State v. White

Decision Date20 April 2004
Docket NumberNo. 02-636.,02-636.
Citation88 P.3d 1258,2004 MT 103
PartiesSTATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert WHITE, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

For Appellant: Kirsten Mull Core, Bozeman, Montana.

For Respondent: Mike McGrath, Attorney General; John Paulson, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana.

Justice JIM RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Robert White (White) appeals the order of the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, which denied his motion to withdraw his pleas of nolo contendere. We affirm.

¶ 2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying White's motion to withdraw his pleas of nolo contendere.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The criminal charges in this case arose out of a boundary dispute between White and his neighbors, Michael and Susan Rose (Roses), involving their adjoining land near Livingston, Montana. The Roses contended that they could access a channel of the Yellowstone River through the southeastern corner of their land, which ultimately became referred to as the "disputed area." White, however, contended that he owned the land referred to as the "disputed area," and proceeded to close openings in their common fence, to apply orange paint, and to post "no trespassing" signs. After two years of escalating tensions between the parties, both the Roses and White began filing numerous complaints against each other. The proceedings were initially filed as civil complaints, but eventually evolved into criminal proceedings.

¶ 4 On August 28, 2000, White was charged with five counts of criminal mischief by amended complaint based upon allegations of tampering with property belonging to the Roses, specifically, vandalizing their common fence. On May 31, 2001, White was charged with another count of criminal mischief for a similar action of tampering.

¶ 5 On May 16, 2001, White, proceeding pro se, was found guilty of all six counts of criminal mischief following a jury trial in Justice Court. Shortly thereafter, the Roses filed two other related civil actions against White: (1) a complaint alleging trespass, slander, property damages, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (2) a complaint to quiet title to the land in dispute.

¶ 6 On June 25, 2001, White signed a stipulation in District Court granting the Roses a temporary order of protection. On July 2, 2001, White was charged with misdemeanor violation of the order of protection when the Roses observed White, on horseback, within forty yards of their back door.

¶ 7 Six months later, on December 20, 2001, White was charged by Information with two counts of stalking, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-220, MCA (2001), for acts committed against the Roses allegedly occurring between June and November, 2001. The Information stated that White had harassed and threatened both Michael and Susan Rose by repeatedly approaching their residence and fence line, pounding stakes in the "disputed area," crossing the fence line and painting the stakes orange, and driving into the Roses' driveway entrance, all in violation of the valid order of protection. The Roses also stated that a former colleague of Michael Rose informed them that White had been seeking information about Rose. Additionally, Rose observed White near their home pounding stakes on their property with two other men, and, while sitting in his truck at the front entry of their home, White taunted them and took their picture.

¶ 8 On February 5, 2002, at his initial appearance and arraignment in District Court, White, accompanied by court-appointed counsel, pled not guilty to the two felony charges of stalking, and was released on $30,000 bond. On April 9, 2002, White was appointed a court-ordered investigator.

¶ 9 On April 22, 2002, all matters were set for a two-day trial on August 12 and 13, 2002, under the following District Court cause numbers: (1) DC 01-34: the five counts of misdemeanor criminal mischief; (2) DC 02-06: the additional charge of misdemeanor criminal mischief; (3) DC 02-32: the misdemeanor violation of the order of protection; and (4) DC 01-85: the two felony stalking charges.

¶ 10 On July 15, 2002, White's court-appointed investigator, his court-appointed counsel, the deputy county attorney, and Michael Rose inspected Roses' property. In an affidavit, White's court-appointed investigator stated that on July 15, 2002, she met with the Roses on their property, walked the boundaries of the Rose property, and was shown the "disputed area" by Michael Rose. During this inspection, Rose was asked whether he had walked the boundary of the "disputed area" with Mr. Vinton, from whom Rose had purchased the property, and he replied that he had not. As noted, White was not with the group.

