State v. White
| Decision Date | 04 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2017-1292,2017-1292 |
| Citation | 2019 Ohio 1215,156 Ohio St.3d 536,130 N.E.3d 247 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. WHITE, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Introduction
{¶ 1} This appeal concerns appellant Gregory White's conviction for failure to maintain reasonable control of a vehicle, a minor misdemeanor under R.C. 4511.202. The trial court had discretion to impose a financial sanction on White, but the judgment of conviction was silent as to any sentence. The First District Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed White's appeal on the ground that the judgment of conviction was not a final, appealable order, because it did not include a sentence.
{¶ 2} We agree that the judgment of conviction was not a final, appealable order. For White to be able to appeal his conviction, the trial court must first issue a judgment of conviction that clearly and explicitly meets the requirements of State v. Lester , 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, paragraph one of the syllabus. We therefore affirm the judgment of the First District.
Relevant Background
{¶ 3} White was involved in a multi-car accident in the early morning hours of January 1, 2016. He was subsequently charged with three misdemeanors: (1) driving under suspension, a first-degree misdemeanor under R.C. 4510.11, (2) failure to stop after an accident, a first-degree misdemeanor under R.C. 4549.02, and (3) failure to maintain reasonable control of a vehicle, a minor misdemeanor under R.C. 4511.202. The driving-under-suspension charge was resolved through a plea agreement. The other two charges proceeded to a bench trial, and White was found guilty of both.
{¶ 4} Relevant to this appeal is the judgment of conviction entered for the failure-to-maintain-control conviction. In sentencing White, the trial court had the authority to impose a financial sanction, such as a fine of up to $150, or up to 30 hours of community service, but it was not required to impose either. See R.C. 2929.28(A)(2)(a)(v) ( ); R.C. 2929.27(D) ().1 The trial court was required to order White to pay court costs, R.C. 2947.23, but this court has held that costs are not part of a sentence, State v. Threatt , 108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, 843 N.E.2d 164, ¶ 15.
{¶ 5} The trial court ordered White to pay costs, but it did not impose a fine or community-service obligation. The judgment of conviction stated the following:
{¶ 6} White appealed this conviction, but the First District dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. It observed that under Crim.R. 32(C) and Lester , 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, at paragraph one of the syllabus, a judgment of conviction must contain the fact of conviction, the sentence, the judge's signature, and the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk of courts. It also noted that court costs are not considered criminal punishment and are therefore not part of a sentence. As a result, "there was no sentence imposed on [White] and thus, no conviction for the failure-to-control charge, and therefore, no final appealable order." Accordingly, the First District held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
{¶ 7} White appealed to this court, seeking review of one proposition of law:
A final appealable order for a minor misdemeanor conviction does not require a punishment; judgment of conviction for a minor misdemeanor need only include the fact of conviction, the imposition of court costs, the judge's signature, and the entry upon the journal by the clerk of courts.
{¶ 8} We accepted jurisdiction. 152 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2018-Ohio-723, 92 N.E.3d 878.
Analysis
{¶ 9} We review the First District's decision on subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State , 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 12.
{¶ 10} White argues that the First District's decision means that a judgment entry that fails to impose a fine for a minor misdemeanor is not a final judgment of conviction and cannot be appealed and that thus, for a minor-misdemeanor conviction to be appealable under the First District's decision, a trial court must impose a fine. This, he argues, is contrary to the terms of R.C. 2929.28(A), which explicitly makes the imposition of a fine discretionary, providing that "the court imposing a sentence * * * for * * * a minor misdemeanor[ ] may sentence the offender to any financial sanction or combination of financial sanctions authorized under this section" (emphasis added). See also id. ().
{¶ 11} The state disagrees. According to the state, the First District's decision does not require a fine to be imposed. It requires simply that a trial court include language in the judgment entry clearly establishing that it has decided how to exercise its discretion concerning a sentence. For example, the state suggests that if the court wishes to decline to impose a fine, it may include language such as "$0 fine," "no fine," "waive fines," or "remit fines."
{¶ 12} White counters that the imposition of costs in the judgment entry indicates that the trial court made a decision on a sentence and simply declined to impose a fine. He further argues that requiring a trial court to specifically state "$0 fine" or similar language would be "frivolous" and that nothing in the Revised Code or Crim.R. 32(C) requires any notation of what sentence the court chose not to impose. Only an actual sentence must be stated.
{¶ 13} We agree with the state. When valid, a judgment of conviction is a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B). State v. Jackson , 151 Ohio St.3d 239, 2017-Ohio-7469, 87 N.E.3d 1227, ¶ 11. Crim.R. 32(C) sets forth what must be contained in a judgment of conviction for it to be valid; it provides that "[a] judgment of conviction shall set forth the fact of conviction and the sentence" and that "[t]he judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall enter it on the journal." Accordingly, we have held that "[a] judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge's signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk." Lester , 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 14} The issue here is what, if anything, a trial court is required to state in the judgment of conviction when it chooses to exercise its discretion not to impose a financial sanction or community service as a sentence. We recognize that the judgment of conviction here imposed costs, omitted any reference to a fine or community service, and stated that the sentence was stayed pending appeal.
Initially, there is the problem of ambiguity. The judgment's reference to a stay—"STAY OF SENTENCE GRANTED PENDING APPEAL"—is ambiguous. What is stayed? Costs are not part of the sentence, but the court may have meant that the payment of costs was stayed pending appeal. Additionally, the entry's silence regarding a monetary or community-service sentence may imply that the court had exercised its discretion to decline to impose a sentence. But implication is not enough. A trial court's decision to exercise its discretion not to impose a sentence should not be communicated in the judgment of conviction passively—let alone ambiguously—through suggestion or by implication. Permitting such a practice would undermine the purpose of Crim.R. 32(C), which we have recognized is "to ensure that a defendant is on notice concerning when a final judgment has been entered and the time for filing an appeal has begun to run," Lester at ¶ 10. To ensure that the defendant is on notice of when the time to appeal has begun to run, and to avoid disputes regarding the same, clarity is required.
{¶ 15} We therefore reiterate our holding in Lester concerning the essential elements of a final, appealable judgment of conviction, and we further hold that a trial court's decision to exercise its discretion not to impose a monetary or community-service sentence must be clearly communicated in the text of the entry. No magic words are required, and there is no requirement that a fine or other sanction be imposed before it may be waived. The trial court's decision not to impose a sentence must simply be clear in the entry. For example, in this case, it would have been sufficient for the trial court to state in the entry "no fine," "fine waived," "$0 fine," or similar language. See, e.g. , State v. Jackson , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28625, 2018-Ohio-19, 2018 WL 283159, ¶ 6, 12-13 ( that a judgment of conviction was a final, appealable order when it stated that fines were waived without first stating that fines were imposed, because the entry made clear that the court had considered and fully resolved the convictions and sentence).
{¶ 16} White also makes a series of arguments concerning alleged secondary harms or problems that could result from the First District's...
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