State v. Wilcox
| Decision Date | 23 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 31649-4-I,31649-4-I |
| Citation | 71 Wn.App. 116,856 P.2d 1104 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Marty R. WILCOX, Respondent. Division 1 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
David R. Needy, Pros. Atty., and Morgan Witt, Mount Vernon, for appellant.
Donald J. Bisagna, Mount Vernon, for respondent.
The State appeals an order dismissing the case with prejudice based upon failure to bring the juvenile respondent to trial within the juvenile speedy trial rule. We accelerate review pursuant to RAP 18.12 and affirm.
On April 30, 1991, Marty Wilcox was arraigned in the juvenile division of Whatcom County Superior Court on one count of indecent liberties.
Receiving an unfavorable ruling on a pretrial evidentiary issue, the State sought interlocutory review in this court, as well as a stay of the speedy trial period. On August 31, 1991, a commissioner of this court granted the motion, ruling that the speedy trial period was stayed until issuance of the mandate.
This court issued a decision on July 13, 1992. On September 1, 1992, the mandate issued.
A trial date was set for September 29, 1992. On that same day, the defense moved to dismiss for failure to bring Wilcox to trial within the 17 days remaining of the 60-day period, i.e., on or before September 18.
On October 1, 1992, a commissioner issued a memorandum decision granting the defense motion to dismiss. The State appeals.
Under the juvenile speedy trial rule, JuCR 7.8, a juvenile must be brought to trial within 30 days of arraignment if held in detention and within 60 days otherwise. JuCR 7.8(b). The juvenile speedy trial rule is shorter than the adult 60/90 day rule because it is designed to promote the juvenile justice system's goal of prompt adjudication. State v. Chavez, 111 Wash.2d 548, 555, 761 P.2d 607 (1988).
At issue in this case is whether the case was set for trial within the juvenile speedy trial rule once the appellate stay was lifted. JuCR 7.8 is silent regarding the impact of an appellate court stay.
The question then becomes whether the adult speedy trial rule, CrR 3.3, should apply to fill in the gap in the juvenile rule. See, JuCR 1.4(b) ()
CrR 3.3 contains two separate provisions concerning appellate court stays. The first, CrR 3.3(d)(4), provides for a new speedy trial period upon the lifting of an appellate stay. The rule reads:
Trial After Appeal or Stay. If a cause is remanded for trial after an appellate court accepts review or stays proceedings, the defendant shall be brought to trial not later than 60 days after that appearance by or on behalf of the defendant in superior court, with notice to both parties of any such appearance, which next follows receipt by the clerk of the superior court of the mandate or other written order, if after such appearance the defendant is detained in jail, or not later than 90 days after such appearance if the defendant is thereafter released whether or not subject to conditions of release.
The State relies upon CrR 3.3(d)(4), arguing that upon issuance of the mandate a new speedy trial period commences. Recognizing that the 60/90 day period in CrR 3.3(d)(4) is inconsistent with the 30/60 day period of JuCR 7.8(b), the State suggests that when the rule is applied to juvenile offenders, the speedy trial periods should be reduced to the shorter juvenile periods.
The second provision at issue, CrR 3.3(g)(5), conflicts with CrR 3.3(d)(4) because rather than establishing a new speedy trial period, it provides that an appellate stay tolls the speedy trial period. The rule reads:
(g) Excluded Periods. The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for arraignment and the time for trial:
(5) Delay resulting from a stay granted by an appellate court.
Wilcox argues that under CrR 3.3(g)(5), when the stay lifted, the court was required to set a trial date within the 17 days remaining of the original 60 days. Because the September 29 trial date exceeded the speedy trial period by 11 days, Wilcox argues the commissioner properly dismissed the case.
As discussed below, we find that CrR 3....
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State v. Hoffman, 20561-4-III.
...witnesses and otherwise prepare. Indeed, resort to JuCr 7.8(e)(2)(iii) for this type of problem is suggested in State v. Wilcox, 71 Wash.App. 116, 119, 856 P.2d 1104 (1993). The trial court did not abuse its discretion granting the Third, while both sides correctly point to gaps between the......
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State v. Harris
...resolution of juvenile offense proceedings, which in turn promotes rehabilitation of the juvenile offender." State v. Wilcox, 71 Wash.App. 116, 119, 856 P.2d 1104 (1993). See also State v. Adamski, 111 Wash.2d 574, 761 P.2d 621 (1988). "While the specific rights conferred by the rule are no......
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State v. Stafford, No. 54111-1-I (WA 6/27/2005)
...resolution of juvenile offense proceedings, which in turn promotes rehabilitation of the juvenile offender.' State v. Wilcox, 71 Wn. App. 116, 119, 856 P.2d 1104 (1993). The determination of whether a defendant's time for trial has passed requires an application of court rules to particular......
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State v. Detrick
...rehabilitation of the juvenile offender." State v. Harris, 130 Wash.2d 35, 43, 921 P.2d 1052 (1996) (quoting State v. Wilcox, 71 Wash.App. 116, 119, 856 P.2d 1104 (1993)). If the juvenile court violates this rule, the information must be dismissed with prejudice. JuCR The right to speedy tr......