¶ 11 On July 16, 2002, White appeared at a change of plea hearing and entered nolo contendere pleas to four of the charges pending against him. On the same date, the parties entered into an oral plea agreement (reduced to writing on August 5, 2002) in which the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges at the time of sentencing and to recommend a lenient sentence with no incarceration or fines. Specifically, (1) in DC 01-34, White pled nolo contendere to Count V, criminal mischief, spray painting the face of a horse, along with restitution in the amount of $62.31, in exchange for the State's dismissal of the other four counts of criminal mischief and recommendation of a six-month suspended sentence to run concurrently with DC-01-85; (2) in DC 02-06, White pled nolo contendere to the charge of violating the order of protection, in exchange for the State's recommendation of a six-month sentence with imposition deferred for six months to run concurrent with all other sentences; (3) in DC 02-32, White pled nolo contendere to the charge of criminal mischief, in exchange for the State's recommendation of a six-month sentence with imposition deferred for six months to run concurrent with all other sentences; and (4) in DC 01-85, White pled nolo contendere to Count II of the Information, which accused him of stalking Michael Rose, in exchange for the State's dismissal of Count I of the Information, felony stalking of Susan Rose. The State agreed that the sentence for the stalking charge would run concurrently with all other sentences referenced in the plea agreement, and, further, that the State would recommend a one-year sentence to the Department of Corrections, with imposition deferred for one year, based upon a number of conditions designed to prevent further contact or harassment of the Roses by White. The District Court set sentencing in all four of the cases for August 13, 2002.

¶ 12 White contends that several days after he entered his pleas, he learned of Rose's statement that Rose had not walked the property with Vinton. White asserts that Rose had stated in the related quiet title civil litigation that Rose had walked the property with Vinton. White maintains that he would not have changed his not guilty pleas to nolo contendere and waived his trial rights had he known of Rose's July 15, 2002, admission. He contends Rose's statement in the earlier quiet title action constitutes a prior inconsistent statement which, White believed, seriously impacted the credibility of Rose, the State's primary witness.

¶ 13 Consequently, on August 13, 2002, the date set for sentencing in all consolidated causes, White filed a motion to withdraw all his nolo contendere pleas. The District Court heard oral argument by counsel for both White and the State, and heard testimony by White wherein he stated he wished to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas based upon the "newly discovered evidence" of Rose's inconsistent statement. He contended that knowledge of this statement would have materially affected the outcome of his trial and that, had he known of the statement, he would not have changed his pleas. The court denied the motion and proceeded to sentencing according to the plea agreement.

¶ 14 On August 28, 2002, White filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 15 Before accepting a plea of guilty, a trial court must satisfy statutory requirements such as those contained in §§ 46-12-210 and 46-16-105(1), MCA. Because a criminal defendant waives numerous constitutional rights and protections when pleading guilty, "it is a well-settled legal principle that a guilty plea must be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." State v. Radi (1991), 250 Mont. 155, 159, 818 P.2d 1203, 1206 (citing North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 165, 27 L.Ed.2d 162). Furthermore, a trial court may permit a plea of guilty to be withdrawn before or after judgment, for good cause shown. Section 46-16-105(2), MCA. "The fundamental purpose of allowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea is to prevent the possibility of convicting an innocent [person]." State v. Bowley (1997), 282 Mont. 298, 304, 938 P.2d 592, 595.

¶ 16 The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a plea is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. State v. Keys, 1999 MT 10, ¶ 11, 293 Mont. 81, ¶ 11, 973 P.2d 812, ¶ 11. To determine whether good cause existed and whether a district court abused its discretion by denying a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we consider three factors: (1) the adequacy of the court's interrogation at the time the plea was entered regarding the defendant's understanding of the consequences of the plea; (2) the promptness with which the defendant attempts to withdraw the plea; and (3) the fact that the plea was the result of a plea bargain in which the guilty plea was given in exchange for dismissal of another charge. Bowley, 282 Mont. at 304, 938 P.2d at 595. We have not established a rule or standard under which a trial court must address a request to...

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  • State v. Martin
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • October 19, 2004
    ...timeliness of Martin's motion is not challenged. Further, promptness of a motion, alone, does not outweigh the other two factors. State v. White, 2004 MT 103, ¶ 18, 321 Mont. 45, ¶ 18, 88 P.3d 1258, ¶ 18 (quoting State v. Keys, 1999 MT 10, ¶ 21, 293 Mont. 81, ¶ 21, 973 P.2d 812, ¶ 21). Ther......

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