State v. White
| Decision Date | 06 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 36,935-KA.,36,935-KA. |
| Citation | 850 So.2d 751 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Rufus Edward WHITE, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Peter J. Black, Shreveport, for Appellant.
Paul J. Carmouche, District Attorney, J. Thomas Butler, Edward Brossette, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.
Before WILLIAMS, CARAWAY and KOSTELKA (Pro Tempore), JJ.
The defendant, Rufus White, Jr., was charged by bill of information with possession of cocaine, a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967(C). After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court adjudicated defendant a third felony offender and imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Defendant's motions for new trial and reconsideration of sentence were denied. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
Just before midnight on March 6, 2001, Sergeant Rickey Scroggins of the Shreveport Police Department was monitoring traffic at the intersection of Jewella and Greenwood Road. Sergeant Scroggins observed a large brown and white automobile with very darkly tinted front windows that prevented a view into the vehicle, which is a traffic violation. Sergeant Scroggins followed the automobile in his patrol car, turned on his red and blue lights and subsequently stopped the vehicle on Milton Street for the tinted windows violation.
As Sergeant Scroggins exited his vehicle, the brown and white automobile sped off eastbound on Milton Street and pulled into a driveway. The driver, later identified as the defendant, then left his vehicle and ran past a house to a fence leading to a backyard. Sergeant Scroggins got out of his vehicle, secured the passenger, and shouted for the defendant to stop. When the defendant turned around to look at him, Sergeant Scroggins observed the defendant's appearance and clothing. The defendant then ran away. Sergeant Scroggins radioed the defendant's description and location to headquarters and remained at the scene with the passenger, who was questioned and released.
Shreveport Police Officer Brown responded to the report of a traffic stop and as he approached the intersection of Hardy and Grove Streets, he observed the defendant, whose appearance and clothing matched the description of the fleeing suspect broadcast on the radio. When the defendant saw the patrol car, he began to run. Officer Brown stopped and exited the patrol car and tackled defendant to the ground after a short chase. Following a brief struggle, Officer Brown handcuffed the defendant and searched his person.
When Officer Scroggins arrived at the location of defendant's apprehension, he observed fire department personnel administering first aid to the defendant and Officer Brown, whose right knee was cut and swollen. The defendant had scratches on his cheek and hand. Officer Brown recovered a .40 caliber handgun which he had seen the defendant drop during the chase. Afterwards, Officer Brown placed the defendant in the backseat of his patrol car and drove to the city jail at the police station.
Sergeant Scroggins went separately to the station to complete the paperwork. Because Officer Brown was injured, police procedure required that Scroggins accompany Brown to the hospital for treatment and a drug test. Sergeant Scroggins met Officer Brown at his patrol car in the police parking lot. Before leaving for the hospital, Officer Brown unlocked his patrol vehicle in the presence of Sergeant Scroggins and searched the rear passenger compartment for any contraband or weapons that might have been disposed of by the defendant while in transit to the police station. Officer Brown later stated that he regularly followed this procedure to insure his safety.
Using a flashlight, Officer Brown found a small clear plastic bag on the passenger floorboard. He put on rubber gloves and picked up the bag, which contained a white powder. The bag was not sealed closed and there was a thick clear liquid, which appeared to be saliva, on the outside and inside of the bag. Officer Brown placed the bag inside of a police evidence bag, which he then sealed.
Analysis by forensic chemist Randle Robillard of the North Louisiana Criminalistics Laboratory determined that the white substance in the plastic bag was cocaine. The defendant was charged with possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, cocaine. The clear fluid inside the bag was tested for the presence of DNA evidence and compared to a buccal swab sample taken from inside the defendant's mouth. The state filed a motion in limine to determine the admissibility of the DNA evidence.
At the original hearing on the motion, the district court heard testimony from the state's expert witness and took the matter under advisement to review the applicable law. Subsequently, the district court denied the motion in limine, but continued the hearing to give the state a chance to produce evidence showing that the DNA analysis satisfied the criteria for admissibility. At the subsequent hearing on the motion in limine, after questioning the state's expert, the court found that the DNA analysis was reliable and could be admitted into evidence.
At trial, Sergeant Scroggins and Officer Brown testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the collection of the plastic bag from the backseat floorboard of Officer Brown's police vehicle. Randle Robillard testified that the white substance contained in the plastic bag was cocaine. Mary Jones, a forensic analyst for the Northwest Louisiana Crime Lab, was accepted as an expert in DNA analysis. Jones testified that she analyzed the DNA profiles for the swab sample taken from the defendant and for the fluid inside the bag containing the cocaine. Jones stated that the test results determined that these DNA profiles were a match.
Jones opined that the likelihood that the DNA inside the bag came from an African American male other than the defendant was one in one-point-two quadrillion and that the probability of finding the same DNA profile in a Caucasian male was one in four-hundred-seventeen trillion. The jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The defendant's motion for new trial was denied.
Subsequently, defendant was adjudicated a third felony offender. The trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence and denied a motion to reconsider the sentence. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of possession of cocaine. Defendant argues that the evidence presented raised the possibility that his DNA was found on the bag of cocaine because his sweat or spit came in contact with the bag while he was in the backseat of the patrol car.
When issues are raised on appeal both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and other trial error, the reviewing court first determines the sufficiency of the evidence. The reason is that the accused may be entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), if a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, in accord with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), could not reasonably conclude that all of the elements of the offense were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992); State v. Bosley, 29,253 (La.App.2d Cir.4/2/97), 691 So.2d 347. This court's authority to review questions of fact in a criminal case is limited to the sufficiency-of-the-evidence evaluation under Jackson v. Virginia, supra,
and does not extend to credibility determinations made by the trier of fact. LSA-Const. art. 5, § 10(B); State v. Williams, 448 So.2d 753 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984). A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury's decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Bosley, supra.
The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Owens, 30,903 (La. App.2d Cir.9/25/98), 719 So.2d 610.
575 So.2d 365 (La.1991). "Constructive possession" means the object is subject to one's dominion and control and one has knowledge...
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