State v. Wilkerson

• Decision Date: 27 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 20190633-CA,20190633-CA
• Citation: 478 P.3d 1048
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Devin Lee WILKERSON, Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

478 P.3d 1048

STATE of Utah, Appellee,

v.Devin Lee WILKERSON, Appellant.

No. 20190633-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed November 27, 2020

Bryson King and Douglas J. Thompson, Attorneys for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City, and Jonathan S. Bauer, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges David N. Mortensen and Diana Hagen concurred.

Opinion

Harris, Judge:

¶1 Under Utah law, persons who spend time incarcerated in county jails may be required to reimburse the county for "the cost of incarceration." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(6) (LexisNexis 2017) (the Pay-to-Stay Statute). After pleading guilty to one misdemeanor count of drug possession, Devin Lee Wilkerson was ordered to pay $1,939.65 to Utah County for the cost of his 111-day pre-plea detention in the Utah County Jail. Wilkerson appeals that restitution order, asserting that the Pay-to-Stay Statute does not authorize reimbursement for jail time served prior to conviction. He also asserts that the court's restitution order violated principles of due process. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 One night in August 2018, Wilkerson and a friend were skateboarding in a road near an intersection. A police officer patrolling nearby saw the two men and stopped them, believing that their skateboarding in the street was unlawful. The officer soon discovered that there was a valid warrant out for Wilkerson's arrest. The officer then arrested Wilkerson, searched him, and found methamphetamine on his person. Wilkerson was booked into the Utah County Jail that same day, and a few days later the State charged him with drug possession—which in his case was charged as a third-degree felony due to prior convictions—and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. Soon thereafter, after spending approximately sixteen days in jail, Wilkerson was released on his own recognizance while the case proceeded.

¶3 Several weeks later, Wilkerson failed to appear at a scheduled hearing in the case, and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Wilkerson was subsequently arrested and again booked into the Utah County Jail, where he spent more than ninety additional days before he posted bail. In total, Wilkerson ended up spending 111 days in the Utah County Jail, all of which took place pre-plea and pre-sentencing.

¶4 Eventually, Wilkerson negotiated a plea agreement with the State, under which the State agreed to reduce the drug possession count to a class A misdemeanor and to dismiss the paraphernalia count, and Wilkerson agreed to plead to the reduced charge of attempted drug possession. The court sentenced Wilkerson on the same day he entered his plea. The court ordered Wilkerson to serve a one-year jail sentence, but suspended that sentence and placed Wilkerson on probation. Among other conditions of probation, the court ordered Wilkerson to "serve 111 days in jail," but gave Wilkerson credit for the 111 days he had already served, and did not require Wilkerson to spend any additional time in jail.

¶5 At the sentencing hearing, which took place in July 2019, Wilkerson's counsel anticipated that the State would ask for reimbursement under the Pay-to-Stay Statute, noting that "because [Wilkerson] has now been convicted of a misdemeanor, he is subject to restitution requirements" under that statute. Counsel noted that the statute exempted individuals who did not have "the ability to pay," but acknowledged that Wilkerson had the ability to make reimbursement payments. Instead of asserting that the statute was inapplicable to Wilkerson on indigency grounds, counsel asked "for the Court to make a finding that [the Pay-to-Stay Statute] does not apply in a case where a defendant does not receive further time after conviction that results in incarceration at a county jail facility." The State took the opposite position, asserting that the statute authorized reimbursement even for pre-conviction incarceration, so long as the defendant was eventually convicted of the crime that was holding him in jail and sentenced to serve a period of time that included the time already served.

¶6 After hearing arguments of counsel, the court declined to immediately rule on the issue, ordering Wilkerson's sentence stayed until it could resolve the reimbursement issue. The court invited the parties to submit briefing on the question of the applicability of the Pay-to-Stay Statute, which invitation both parties accepted. After reviewing the parties' briefing, the court sided with the State, and issued a written order commanding Wilkerson to pay restitution for the 111 days he served in jail, an amount the State computed to be $1,939.65.

