State v. Williams, 89-3282

• Decision Date: 12 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-3282,89-3282
• Citation: 566 So.2d 1348
• Parties: 15 Fla. L. Weekly D2329 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Howard L. WILLIAMS, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1348

566 So.2d 1348

15 Fla. L. Weekly D2329

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Howard L. WILLIAMS, Appellee.

No. 89-3282.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Sept. 12, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 22, 1990.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Carolyn J. Mosley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellant.

Barbara M. Linthicum, Public Defender and Paula S. Saunders, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellee.

WIGGINTON, Judge.

The state appeals an order granting appellee a new trial due to the trial judge's failure to hold a hearing pursuant to State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984) after appellee objected to the state's use of peremptory challenges against black jurors. We reverse.

The record shows that appellee is a black male. During his trial on an armed robbery charge, the state used peremptory challenges to strike three black jurors during jury selection. Six blacks were in the prospective jury pool and three of them actually served on the six-person jury. The state did not use all of its peremptory challenges.

In objecting to the striking of the three black jurors, defense counsel asserted that their voir dire statements did not indicate any valid reasons to strike them and that "the only reason they are being stricken is due to their color." The trial judge offered the prosecutor the opportunity to state a rationale for striking them. The prosecutor declined, maintaining that a systematic exclusion of blacks was not evident especially in light of the fact that he had stricken only three blacks and had left three other blacks on the jury. The judge agreed that no systematic exclusion of jurors on the basis of race had occurred and that the defense had not made a prima facie showing that the state was excluding the jurors only because of their race. He did not conduct any further inquiry into the matter.

After the guilty verdict was rendered, defense counsel moved for a new trial alleging, in pertinent part, that the court erred in not requiring the state to set forth its reasons for challenging peremptorily the three black jurors merely because the state had left three other black jurors on the panel. At the motion hearing, defense counsel argued that no matter how many black jurors are left on the jury, the trial judge must examine the exclusion of each individual black juror and should hold a full Neil hearing anytime the defense raises an objection, based on racial grounds, to the peremptory exclusion of a juror. The state responded that since the judge did not find a strong likelihood that the jurors were being stricken only because of race, there was no necessity to hold a Neil hearing. The state also argued that the record clearly showed that the peremptory challenges were exercised for valid reasons--one of the jurors knew the defendant in high school, another expressed that she was afraid to sit on the jury, and the third had a relative that had been charged with a crime. The judge specifically stated that, having observed the voir dire examinations, he was aware that appropriate reasons for the strikes existed and he did not find the striking of the three black jurors by the state to be...