State v. Whitman
| Decision Date | 30 April 1984 |
| Citation | 475 N.E.2d 486,16 Ohio App.3d 246,16 OBR 269 |
| Parties | , 16 O.B.R. 269 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. WHITMAN, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. To properly evaluate the admission of expert testimony evidence related to "rape trauma syndrome," it must be subjected to the following tests: Whether or not the evidence (1) is relevant and material, (2) is within the view of the average layman, (3) has acceptable scientific reliability, and (4) has probative value that outweighs its prejudicial impact.
2. Evid.R. 702 provides that the expert witness may testify as to scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The rule recognizes that the expert may give an exposition of relevant principles leaving the trier of fact to apply the principles to the facts found.
3. A reviewing court is not permitted to reverse a judgment of conviction unless it shall affirmatively appear from the record that the accused was prejudiced thereby or was prevented from having a fair trial.
John E. Shoop, Pros. Atty., for appellee.
Spiros E. Gonakis and David J. Lombardo, Euclid, for appellant.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Lake County, in which after a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of counts one and two, kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01, and counts three and four, rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(3). He was sentenced to seven to twenty-five years in the Ohio State Penitentiary on count two, to run concurrently with counts three and four. Defendant was also sentenced to life imprisonment in the Ohio State Penitentiary on counts three and four. Counts three and four are to run consecutively with each other. The court found no separate animus in the commission of count one and handed down a sentence of conviction only as to count three.
During the late hours of March 6 1982 or early morning hours of March 7, 1982, the defendant allegedly engaged in sexual intercourse with the twelve-year-old babysitter of his estranged wife. The rape occurred in the defendant's marital residence.
Likewise, on March 22, 1982, the defendant allegedly forced the same babysitter to engage in sexual intercourse. March 27, 1982, the girl told her mother about the rapes and two days later was examined by a physician. The girl was referred to the counseling service of the Lake County Mental Health Department.
On April 23, 1982, the defendant was charged with two counts of kidnapping, two counts of rape, and one count of gross sexual imposition. On September 9, 1982, the jury returned guilty verdicts on the rape and kidnapping counts. This appeal followed.
The defendant's first, third, and sixth assignments of error will be discussed together. They are without merit.
All of these assignments relate to alleged errors in the admission of evidence.
To properly evaluate the admission of expert testimony evidence related to "rape trauma syndrome," it must be subjected to the following tests: Whether or not the evidence (1) is relevant and material, (2) is within the view of the average layman, (3) has acceptable scientific reliability, and (4) has probative value that outweighs its prejudicial impact.
The testimony is clearly relevant and material to the alleged rape. The post-shock reactions of a rape victim are important to a proper corroboration of testimony of the victim that she was, in fact, raped. Likewise, these reactions may manifest themselves in a lesser degree when observed by the average layman. Expert opinion is necessary to properly interpret the reactions. This is probably more important in child rape cases than in adult situations.
Review of the handbooks, journals, and textbooks cited by the appellee successfully rebut the defendant's claim of a lack of scientific foundation or knowledge on the subject matter. The American Medical Association adding the understanding and treatment of rape victims exhibiting rape trauma syndrome is additional proof of the vitality of the theory.
Lastly, it is clear that although the admission of evidence of this nature has a prejudicial impact on the defendant's claim of innocence, the probative value of this testimony clearly outweighs the prejudicial impact.
As noted in the discussion above, the testimony of the expert witness tended to explain the psychological trauma experienced by the rape victim.
Any error committed by admission of results of the time it took two boys to run from nearby Lawsons to the defendant's marital home is harmless in nature. We find no error.
Finally, admission of evidence of other acts of the defendant is proper pursuant to R.C. 2945.59. That section states in pertinent part: "In any criminal case in which the defendant's motive or intent, the absence of mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan, or system in doing an act is material, any acts of the defendant which tend to show his motive or intent, * * * may be proved, whether they are contemporaneous with or prior or subsequent thereto, notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend to show the commission of another crime by the defendant."
The second assignment of error presented by the defendant is with merit.
The defendant contends that the testimony of Cindy Schmidt was improperly admitted by the trial court. The court treated Schmidt as if she were a qualified expert in the study of rape trauma syndrome, although that is clearly not the case. Schmidt testified to the following:
Nonetheless, she was permitted to testify to the following:
Our main focus of work was around Melanie's suicidal thoughts.
The court erred in admitting this testimony, in that the manner of its presentation added credibility to the evidence that was unwarranted. It therefore tended to prejudice the defendant's case. The time honored principle related to admission of expert testimony is contained in Hartford Protection Ins. Co. v. Harmer (1853), 2 Ohio St. 452, and reiterated in the Staff Note to Evid.R. 702, as follows:
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