(2), (3) and (4) concern sentencing. They require a defendant to understand the mandatory minimum sentence, whether the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Elson, No. 31511.
...declines to review claim under Golding when defendant failed to brief entitlement to Golding in main brief); State v. Wheatland, 93 Conn.App. 232, 243-44, 888 A.2d 1098 ("Connecticut law is clear that a party seeking review of unpreserved claims under either the plain error doctrine; Practi......
-
In re Emerald C., (AC 28573) (Conn. App. 7/1/2008)
...doctrine; Practice Book § 60-5; or State v. Golding, [supra, 239-40], must affirmatively request such review." State v. Wheatland, 93 Conn. App. 232, 243-44, 888 A.2d 1098, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 919, 895 A.2d 793 (2006); see also State v. Ramos, 261 Conn. 156, 171, 801 A.2d 788 (2002) ("[......
-
State v. Elson, AC 31511
...declines to review claim under Golding when defendant failed to brief entitlement to Golding in main brief); State v. Wheatland, 93 Conn. App. 232, 243-44, 888 A.2d 1098 (''Connecticut law is clear that a party seeking review of unpreserved claims under either the plain error doctrine; Prac......
-
In re Emerald C.
...Book § 60-5; or State v. Golding, [supra, at 239-40, 567 A.2d 823], must affirmatively request such review." State v. Wheatland, 93 Conn.App. 232, 243-44, 888 A.2d 1098, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 919, 895 A.2d 793 (2006); see also State v. Ramos, 261 Conn. 156, 171, 801 A.2d 788 (2002) ("[a] ......