State v. Wigham
| Decision Date | 08 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | A20-0857 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Darrell James Wigham, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Affirmed
Mower County District Court
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Megan A. Burroughs, Assistant County Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges a restitution order issued by the district court after sentencing. We affirm.
Following a major house fire in 2018, the state charged Darrell James Wigham with one count of first-degree arson and several counts of attempted murder. Wigham entered an Alford plea1 to the first-degree arson charge and the state dismissed the remaining charges.
The house involved in the fire was a rental property. At the time of the fire, the homeowner rented out the property through a company that he owned. North Star Mutual Insurance Company insured the property. The insurance company declared the dwelling a total loss for insurance purposes.
Before sentencing, the homeowner and the insurance company each submitted an affidavit of restitution claiming monetary losses caused by the fire. The homeowner sought $71,600, including amounts for loss of rental income, loss of the value of the home, and the cost of removal of debris. The insurance company sought $71,500 for payments made to the homeowner, up to the applicable policy limits, for loss in rental income and loss of the value of the home.
At the sentencing hearing, the state requested that the issue of restitution be left open for 60 days after sentencing because of concerns regarding "[t]he way the affidavits are currently." The state told the district court that there "may be too much requested, so we will confirm that." Wigham's counsel agreed, saying, "As for the restitution, I also havesome concerns, and even some confusion, with it, so I would agree with the 60 days for that amount to be clarified before challenging it would be considered." At the end of the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed an executed sentence of 88 months in prison for the arson conviction and left restitution open for 60 days.
In September 2019, approximately five months after sentencing, the state sent a letter to the district court requesting that it issue an order requiring Wigham to pay $16,000 in restitution to the homeowner and $71,500 in restitution to the insurance company. The state did not submit any additional information but based its request on the previously filed affidavits. The next day, the district court ordered Wigham to pay the requested amounts. Wigham filed a timely challenge to the order and demanded a restitution hearing.
The district court ultimately held three restitution hearings before issuing its final order. The first hearing was brief because the prosecutor who had been handling the case was unexpectedly ill, the homeowner did not appear, and the sole witness present was a representative of the insurance company who only had limited involvement with the homeowner's claim. At the hearing, Wigham argued that the state waived the issue of restitution by failing to file its request with the district court within 60 days of the sentencing hearing. The state argued that it had not waived restitution because the victims' affidavits had been submitted before the expiration of the 60 days. The district court declined to rule on Wigham's timeliness argument and instead set the matter for a second hearing.
At the second restitution hearing, the homeowner did not appear again due to an out-of-state family emergency. Only one witness testified at the second hearing—arepresentative of the insurance company who prepared the property loss report concerning the fire. The representative testified that the home was valued at approximately $145,000 and was a total loss. The representative further testified that the insurance company paid the homeowner $65,000 for property loss and $6,500 for lost rent, for a total of $71,500. At the hearing, Wigham renewed his argument that the district court lacked authority to order restitution outside of the 60-day period for which the matter was left open. The state argued that the court retained authority to order restitution under Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(b) (2018), because the "true extent of the victim[s'] loss[es]" was not known at the time of sentencing. Wigham disagreed, maintaining that the true extent of the victims' losses was known at sentencing. The district court continued the matter for a final hearing to allow the homeowner to testify.
At the third hearing, the homeowner testified about the exact nature of his losses resulting from the arson and explained how those amounts differed from the numbers presented in his affidavit. In his affidavit, the homeowner specified $71,600 in losses including: $21,600 in lost rent ($600/month for three years), $35,000 in property value not covered by insurance (in his affidavit, he estimated the value of his home to be $100,000 and indicated that he had received an insurance payment of $65,000), and $15,000 in debris-removal costs. In a separate section of the same affidavit, the homeowner inconsistently claimed only $16,000 in uncompensated losses. At the hearing, the homeowner clarified and revised the amount of his losses. The homeowner testified to the following losses: $1,300 in unpaid rent that was not compensated by insurance, $35,000 in dwelling value that was not paid for by insurance, $15,000 for property-cleanup costsfollowing the fire, and $12,000 to replace part of the sidewalk and street curb—a new cost incurred by the homeowner after the filing of his affidavit. These amounts added up to $63,300, which is less than the $71,600 specified by the homeowner in his affidavit. At the hearing, the homeowner further testified that he was requesting only $16,000 in restitution even though his uncompensated losses were greater than that amount.2 After the homeowner testified, the parties presented closing arguments and the district court took the matter under advisement.
In its final order, the district court ordered Wigham to pay a total of $87,500 in restitution: $16,000 to the homeowner and $71,500 to the insurance company. In the accompanying memorandum, the district court explained that, at the time of sentencing, "it appeared obvious to the Court (and apparently to the parties as well) that there was some 'doubling up' between" the homeowner and the insurance company. The district court stated that it "could have ordered [Wigham] to pay $143,100 at the time of sentencing, which was the total amount of the two affidavits" but instead "reserved the restitution order for 'clarification.'" The district court also rejected Wigham's argument that the state waived the issue of restitution by failing to make a filing within 60 days of sentencing. After "balancing the interests of [Wigham] and the victims," the district court concluded that there was no unfair prejudice to Wigham in ordering restitution in the amount of$87,500 because "it is considerably less than the total amount of $143,100" set forth in the victims' affidavits. The court concluded that if it adopted Wigham's position and ordered no restitution because of the state's neglect in not making a filing within the 60-day post-sentencing window, "the only parties who would be prejudiced are the victims, the only ones who have committed no wrong or negligence, and that would not be fair or just." This appeal follows.
Wigham challenges the district court's restitution order, arguing that (1) the district court lacked authority to order Wigham to pay restitution after sentencing, (2) the district court failed to consider Wigham's ability to pay; and (3) the district court abused its discretion by ordering Wigham to pay losses sustained by the homeowner's business rather than by the homeowner individually. Because we conclude that the district court had the authority to order Wigham to pay restitution after sentencing and considered his ability to pay, and we conclude that he forfeited his remaining argument not brought before the district court, we affirm.
A district court's authority to order restitution to victims of a crime is governed by Minn. Stat. § 611A.04. Wigham argues that the district court exceeded its statutory authority when it ordered him to pay restitution because the district court issued the restitution order after Wigham was sentenced. The state argues that the district court had the authority under Minn. Stat. § 611A.04 to order post-sentence restitution because thetrue extent of the victims' losses was unknown at the time of sentencing. We agree with the state.
"A district court has broad discretion to award restitution, and the district court's order will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). "The district court's factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. Questions "concerning the authority of the district court to order restitution are questions of law subject to de novo review." Id.
Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(b), "sets forth three conditions that must be fulfilled for a district court to order restitution after a sentencing hearing." Id. at 914. Those conditions are:
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