¶7 Wilkerson then filed a motion to vacate the restitution portion of his sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, asserting that the restitution order was illegal and that it violated principles of due process. However, Wilkerson advanced only the same argument that he had advanced before, in his post-sentence brief: that he was "not subject to" the Pay-to-Stay Statute because "he was not actually incarcerated at the county jail following sentencing." Thus, the only asserted due process violation he identified was the court's application of the statute to him under these circumstances. The court denied Wilkerson's motion in a written order.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶8 Wilkerson appeals the restitution order, and asks us to review two issues. First, he asserts that the district court incorrectly interpreted and applied the Pay-to-Stay Statute. "We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." Grimm v. DxNA LLC , 2018 UT App 115, ¶ 14, 427 P.3d 571 (quotation simplified). Second, Wilkerson appeals the denial of his post-sentencing motion that invoked both rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and due process. We review the court's denial of that motion for correctness.

See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network , 2012 UT 84, ¶ 105, 299 P.3d 990 ("Generally, due process issues present questions of law that we review for correctness." (quotation simplified)); see also State v. Walton , 2019 UT App 187, ¶ 14, 455 P.3d 1066 ("We review the denial of a rule 22(e) motion for correctness.").

ANALYSIS

I

¶9 Wilkerson first asserts that the Pay-to-Stay Statute, by its terms, does not apply to him, and that the district court therefore erred when it ordered him to reimburse the county for the time he spent in jail. That statute, in relevant part, reads as follows:

In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, ... the defendant shall pay restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration and costs of medical care provided to the defendant while in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing if ... the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the county correctional facility.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(6)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2017). Wilkerson interprets this statute as authorizing reimbursement only for jail time served following conviction and sentence. The State, by contrast, sees no such restriction in the statutory language, and asserts that the district court correctly ordered restitution here.

¶10 As we consider this question of statutory interpretation, we keep in mind our supreme court's instruction that "the point of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature." In re adoption of B.H. , 2020 UT 64, ¶ 31, 474 P.3d 981 (quotation simplified). And the best evidence of legislative intent is the language our legislature used to express that intent. See Hertzske v. Snyder , 2017 UT 4, ¶ 10, 390 P.3d 307 ("The best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statutes themselves."). When the statutory language is unambiguous, we do "not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent" because "we are guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed according to its plain language." State v. Malo , 2020 UT 42, ¶ 22, 469 P.3d 982 (quotation simplified); see also Scott v. Scott , 2017 UT 66, ¶ 22, 423 P.3d 1275 ("When we can ascertain the intent of the legislature from the statutory terms alone, no other interpretive tools are needed, and our task of statutory construction is typically at an end." (quotation simplified)). But if the relevant statutory language is ambiguous, "we generally resort to other modes of statutory construction and seek guidance from legislative history and other accepted sources." Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship , 2011 UT 50, ¶ 15, 267 P.3d 863 (quotation simplified).

¶11 A statute is considered ambiguous if "its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain language analysis." Id. ; see also Sachs v. Lesser , 2008 UT 87, ¶ 17, 207 P.3d 1215 ("A statute is ambiguous when it may reasonably be understood to have two or more plausible meanings." (quotation simplified)). A party's "suggested interpretation" of a statute is not reasonable, however, when it "contradicts the plain language of the statute." State v. Watkins , 2013 UT 28, ¶ 27, 309 P.3d 209, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Christensen v. Juab School Dist. , 2017 UT 47, ¶ 14, 424 P.3d 108 ; cf. Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 2006 UT 20, ¶ 17, 133 P.3d 428 (stating, in the context of contractual interpretation, that "to merit consideration as an interpretation that creates an ambiguity, the alternative rendition must be based upon the usual and natural meaning of the language used and may not be the result of a forced and strained construction" (quotation simplified)).

¶12 Here, Wilkerson argues that the relevant statutory language is ambiguous, and can be reasonably interpreted in two different ways. Wilkerson acknowledges the State's interpretation: that the statute authorizes reimbursement for jail time spent both "before...