State v. Wiernasz

• Decision Date: 27 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. C0-97-1092,C0-97-1092
• Citation: 584 N.W.2d 1
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Kathleen Ann WIERNASZ, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 1

584 N.W.2d 1

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Kathleen Ann WIERNASZ, Respondent.

No. C0-97-1092.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 27, 1998.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

Use by police of results of polygraph test to induce suspect to confess did not convert a noncustodial setting into a custodial setting requiring the giving of a Miranda warning.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Atty., Michael Richardson, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for appellant.

William E. McGee, Hennepin County Chief Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

OPINION

BLATZ, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the state of a pretrial order suppressing evidence in the prosecution of the defendant, Kathleen Ann Wiernasz, for second-degree intentional murder in the death of her just-born child. The issue is whether what otherwise would have been a noncustodial interrogation of Wiernasz became custodial, thereby requiring the giving of a Miranda warning, when the police began their questioning by telling Wiernasz about the results of a voluntary polygraph test she had just completed. Specifically, the police indicated that there was a 100% likelihood Wiernasz had been deceptive in responding to a question regarding whether she had done anything to cause her baby to stop breathing. Affirming the trial court's suppression order, the court of appeals concluded that the interrogation was custodial and that police therefore should have given Wiernasz a Miranda warning before questioning her. State v. Wiernasz, 1998 WL 15912 (Minn.App.1998). In independently reviewing the trial court's determination regarding custody and the need for a Miranda warning, State v. Shoen, 578 N.W.2d 708, 716 (Minn.1998), we hold that the police statement about the results of the lie detector test did not convert the interrogation into a custodial interrogation. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals affirming suppression of the confession and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

In December of 1995, Wiernasz, a divorced mother of two teenagers, learned she was pregnant. In the following months, Wiernasz kept her pregnancy a secret, wearing a corset and loose clothing to conceal her condition. On July 18, 1996, paramedics were called to Wiernasz's Minneapolis house after her sister found her unconscious and the just-born baby dead. When paramedics arrived, they found the dead baby, which appeared to have been washed, in a paper bag.

Detectives Zimmer and VanSlyke, of the Hennepin County Sheriff's Office and Minneapolis Police Department respectively, interviewed Wiernasz in the Minneapolis homicide office on July 31, 1996. We are not concerned with Wiernasz's statements during that interrogation but with incriminating statements she made in a video taped interrogation that occurred at the station house on August 15, 1996.

The detectives made arrangements with Wiernasz to meet with them voluntarily on August 15 for a polygraph test and a second interview. Wiernasz was given the choice of coming to the station on her own or being picked up and driven there by a police officer. She chose the latter option. After the completion of the polygraph test, police took Wiernasz to the interview room, where she waited for approximately 15 minutes by herself before Detectives Zimmer and VanSlyke entered the room.

At the start of the interrogation, the detectives advised Wiernasz that they would tell her the results of the polygraph test but first they wanted to remind her that she was not under arrest, that no matter what happened during the interview they were going to drive her home afterwards, that she was free to leave whenever she wanted, and that they were not holding her in custody. Defendant acknowledged she understood.

The detectives then told Wiernasz that the polygraph test examiner had indicated that she had been 100% deceptive in responding to a question regarding whether she did anything to cause the baby to stop breathing. The detectives added that they understood there were reasons and they wanted to get to them and get matters resolved. Wiernasz then slid up to the table at the detectives' request and they began their interrogation of her, ultimately obtaining incriminating statements from her, which we need not detail in this opinion. Later, after fingerprinting her and photographing her, the detectives took Wiernasz home. Eleven days later she was formally charged with murder in the second degree.

The trial court first decided that the interrogation was noncustodial at the outset which we agree with. But then in suppressing the incriminating statements made on August 15, the trial court concluded that once the detectives told Wiernasz that the polygraph test indicated that she had lied when she denied having done anything to cause the baby to stop breathing, Wiernasz had reason to believe she was in custody to the degree associated with a formal arrest and therefore the detectives should have given her a Miranda warning. We disagree that the detectives' statements transformed the noncustodial interrogation into a custodial interrogation.

The court of appeals, citing as its authority our decisions in State v. Champion, 533 N.W.2d 40 (Minn.1995), and State v. Rosse, 478 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn.1991), agreed with the trial court and affirmed the suppression order. However, in Champion we held that if a station house interrogation is noncustodial at the outset and police do not change any of the circumstances of the interrogation during the interrogation, they may continue asking questions after a suspect makes a significant incriminating statement without first stopping and giving the suspect a Miranda warning provided that a reasonable person under the circumstances would not believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with a formal arrest. But we cautioned that no "bright line rule" exists in determining whether a defendant is in custody. Id. at 43. Here the police did not change any of the circumstances of the interrogation during the interrogation. As in Rosse, we must then examine all the surrounding facts to determine whether there is a formal arrest or restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest and if that belief is objectively reasonable. Id. at 484 (citations omitted).

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court created a prophylactic bright-line rule requiring police to give a warning of rights before subjecting any person to "custodial interrogation." The Miranda rule, which is designed to implement the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination, uses an objective test of custody: whether the identified circumstances would prompt a reasonable person to believe that he or she was under formal arrest or restraint in freedom of movement to a degree associated with formal arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 422, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

In applying the Miranda test, the Supreme Court has held that the mere fact that the interrogation occurs at the police station does not by itself require a determination that the questioning was custodial in nature. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that parolee was not in custody when he voluntarily submitted to questioning at the police station, even though the questioning by the police occurred in a room with the door closed); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam) (holding that suspect was not in custody simply because questioning occurred at the police station or because person questioned was a prime suspect).

On the other hand, the mere fact that questioning occurred in a suspect's home does not by itself mean that the questioning was not custodial in nature. Compare Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345-47, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976) (holding that taxpayer was not in custody when IRS agents conducted an interview of him at his home) with Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325-26, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969) (holding that suspect was in custody when several police officers questioned him in his bedroom at 4:00 a.m.).

In other cases, the Supreme Court has held that a person detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop was not in custody, Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), and that a man on probation was not in custody during a required meeting between him and his probation officer, Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429-34, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984).

As the Supreme Court made clear in Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995), whether a defendant was "in custody" at the time of interrogation is a mixed question of law and fact, requiring the appellate court to apply the controlling legal standard to historical facts as determined by the trial court. ¹ In other words, an appellate court reviews a trial court's findings of historical fact relating to the circumstances of the interrogation pursuant to the clearly erroneous test ² but makes an independent review...