State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 15 February 1907 |
| Parties | STATE v. WILLIAMS. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Aiken County; Watts Judge.
James Williams was convicted of murder, and appeals. Affirmed.
H. W Rice and Sawyer & Owens, for appellant. James E. Davis and Hendersons, for the State.
The defendant, James Williams, was convicted at the winter term of the court of general sessions for Aiken county of the murder of E. H. Fisher. Fred Dunbar, who was jointly charged in the same indictment, being at the time a fugitive from justice, was not put on trial. Williams appeals to this court, charging error in the refusal of the motion for continuance, in the admission of evidence in the charge to the jury, and in the refusal to order a new trial. The alleged excited state of the public mind at the time of the trial has emphasized the duty, which always presses on this court, to seek for any error that may have been prejudicial to a defendant when the issue is life or death. While only a very few of the 32 grounds of appeal have been argued by the zealous counsel for the appellant, we shall endeavor to consider all of the alleged errors, without referring specifically to the exceptions.
The issues will be understood from the following brief statement of the circumstances of the homicide: At the instance of Fisher, the deceased, J. H. Eidson, magistrate, issued a warrant for the arrest of Barney Dunbar on the charge of stealing a mule, the property of one Paul Frazier, on which property Fisher held a mortgage. The magistrate, at the request of Fisher, by special appointment, deputized A. M. Black to execute the warrant. Black, accompanied by Fisher, went in the nighttime to the house of Barney Dunbar for the purpose of making the arrest. On the first visit he failed to find Barney Dunbar. On returning to the house later in the night, Black entered and arrested Barney Dunbar, who submitted without resistance. Just as the arrest was made, or immediately thereafter, Fisher entered and was mortally wounded by a shot or shots fired by some person or persons from the other room of the house. The state offered evidence in support of its contention that Fisher was not present for the purpose of attempting to aid in making the arrest, but was with the officer merely to identify Barney Dunbar, and went into the house only to aid the officer when he supposed him to be in peril, and that he was shot by defendant and Fred Dunbar or some other person without legal provocation. For the defense, testimony was offered to the effect that Williams was not present when the shooting occurred, and had nothing whatever to do with it. On the part of the defendant, it was also contended that there was no legal warrant for the arrest of Barney Dunbar; that Black and Fisher had invaded his dwelling house as trespassers; and, further, that, even if the warrant was legal, Fisher was killed in the house of the person whose arrest it required, while attempting to serve the warrant, in violation of section 35 of the Criminal Code of 1902, which provides: "No magistrate shall deputize the person swearing out a warrant in any case to serve the same." As we understand, counsel for appellant rely mainly on alleged errors of the circuit judge respecting the alleged invalidity of the warrant.
1. The magistrate, Eidson, testified, without contradiction, that the oath of Fisher to the affidavit on which the warrant was issued was made before him, the warrant itself issued, and the special constable appointed by him before the arrest of Barney Dunbar. The affidavit, the warrant, and the appointment were all on one sheet of paper. When the paper was offered and received in evidence as "the warrant," it was properly considered by the circuit court that the whole paper with all it contained was meant and understood to be in evidence. If the warrant, affidavit, and appointment had not been properly proved when they were introduced, the defect in the proof was afterwards fully supplied by the evidence of the magistrate. The circuit judge charged as to the warrant and arrest as follows: "I charge you, as matter of law, that if you believe the warrant which has been introduced in evidence here was issued by the magistrate, and that he deputized Constable Black to execute it, and the affidavit was signed by Mr. Fisher, I charge you that was a legal warrant, and it charged Barney Dunbar and Chris Lowe with grand larceny." The point is made that signing the affidavit was not equivalent to swearing to it, as the law contemplates. The objection to the language of the charge is hypercritical. It is true, signing is not the equivalent of swearing, but the court said the ""affidavit" must be signed, and the word "affidavit" means a written statement sworn to. In view of the fact that the magistrate testified Fisher did take the oath in this case, and that there is no proof to the contrary, if the defendant wished to have the distinction between swearing and signing the affidavit laid before the jury, he should have called the matter to the attention of the court. For a like reason the objection cannot avail that in another part of the charge the circuit judge said: "If this warrant was issued by the magistrate and signed by Mr. Fisher, and the magistrate deputized Mr. Black to execute it, then Black had a right to arrest the parties charged with the commission of this offense, larceny of live stock, on Sunday." The jury could not fail to understand signing of the affidavit was meant.
2. It is insisted the circuit judge charged on the facts to the prejudice of the defendant, in saying to the jury: "I charge you that, as a matter of law, whenever a warrant is issued, and it is a valid warrant, and this is a valid warrant, if it was issued, then it is the duty of the party charged with the commission of any offense in the warrant to submit to the officers of the law." Just before using these words, the circuit judge had, in the most explicit language, left it to the jury to say whether the requirements of law necessary to make the warrant of arrest valid had been complied with. It seems hardly reasonable to suppose the jury would have thought he meant, in the next breath, to take away from them the consideration of that question. But, assuming that the language of the circuit judge is correctly reported, and that the jury might have drawn such an inference, it does not follow there was reversible error; for, as we have already said, the affidavit of the prosecutor, the issuance of the warrant, and the appointment of the deputy, had been proved by the best possible evidence--the sworn statement of the magistrate who issued it--and there was not a scintilla of evidence to even cast suspicion on it. Under these conditions, it surely cannot be...
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